CONDUCT OF WAR.

Ashburton Guardian, Volume 64, Issue 212, 19 June 1944, Page 3

CONDUCT OF WAR.

NAZIS MAKE MANY ERRORS.

DEFEATS NOT ACCIDENTAL

WASHINGTON, May 25

The defeats Germany is now suffering are not accidental, but reveal the enemy’s immense miscalculations in his entire method of conducting war. A leading Soviet officer, General Galationov, made this comment in a statement issued by the Russian Embassy at Washington, dealing with the shortcomings in Nazi strategy.

General Galaktionov declares that the chief shortcoming in Nazi strategy is “the discrepancy between its objectives and its means.”

He adds: “The Nazis base their calculations on epheremal factors; on outstripping their enemie& in preparations for war and on speed of action, and on creating numerical superiority in different war theatres.

Permanent Factors. ‘They display a complete disregard for the permanent factors —the moral and political state of their troops and the home front and the correlation of forces and material resources." The Germans planned to overcome the discrepancy between their resources and those of their opponents: (1) By building a military machine able to win swift campaigns. (2) By crushing their enemies one by one. ‘They admitted the possibility that fronts might be established, but they excluded'the possibility that these fronts might become stabilised for longer periods,” stated the Soviet gen- j eral. “They based their calculations on j the German war machine’s supposed j ability to break through swiftly and i destroy any front, however strong.

"It was an adventurist distortion of military theory. The defeats Germany is suffering are not accidental, but reveal immense miscalculations in the enemy's entire method of conducting war.”

No Provision for Surprises,

General Galaktionov pointed out that the Germans counted on the blitzkrieg as a perfect formula, and made no provision against unpleasant surprises.

Then they blundered into the deadly error of attempting a static defence when their offensive strategy backfired. Ho claims that, whereas the Germans learned nothing, the Russians learned much from German failures, Soviet armies shattered the Nazi plan for preventing a breakthrough by extending the attack to adjacent areas and by confronting the Gorman High Command with ever-expanding threats on an over-widening front. The Rns-j sians also simultaneously developed j tile offensive in depth, thereby shattering German plans for rapid manoeu- ! vring of their reserves in rear areas.