Ashburton Guardian Magna est Veritas et Prævalebit. FRIDAY, JANUARY 23, 1942. A NAVAL PROBLEM.

Ashburton Guardian, Volume 62, Issue 87, 23 January 1942, Page 2

Ashburton Guardian Magna est Veritas et Prævalebit. FRIDAY, JANUARY 23, 1942. A NAVAL PROBLEM.

The situation in Malaya clearly shows the necessity of united naval action to obtain command of the sea, for the repeated landings made by the Japanese add to the danger to Singapore. It has been said that the landings are possible because the nature of the coast provides abundant shelter for small craft, but the fact remains that the enemy can avail himself of local conditions only because he has accomplished safe transport over long distances by sea. The decision at Washington for the pooling of naval forces should enable the Allies to meet the position by the formation of a battle fleet for operations in Far Eastern waters. Neither Britain <ior the United States alone can provide such fleet. It could not be supplied so long as each continued to work on defence problems severally. British capital strength would be fully occu-„ pied in the Atlantic and the Mediterranean, American in the Atlantic and East Pacific, leaving no sufficient capital surplus for the Far East. The whole position is changed when the two Allies share defensive tasks and pool their navies for the purpose. In combination they can dispose of sufficient force in Western waters to contain the Axis fleets and still release a battle fleet for the Far East strong enough to give them preponderance. The calculation can be roughly made on the basis of capital ships. Britain and America probably have thirty in commission, against a Japanese maximum of twelve, which may have been reduced to ten. It would appear that the Allies could detach a fleet sufficient to deal decisively with the Japanese while still maintaining superiority in the West. Of course, the problem is not as simple as that. It is, in fact, infinitely complex. Not only would battleships have to be detached, but also complementary auxiliary forces —aircraft-carriers, cruisers, destroyers and other auxiliaries —forces whose subtraction from the Battle of the Atlanaic might open a dangerous opportunity for German submarines, bombers and raiders. If such questions can be answered, there remains another great difficulty to overcome. A Far Eastern battle fleet of the requisite dimensions must be provided with adequate bases within the Far Eastern zone of operations. Singapore, the only base adequately equipped, cannot be used until the enemy has been driven away from its near approaches. Can Sourabaya, Darwin or Sydney be rapidly raised to the requisite standard and play the role intended for Singapore? The difficulties are enormous, but so are the issues at stake.