DUNKIRK EVACUATION

Ashburton Guardian, Volume 62, Issue 6, 18 October 1941, Page 3

DUNKIRK EVACUATION

PRECEDING ACTIONS. THE EXPEDITIONARY FORCE. IN FRANCE AND BELGIUM. VISCOUNT GOUT’S DISPATCHES. (P.A.) ' WELLINGTON, Oct. 17. The story of Great Britain’s battle against Nazi Germany in France and Belgium is now told in Viscount Gort’s dispatches (France and Belgium, 193940), which have been issued as a supplement to the London Gazette. The following is a summary of the dispatches. The story of the Dunkirk evacuation epic of land, sea, and air, has long been known, and is to-day part of British history, but details of the three weeks’ battle which preceded it have not been set forth in continuous and authoritative form until now, when, with the publication of Lord Gort’s official dispatches, the whole narrative is given to the world. No man of British birth will read it without the profoundest emotion and pride. Briefly, because of the. break through upon a part of the Allied line remote from their own, the British Expeditionary Force found themselves involved almost from the start in what amounted to a continuous rearguard action in which the situation deteriorated day by day, and means had to be devised almost from hour to hour to deal with this emergency or that. Yet nowhere throughout the whole of the most difficult and! harassing operations can we detect any loss either of head or heart on the part of the British troops or of the men who led them. Their lines of communication wer,e cut. They were hungry and lacking essential equipment. Allied support failed them upon either flank, yet they fought their way unbroken to the Straits of Dover and delivered some 80 per cent, of their strength from the enemy’s grasp.”

Dispatch of the Force.

The dispatch begins inevitably with an interesting comparison between conditions under which the British Expeditionary Force was conveyed to France in September, 1939, and those prevailing in August, 1914. .

Time had marched on and the avoidance of a concentrated air attack was now an overwhelming consideration. Calais ' and Boulogne were held to be out of the question as main landing ports, so Cherbourg, Nantes, St. Nazaire and Brest were selected. A move to France was begun upon September 10, and was completed, |hanks to the elaborate and secret nature of precautions taken, exactly on a schedule time without the loss of a man.

After being collected in their assembly area between Le Mans and Laval, the British proceeded to their allotted sector, and on an agreed date, October 3, the first corps was in position upon the Belgian frontier. It should be noted that Lord Gort’s was not an independent command. He was under the orders of General Georges, Commander of the French. The front of the north-east British sector followed the frontier from the village of Maulde to the village of Halluin, and thence to the river Lys to Armentieres —familiar territory to many a British veteran. The sector covered Tourcoing, Courtrai, and Lille. Lord Gort established his headquarters at Arras, or rather the village of Habarcq, eight miles to the we3t. New conditions of warfare had rendered the widest possible dispersion necessary, not merely of troops of any given area but of headquarters staffs as well.

Line of Defences.

Winter was spent in the construction of a line of strong defences, in depth, along the Franco-Belgian frontier, from the very point of the Ger-man-Belgian frontier, thus prolonging the Maginot Line to its logical conclusion as a continuous rampart against a German invasion. But the Belgian Government adhered to a policy of strictest neutrality.

It was understood that defensive works in the form of tank obstacles were under construction in eastern Belgium, but nothing was known for certain. The Belgian Government, anxious not to compromise their position of neutrality, resolutely declined either to hold joint staff conferences with the Allies or to permit Allied officers to enter Belgium and reconnoitre possible positions. Bv the end of January, the British Expeditionary Force in France stood at 222,000 men—two corps of three divisions each with other troops. Bases had been established and our lines of communication extended from the Belgian frontier in a south-westerly direction through Amiens to 17 ports in western and southern France. Various defence schemes had been considered and decided upon so far as the aloof attitude of the Belgian Government permitted with the French High Command. But plainly Lord Gort, confident though he was in his men, was far from happy about the equipment situation. and on several occasions he called the attention of the "War Office to shortages of guns, ammunition, and various technical apparatus. Invasion Started. The storm broke upon May 10, 1940, with the simultaneous violation of Dutch and Belgian neutrality by the Germans and an invasion in immense force of both these countries. Belgium immediately called upon the Allies for assistance, and the British Expeditionary Force, together with the French Ist Army on its right, crossed the frontier that day, proceeding at speed

for 60 miles, amid the cheers of the Belgian civilian population, so selected positions along the little River Dyle, which runs north and south through Louvain, east of Brussels.

These positions had barely been reached when grave news began to come in that the Belgians had failed to demolish important bridges upon their own eastern frontier and were falling back, pressed by the enemy. Next day, May 12, came the rumour that the French 9tli Army, on the right of the FTench Ist Army, opposite Ardennes, at Sedan, was giving way before a thrust by German armoured divisions. It was more than rumour. It was tragic truth. The French 9th Army disintegrated completely, and within a few days German tanks and armoured cars were pouring through a gap 20 miles wide, heading straight for the French coast, and threatening to sever the Allied forces, including the British Expeditionary Force, in the north from the main body of the French Army to the south. Events Moving Too Fast. Meanwhile measures were being taken to restore the situation in Belgium, which had been rendered difficult by the retirement under pressure of the Belgian Army. A conference was held at Mons on the afternoon of May 12, when it was agreed that General Bilotte should co-ordinate dispositions of the British Expeditionary force, Belgian Army, and FTench Ist and 7th Armies. So for a short time the Dyle line was held with some promise of success. But events elsewhere were moving too fast. On May 1.5, the Dutch laid down their arms, creating a new source of danger in the north. It was obvious, too, that the French Ist Army on our right could not hold on to their present position much longer. Owing to the dissipation of the French 9th Army, their right flank was in.the air. It was therefore decided to abandon the Dyle position and fall back in accordance with a prepared plan to the River Escault, 69 miles westward. This difficult withdrawal was completed by May 19, but the gap to the south remained and was growing wider. Enemy troops bad penetrated as far as Amiens and were getting astride the British lines of communication, which, it will he remembered, reached diagonally across France to the south-west, instead of running straight hack to the Channel.

German armoured vehicles actually reached Boulogne as early as May 21. Plainly the situation could only bo restored by strong counter-attacks across the gap. The initiative and the principal effort must come from the south side, where French G.Q.G. and main French forces were situated. The Most Pressing Need. But precious hours and days passed. It did not mature. True, after the supersession of General Game!in by General Weygand a scheme known as the Weygand Plan was formulated, but it was never put into execution. The situation had deteriorated too swiftly. Lord Gort found himself almost from the start thrown largely on his own resources.

Tlje most pressing need was to organise a line of defence along what had now become the southern front of Billott’s army group. This was accomplished by manning a chain of canals which runs through Bothuno and St. Omer to Gravelines and the sea, and the situation was for the moment relieved. Second, varying emergency forces were improvised. These wero called as a rule by names of the general commanding them Facforce, Petreforce (Mason Macfarlane, Pet re). The operations of these forces were particularly creditable because many of the troops composing them had been brought out from England, not to fight, but to dig and complete their training. Half-trained and only partially armed, they clung grimly to the Canal du Nord, the iScarpe, Arras, and other key-points. Lastly, on May 20, from his scanty reserves, Lord Gort even contrived to organise a force (“Frankforce”) sufficient to counterattack across the Corridor. It was a gallant gesture, and the troops concerned reached their objectives for the first day. But adequate support was not forthcoming, and the effort ended. Still, casualties had been inflicted on the enemy and delay had been imposed upon a greatly-superior enemy force agaftist which the “Frankforce” had blocked a vital road centre. The British Beleaguered. Oii May 23, tin* British Expeditionary Force found itself in a position ot a beleaguered garrison contained within a rough triangle some 50 miles each way. The base ot the triangle was the sea coast from Gravelines, near Calais, to Nicuport, in Belgium. The apex was at Douai, where most of the French were situated. The southern side followed the canal line and was manned chiefly by pur improvised forces. The eastern side was held by the three corps of the original British Expeditionary Force, with Belgians on their left. Our lines of communication were completely cut, and no more reserves were available. The British Expeditionary Force were on half-rations. The Weygand Plan was flickering out. and it was obvious now that, our only alternatives were surrender, evacuation, or light to the death. On May 27, Lord Gort received a definite order from the Secretary ot State for War making it clear that his solo task now was to evacuate to England the “maximum number ol your force possible” On the same day nows came that the King ol the Belgians, faced with the now imminent collapse of his army, had asked for an armistice, and that a new gap some 20miles wide was thus about to appear in the eastern lace of the triangle, through which enemy tanks could pour towards the beaches. Nothing now remained but to withdraw to a bridgehead (already reconnoitred )round Dunkirk and cover the embarkation of as many troops as possible. Into the Dunkirk perimeter, as it was called, British and French

troops accordingly lought their way hack. Here, the Royal Navy and the Royal Air Force came to their help with a flotilla of every kind of craft to bear them home. _ ... . Orders were issued that British and French troops were thenceforth to he embarked in equal proportions. The story of the Dunkirk evacuation has often been told and need not be repeated here. Indeed, Lord Gort himself did not see its completion., -He had already received instructions n’ 01 ” the British Government, which Jon him no option hut that as soon as tlie British Expeditionary Force by evacuation fell below the strength ol three divisions he was to hand over to a corps commander and return homo. Upon May 31 he hajidod over to MajorGeneral Alexander and sailed that night. . ... Four days later, m tlm small hours of June 3. his successor accompanied by a senior naval officer, made a tom of the Dunkirk beaches. They were deserted and empty. “On being satisfied,” we are told, “that no British troops were left on shore they themselves lelt tor England. Nearly 225,000 British soldiers (including 13,000 wounded) and 112,000 French soldiers hud preceded them to England not counting some thousands more of French troops evacuated from Dunkirk to others ports in France The dispatch closes with “Some Lessons of the Campaign.’ They clo not include comment on the question ot the High Command, of the Allied Forces—lor on this question Lord Gort received orders' from the Government and through French Commanders under whom he was placed. Noi* do they include detailed comment on military lessons on which another report has been made to the proper quarter. The dispatch does, however, say that “the offensive has regained the ascendancy” when undertaken by an army amply-equipped for the purpose. The fate of the British Expeditionary Force was sealed by the break-through many miles from their own front, and not by any failure of the British troops to hold positions of their own choosing It also emphasises the paramount importance of equipment, the factors of speed and daring in the enemy’s success, and the military value of Demolitions proved their value,