Ashburton Guardian Magna est Veritas et Prævalebit WEDNESDAY, AUGUST 6, 1941. HITLER’S BLUNDERS.

Ashburton Guardian, Volume 61, Issue 252, 6 August 1941, Page 4

Ashburton Guardian Magna est Veritas et Prævalebit WEDNESDAY, AUGUST 6, 1941. HITLER’S BLUNDERS.

The Germans are not likely to learn of the opinion held by Field Marshal Smuts regarding Hitler s blunders in the war, but realisation of the position must be forced upon them, no matter how unwilling they may be to doubt the boasting promises made by the Fuhrer. According to Field Marshal Smuts Hitler’s first blunder was in not attacking Britain immediately after the evacuation of Dunkirk and his second —a great one —was his attack on Russia. The Germans may not realise the position regarding Britain, but from all accounts the truth regarding Russia is being presented to them through the most telling of all mediums —the' announcement of deaths occasioned in the campaign. The effect upon the public mind of exceedingly heavy casualties will be intensified by the changing tone of the official communiques, which have abandoned their initial note of prediction of coming successes for one of apology and excuse for the check to the offensive. The stubborn defence by the Soviet forces is the more galling to the Leader because he reckoned on a quick decision, with the acquisition of most of Russia’s resources, enabling him to turn again to-the attempt on Britain. Some idea of the pressing need of haste in the offensive is to be gained from the fact that the Russians reported at the end of last week that there had been forty-two unsuccessful assaults against the important position at Smolensk. In Flanders and again in the Balkans, the- German method was to search for a weak spot and then concentrate on it all the force available. There have been similar attempts to discover weak spots in the Russian defences, but the front has been so wide and the defensive posi-, tions prepared in such depth that no vital breach has been effected. The swift and deadly thrust has given vvay to a relentless battering and against such tactics Russia opposes her accepted strength in manpower and the seemingly incalculable weight of her equipment. Under these conditions it is not surprising that therefshould be talk of a war of attrition—a type of war which must at least deny Hitler the speedy results to which he is accustomed, and on which his conception of warfare relies for success. ■