ITALY AND WAR

Ashburton Guardian, Volume 60, Issue 201, 3 June 1940, Page 5

ITALY AND WAR

WHY COUNTRY SHOULD ENTER. TWO REASONS BROADCAST. JUSTICE TN MEDITERRANEAN. (United Press Association. —Copyright.) (Received This Oay, 11.10 a.m.) ROME, June 2. Signor Ansaldo (director of the newspaper “ Telegrafo”), broadcasting to the Italian forces, said: “The Italian military preparations begun last autumn have reached a conclusive stage. There are two reasons why Italy must be present in the war. First, it is impossible for a great nation to stay out of a conflict in which the fate of the Continent is being decided. We will no longer bo a great nation if we do not intervene in time. Secondly, Italy achieved an Alpine frontier in the last Avar, but did not secure complete independence and justice in the Mediterranean and colonial realms. Our independence in the Mediterranean must be utterly complete.”

THE ATTITUDE OF BRITAIN. NO REAL CAUSE FOR WAR. SOME OUTSIDE MOTIVE. (Received This Day, 9.45 a.m.) LONDON, June 2. Reports continue to reach London of manifestations in Italy of a belligerent tendency and in a sense hostile to the Allies. For some time now official quarters here have not felt able to deny that Italy’s early entry into the war on the side of Germany must be considered possible. It is, hoAve\ r er, a very unusual and uirwelcome situation that the British Government, Avhich is not conscious of any difference hetAveen itself and Italy incapable of solution by discussion, should nevertheless have, to contemplate the likelihood of hostile action by that country.

The Anglo-Italian agreement freely negotiated in 1935 is standing. The relations and interests of the Wo countries in tho Mediterranean and East Africa are capable of mutually satisfactory regulation Avithout recourse to war, Italy has had good reason to know for a long time past the readiness of both Britain and France to discuss all legitimate Italian aspirations, but it has shown no desire to enter into conversations. Only recently the outstanding difficulties arising from tho application to Italy of the Allied contraband control Averc made the subject of discussion between British and Italian experts, and after the recent visit of the Master of the Rolls to Rome it AA r as confidently believed, from the BrL tisli side, that agreement had been reached. But this AA r as subsequently repudiated from the Italian side. If, therefore, Signor Mussolini chooses to bring the Italian people into the Avar and accept the responsibility for extending hostilities and adding to the toll of life and the area of devastation, it must be clear that it is from some motive Avhich lies outside the interests of Italy or her relations Avith Britain and France. Any such decision Avill cause the deepest regret in Britain for all that it Avill destroy is the goodAA-ill and friendship betAveen the British and Italian peoples, hut the prospect does not intimidate Britain in her determination to Avage to a successful conclusion the Avar against German aggression and will to dominate.-—British Official Wireless.