THREAT TO CHANNEL.

Ashburton Guardian, Volume 60, Issue 201, 3 June 1940, Page 5

THREAT TO CHANNEL.

THE ENEMY’S LIMITATIONS. BRITAIN’S CONTROL OF SEA. LONDON, June 1. Britain’s sea control resulted during the opening months of the war in the driving of the German fleet from the seas and so harrying and harassing the German mercantile marine, of whose pre-war tonnage nearly 20 per cent, has been captured, scuttled, or sunk, that it is a bio to render littlo useful service. This control will not, in the opinion of informed circles here, bo radically changed if the G’ermans secure and retain certain Channel ports. It is recalled that in the last war the enemy had tho use of Zcebruggc, Ostend, and nearly all the Belgian coast as submarine bases, without effect in his campaign agaifist British merchant shipping. Whatever bases they use, submarines while operating are subject to attack by destroyers and swarms of small craft, which are their special enemies. These small harriers of the submarine can only bo driven off by stronger forces of surface craft, and any such attempt would lead to clashes of bigger units, that could have only one result, in view of the Allies’ overwhelming preponderance in cruiser and battleship strength. Similarly, should the enemy try to close the Straits of Dover by a minefield, either British minesweepers would clear tho Channel unmolested by surface craft or any attempt to interfere with them would develop into a large-scale action. Motor torpedo-boats working from the Flanders coast might be a menace to coastwise shipping in convoy or out of it. On the other hand, as tho last war showed, motor torpedo-boats are essentially fair-weather craft for use at short range from their bases, and aro very susceptible to machinegun attacks by aircraft. Guns that might he mounted on tho French coast opposite Dover can hardly be regarded as a serious menace to shipping in the Straits. At a range of 18 miles, ships hugging the English coast would ho a moving target very difficult to hit. And passage could he made under cover of night. Intensified air attacks on Channel and Thames estuary shipping may he expected. Experience has, however, shown tho great difficulty of hitting ships under way. If narrowed, sea traffic concentrates targets for enemy bombers, so, too, does it reduce tho area to lie defended. Sea power is flexible and adaptable. If the sea approaches to London were temporarily blocked, there would still be many ports in those islands to which traffic could be diverted.