IN ABYSSINIA

Ashburton Guardian, Volume 59, Issue 15, 28 October 1938, Page 8

IN ABYSSINIA

CONSTANT WAR GOES ON. 200,000 TROOPS NEEDED. The sudden collapse of Abyssinian resistance in the spring of 1936 and the swift advance of the Italian forces on Addis Ababa came as a shock to foreign observers, wrote the “Manchester Guardian” editorially on September 8. It seemed incredible that the war should have come to so sudden an end and that the proud Amhara tribes should have surrendered so easily before the invader had even occupied their territory. Some answer to the questions which were asked at that time may be found to-day. The truth is that the .Italian entry into Addis Ababa did not mark the end of the war nor even the end of organised resistance. It marked, perhaps, the collapse of central government and the end of that modern State which the Emperor had superimposed so swiftly on the ancient feudal base. But that is all. The war went on, and is still going on, the only difference being that while in the first two years its course was reported fully (if inaccurately) in the world’s Press its course in the last two years has been hidden and secret, unknown to all except the Italian generals and soldiers who have fought in it. The story which seemed to have been concluded in May, 1936, is in fact continued. There is no other word to describe what is happening in Abyssinia to-day than war.

Small, But Organised. The Abyssinjan resistance, as one of our special correspondents has made clear, is not that of unorganised “shiftas” or bandits (though there is, no doubt, plenty of that also), but of small organised armies fighting under the command of Amhara nobles and chiefs, men totally unused to a life of hardship and campaigning. They are •fighting not for gain but for the freedom and independence' of their country. The Italians themselves are under no misapprehensions about the size, of their task. They maintain in the country an army of 200,000 men (100,000 Italians and 100,000 natives), 300 planes and 10,000 lorries to carry troops and supplies. The tremendous cost of such an Army of Occupation, which the Italian Treasury can ill afford, is the best proof of its necessity. We may feel certain that if the job could be done with fewer men and fewer aeroplanes it would be. In truth there has been continual fighting ever since the fall of Addis Ababa, first in the provinces of the south and south-west and now over the whole Amhara plateau. The resistance "which is being met now in certain provinces is as stubborn as any before, and over two-thirds of the whole country guerrilla fighting is constantly in progress. A Hero to Warriors. In Sboa a leader has risen, Balambaras Ababa Aragai, who has become a hero to the Amhara warriors. At times ho commands an army of nearly 10,000 men and at all times controls an area of 3000 square miles. It can hardly he said even that the Italians are winning this war which was meant to have ended over two years ago. The. prospect is little better. There are still many rifles hidden in Abyssinia in spite' of ruthless attempts to disarm the people. Italian terrorism has roused the * indifferent to active rebellion, and the wholesale execution of chiefs has merely confirmed those who escaped in the conviction that resistance is their only hope. As a result of the continued fighting, of bad administration, and mistaken policy trade has declined and agriculture fallen into decay. More men are therefore free to join the resisting armies or are forced to seek a living hy banditry, since most honest means of livelihood have been destroyed. The Gal la and the Amhara, the Copts and Mohammedans, seem equally to. detest their conquerors. Italians Get Little. In return for this effort and expenditure the Italians have so far got little or nothing. The few exports of pre-war days have dwindled away, and for the first time in her history Abyssinia is now actually importing food for her people. No valuable mineral deposits have beeit found and no oil. A few settlers make a precarious living in settled areas, but only a few, and in the circumstances Signor Mussolini’s offer to the Italian Jews that they should emigrate to the new Empire must be regarded rather as intensifying *his anti-Semitic policy than alleviating it. (It may, of course, be a joke.) When both the extent of military resistance and the economic crisis are taken into account it is hardly too much to say .that Italy’s hold on the country is by no means sure. So long as Italy is not involved in war, no doubt the army of occupation will be able to hold its own, but in case of war in Europe or financial collapse in Italy the situation would be serious. Abyssinia is not yet selfsupporting, and all supplies must pass through the Suez Canal, which might be blocked. How long could the Italians hold out in Abyssinia without supplies of oil and petrol? In the circumstances it seems that the military road which has been built to the frontier of the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan would be less of a threat to Britain in war-time than the very existence of Abyssinia would be to Italy. Another relevant point is the recognition of Italy’s conquest. The British Government has promised this when the Anglo-Italian agreement comes into force (if it ever does), and the League Council may discuss it again soon. Perhaps Lord Halifax may wish to revise the statement he made at the last meeting of the Council on May. 12 this-year ? . . . The Italian meat has obtained controb~of~"virtually all the former territory of Ethiopia, and while resistance