WAR TO THE BITTER END.

Ashburton Guardian, Volume 56, Issue 96, 4 February 1936, Page 5

WAR TO THE BITTER END.

MUSSOLINI’S DETERMINATION. NO “PEACE AT ANY PRICE,” ROME, February 2. * “I hope that foreign nations will appreciate that the sending of 50,000 more labourers to Africa finally disposes of the belief that Italy is ready to negotiate for peace at almost any price when the rains begin,” said Signor Mussolini in an address to Cabinet. This combined with the announcement to-day that Italy is sending a new picked Alpine Division to Africa, is interpreted by qualified observers as show, ing Signor Mussolini’s determination to prosecute tlie war to the bitter end. The Rome correspondent of_ the “Daily Telegraph” says tlie French Ambassador (the Marquis de Ambrun) called on Signor Fulvio-Suvich (Italian Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs) and asked what interpretation foreign diplomats were expected to place on tlie outburst of “Popolo cl*ltalia” vesterThe Rome correspondent of “The Times” says other newspapers, discarding finer distinctions, declare that the extension of sanctions will lead to hostilities. The suggestion that countries upholding the League Covenant are seeking the preservation of peace is discarded as falsehood and hypocrisy.

The French Ambassador’s question in Rome referred to an article, attributed to Signor Mussolini, and published in “Popolo d’ltalia.” The article asserted that armed conflict in Europe would inevitably follow the persistence in sanctions, and appealed to youth to fight against the dominance of “bloodthirsty politicians.”

“FALSE AND ABSURD.” ITALIAN REPLY TO ABYSSINIANS ROME, February 3. The official spokesman characterised the Abyssinian claim of victory in Temboim as false and absurd and another example of the campaign of lies against Italy. The spokesman also reiterated the view regarding the meeting of experts on sanctions at Genera an February 3 that Europe is drifting towards war through sanctions. Italy’s objection to an oil embargo did not concern the economic effect but the moral consequences. There w T as nothing at present to justify the hope of European agreement on Italy’s nuMary operations in Abyssinia. I ’le only hopeful feature in the world situation was that if a conflagration occurred it would not be Italy’s fault.