Ashburton Guardian Magna est Veritas et Prævalebit TUESDAY, FEBRUARY 4, 1936. MENACE TO PEACE.

Ashburton Guardian, Volume 56, Issue 96, 4 February 1936, Page 4

Ashburton Guardian Magna est Veritas et Prævalebit TUESDAY, FEBRUARY 4, 1936. MENACE TO PEACE.

If, as is stated, the article in the Milan newspaper on Italy’s attitude toward Europe was inspired or written by Signor Mussolini, world peace is seriously menaced. The writer, after stating that Europe is sliding down the incline of sanctions at the bottom of which is war, says: “The embargo on oil will develop automatically into a blockade, and a blockade will mean war —no longer a limited security war, but a war of slaughter in Europe, and of vengeance. Those who think war against Italy easy are mistaken. Italy will defend herself tooth and nail. For a long time she has been prepared to meet such an eventuality.” It is contended that Italy cannot be accused of any responsibility for the war that is now threatening — a contention that bears a striking resemblance to that raised by Germany in connection with the Great War. Thus Signor Mussolini, besides hurling defiance at the Powers, misleads the Italians as to the truth of the matter. From the very outset, even before the nations of the world solemnly declared Italy to be aggressor within the scope of the League Covenant, every effort has been made to bring about a settlement by- peacable means. The League itself, Britain and France collectively and those two Powers separately, have put before the Duce plans for settlement; plans, it must be said, that proposed to give to Italy much more than she as the nation at fault was in justice entitled to receive. Signor Mussolini is reported to have intended accepting the Hoare-Laval proposals as a basis of discussion but deferred notifying this; then events in Britain robbed him of the opportunity. If such was his intention, he committed a tactical error in assumming indifference. Now, in the words of Mr Neville Chamberlain, “attempts to find a peaceful settlement must at present be considered to have ended, therefore, we must return to sanctions.” Those in force, following the early institution of a ban on the export of arms and munitions to Italy, are three: a ban on loans, an embargo on exports of raw materials necessary for the making of munitions and implements for war, and a boycott on goods of all kinds from Italy. A fourth is not yet fuily in being, although decided: the institution of a system of mutual support so that the incidence of these three steps shall not fall too harshly on individual States applying them. Related to it is the further question of mutual assistance in the event of armed attack by Italy in an endeavour either to break the economic pressure or to make wanton retaliation. The decision to impose an oil embargo provoked Signor Mussolini to threaten such attack. The Duce has apparently decided to push the issue to the deciding point: Either Europe must leave Abyssinia to struggle unaided against the aggressor or her interference must be enforced by arms. But the nations of Europe will merely impose oil sanctions, the declaration of war must come from Italy. In that most regrettable event, the length and issue of the conflict will be dependant on the manner in which the Powers, great and small, discharge their obligations under the Covenant. There is one hopeful aspect, however. The mere fact that Italy is so dependent on supplies of oil that she would go even to the length of precipitating a European war indicates that she is not in a position to carry out the threats her spokesman is so fond of making.