Ashburton Guardian Magna est Veritas et Prævalebit MONDAY, DECEMBER 23, 1935. THE PEACE PLAN CRISIS.

Ashburton Guardian, Volume 56, Issue 61, 23 December 1935, Page 4

Ashburton Guardian Magna est Veritas et Prævalebit MONDAY, DECEMBER 23, 1935. THE PEACE PLAN CRISIS.

The debate in the House of Commons on the peace proposals formulated in Paris proved a personal triumph for Sir Samuel Hoare, who, however, has been forced from office by pressure of public opinion. His defence of the acceptance of the plan was logically reasoned, if not altogether convincing, for he clearly explained the considerations by which he was swayed in making his decision. The discussions took place under a threat of war, and as he viewed the problem it was a choice between the full co-operation of all the member States of the League or a kind of unsatisfactory compromise contemplated in the suggestions made by M. Laval. As Sir Samuel said, member States had for the most part been prepared to take their part in economic sanctions, but not a single one, except Britain, moved a ship, aeroplane, or soldier to meet a possible emergency. Thus the whole burden of giving effective application of the sanctions devolved upon Britain, placing her 'in the invidious position of being suspect of pursuing her policy for selfish ends, whereas she has always been scrupulous to make it clear that she was acting solely in accordance with her obligations as a member of the League. In the circumstances, Sir Samuel felt that Anglo-French co-operation was absolutely essential if the peace negotiations were to succeed, or if collective action was to continue. He thought it so important to start the negotiations that he could not withhold his provisional assent, much as he disliked some features of the proposals. In his speech Mr Baldwin made the point that the British Government was content to leave the proposals entirely to the decision of the League, and that their formulation did not affect Britain’s attitude of preparedness loyally to meet all the demands made upon her by the League Covenant. The whole trouble, however, is that by acquiescing in the french plan, Britain lent herself to a movement that generated l vacillation in the League. By this action she encouraged in the weaker Powers a distrust of the League. lVJ*'Baldwin, while admitting an error of judgment on his part, places his finger on a weakness in practice that has largely been responsible for the present crisis. "Largely owing to the League,” he said, “the practice has grown up since the war for Ministers to jiave discussions on the Continent and sometimes reach conclusions when there is real difficulty m maintaining that liaison which should be maintained with the Cabinet. Before this method became common we relied upon what was called diplomatic procedure. This resulted in a far more careful examination of the details from the beginning of negotiations than has often been possible under the new system. Speed is often a matter of great danger and it is quite conceivable in some similar si uation that so long as this practice ot telegraphing from one capital to another, with the expectation of a reply the same night, exists there may be some irremediable disaster. It is some consolation to be assured that the Prime Minister is determined that such a position shall be impossible m the future. Maintenance of a laiason, even if it entails delays, is essential.