MOST CRITICAL

Ashburton Guardian, Volume 54, Issue 196, 1 June 1934, Page 5

MOST CRITICAL

THE ARMS CONFERENCE. i DISCUSSIONS MAY. END SOON. FRENCH ATTITUDE A SURPRISE. COMPROMISE NOT POSSIBLE. ■.K‘ ■/_■ ' , ■ > (United Press Association—Copyright) (deceived This Day, 11.35 a.m.) GENEVA, May 31. The situation was never niore critical since the / Conference began,” declared Mr Henderson (the president of the Disarmament Conference). It will be hopeless unless there is speedy transformation,” The delegates are averse to declaring their position, and. the discussions may end next meeting. BRITISH VIEW OUTLINED. EARLY DECISION ESSENTIAL. . - LONDON, May 30. The prospects of the Disarmament; Conference were frankly reviewed by Sir John Simon when, during a debate v by the General Commission of the League of Nations at Geneva, he expressed the views of.the British Government on the present situation. Sir John §imon ■ dealt at length with the recent diplomatic negotiations and asked what were the essential differences which divided French and German points, of view as they emerged from the. documents exchanged between the various Powers. In a statement of views issued on April 16 the German Gevemment defined re-. G armament, for which it stipulated in the proposed convention, at the same ' time declaring that it would agree to the postponement of reduction of armaments of other Powers until the ena of the fifth year of the 10-year convention. If, therefore, an international agreement was reached, either thisclaim must be modified or conceded. Germany claimed that the convention should accept a level of German armament higher than that provided for in the peace treaties, to the extent indicated on. April 16. On the other hand, it appeared that France would desire to stand fast by the limits suggested at the meeting of the Bureau on October 14, with a modification contained in the: French memorandum of January 1. The suggestions of October ..proposed a basis-which would have admitted no immediate rearmament of Germany other, than the increase to which she was entitled under the peace treaty. Germany rejected that suggestion and the contract between that proposal and the formulated requirements of Germany on April 16 a as obvious. Were those suggestions, in the present circumstances, a possible basis of an international agreementThe Crucial Points. The Conference would make no progress by avoiding or-burying these crucial points beneath merely geneial observations. The only thing that mattered now was an agreemenb-to find out If there was a possible 1 bridge to be built between the conflicting views and what was the contribution they must respectively make to construct that bridge. The British Government had done its very best to be bridge - builders. By the end of tins debate they ought to see more clearly where the foundations for such a bridge mu be laid if the gap was to be closed. They could see already how oveiwhelmingly grave the consequences must be if, after all this effort and these prolonged debates no bridge could be built. In, the opinion of the British Government the Draft Convention which the Conference had adopted as a basis still afforded the best solution. Realising, however, the serious consequences of failure to reach an agreement they were determined to formulate the modifications whicn were expressed in the memorandum of January 29. It contained proposals regarded not as ideal but as most likely of acceptance. The close approximation between that memorandum and the German declaration showed that the differences were being narrowed. The British Government felt that the line of that memorandum was more likely to produce agreement than any i other concrete proposal. Indeed, he would go further. Unless something like them was agreed upon then ne did not believe a Disarmament Convention cold be realised The Bntel, Government was strengthened m thiu judgment by the most interesting memorandum put forward by ■ Danish, Spanish, Norwegian, tewedish and Swiss delegations. Sir John Simon pointed out part one of the United Kingdom Draft Convention dealt with security along the lines on which they might hope foi the sympathy and co-operation of. the United States. Reply to M. Litvinoff, Referring to M. Litvinoff’s declaration that the Disarmament Conference so far as the direct object of disarmament was concerned was manifestly dead, but should continue in being because some pact of security could be evolved, Sir John Simon recalled that even in 1924, when the protocol was under discussion, Ino instrument of security was contemplated as coming into operation until >a disarmament agreement was reached. It would therefore be an entirely new departure to transform a conference called for the purpose of disarmament into a conference for devising of security on a basis that no disarma-

ment at all was possible. The value of security pacts depended not on the fact of the promise but o.u the certainty, if need arise, of positive performance by the signatories. From that point of view there might be a higher practical value in a limited undertaking by a guarantee like the Treaty of Locarno than in some new unlimited and world-wide assurance. They had to choose between the chance that remained of an agreement on the lines indicated and a breakdown, in the whole of this peace effort, with the consequences of unlimited competition in armaments and dangers to the future of the world, which no man could measure. It was easy enough to say they were prepared to go on working, but if they were to do justice to themselves and to their responsibilities those efforts must be such as could conduce to a v successful issue of their work. The time was long past when they could delude themselves into imagining that by a- pious expression of a desire to reach an agreement they were promoting an agreement.“While,we talk the world does not stand still,” said Sir John Simon. The British Government is still as convinced as ever that an international agreement about armaments would be the greatest .contribution which could he made to the restoration of confidence and the consummation or peace, and it realises to the full the gravity of reaching no result. But while we will still co-operate irr any new effort- which leally contains prospects of producing a general agreement, we will not lend ourselves to indefinite continuance of vague and inconclusive discussions justified by nothing better than a sanguine hope that something in the way of' a solution might still turn up. Firstly, because we are convinced that such a procedure would -inflict gieat and increasing injury on the League and on the whole conception, of effective international action; secondly, because jf the Disarmament Conference is kept in being purely for the purpose of debate but without any real hope of prospect of obtaining positive results, we ‘ are in effect debarring ourselves ftom whatever new effort might be needed.”

Sir John Simon most earnestly trusted that the outcome of the debate might be to provide solid ground for believing they could accomplish what they had set out to do, and the British Government would exert itself to the uttermost to that end. Was there not material, by combining such agreements as had already been reached with new which must he made ? And in any case could not they put the protocols into effective shape and make them ready for signature, on two of three more limited but most important matters which appeared ripe for prompt and effective treatment:

Firstly, chemical warfare. Secondly j budgetary publicity. ' Thirdly, setting up of a permanent disarmament commission. This woidd be needed in connection with both matters just mentioned, concluded Sir John. The French Case Stated,. M. Barthou (France), following Sir John Simon, asserted that the fate of not only the Disarmament Conference but of the League was at stake. The League was a vital necessity for France. The moment .for reticence and complacence, and even possible compromise, was past. Referring to the danger of the race for aerial armaments, M. Barthou declared that France was not preoccupied with the air menace alone.

“Certain countries,” he said, “are favoured by their geographical position, being protected by land. and sea, but France is exposed in all three dimensions. France is loyally carry: ing out the, Paris agreement of 1925. We were asked not to give motor engines to 'those to whom they are prohibited. We accordingly took firm and precise measures.” This is generally regarded as reference to the recent question in the House of Commons regarding aeroplane engines supplied to Germany. M. Barthou then quoted Sir John Simon’s speech of October 14 last, add ing: “Sir John Simon has just confirmed Germany’s withdrawal as an unjustified step.* Do you think I should be silent ? Shall I not consider; the -reality of the gravity of the situation ? I don’t bring charges against anybody, but the truth is that Germany has left the League. Is that the reason why the principle agreed to on October 14 last should no longer be valid?”

M. Barthou continued: “Germany has budgets for .a great increase in military expenditure. This includes certain mysterious hidden items. Is not this tantamount to asking the world: 'What does it matter about ’guarantees of security? We have left the League and regained full liberty, strong in our strength and embarking on a policy of rearmament.’ ” M. Barthou highly praised Mr Arthur Henderson (president of the Conference) and said that paternity of plans was not Sir John Simon’s raonopoiy. , “Let me reassert France s concrete plan outlined on January 1 last, for par allef, progressive reduction of armaments accompanied by necessary guarantees 1 of security,” he said. ‘I feel that between extreme optimists /and pessimists are men of action and goodwill, who are bound to declare w ar upon war and who will be able to confer the greatest and noblest of all boons upon humanity.” It is generally felt that M. Barthou’s speech seriously prejudices the possibility of Anglo-French accord on (disarmament.