THE COMMON FRONT

AND THE AXIS POWERS

IS It BEING UNDERRATED?

EUROPEAN BELIEFS

(By "Senex."}

With the Powers of the common front

against aggression strengthening their ..position and moulding themselves into, '.a powerful combination, it might be supposed that there would be a period . 6£.relief in Europe from the alarms' and excursions of the last few months. : The previous adventures of the axis ; group have been possible, it might be; r argued, because of the looseness of; . assQciationi the disunity of their adver-j : Saries; shifting of, alliances, and \ mnwiilirtgness to make a firm stand, i So Hitler was able to follow the line T pursued by Bismarck when he was ■ • "told-that Europe would disapprove his ■. course^ and snapped, "Who is Europe?" ' and on being told that it was com: ■' posed of great Powers, asked, "Are they united?" Thus the non-interven- •/• -• tion -policy in- Spain was born in ,the | '.:'. '.■'.■"jn.mds.of>the French' and taken up by ■";■ firitain in a thoroughgoing way. Thus Poland, which was France's ally •- against Germany, participated with; Germany in the first partition of •'..;■.: Czecho-Slovakia, also the ally of ■ .. .France. But surely, it might then be /■■■■'contended, with the formation of the •*" ;? common front this period is ended, i '■•"■ and with it the menace has been les- •- . sened. The axis Powers know today ; that-they cannot undertake more ad-1 /;-/' ventures involving members of the - - common -front without a collision of i /forces;. The very creation of the com-i r-l Mpn front is an insurance against such -■/■' aggression, and must tend" to check r At. •'■'.' " . . ■ ' • " THE DANZIG ISSUE. •"•'.■' ;Etit will-it? The question becomes >^': pertinent because of the present by Germany and .Poland ": over'the-question of Danzig. Britain has given a guarantee to Poland before all the world, and most of the . \vorld believes that Britain means to honour it. But the real test is not what most of the world thinks of that „. guarantee, but what is the opinion in ~-., Kpme and Berlin. If the dictators believe, in short, that the guarantee is not fully meant, if they believe that the people of Britain would be divided - - in- carrying out their Government's ..• pledge, or that the practical difficul- .- - ties in the way are likely to appear too severe, they may not moderate their . policy -in the manner expected. In this course the post-Munich agreements, for instance, confirm them. After that ill-starred settlement we were told that Britain and France could not defend Czecho-Slovakia, that she was outflanked, that she would - ; have been cut in half, that she would have been bombed out of existence before* aid could reach her, and that her allies would have been committed to a singularly unprofitable war on the Western front. Well, it is also true that Poland is outflanked, that her in- / dustrial regions (the so-called "indus- ' --.trial triangle") are singularly vulner- • s[ble, and that unless she has aid from - Russia she would be in similar plight »: "to.'tHat -pictured"for the Czechs.; And the' German leaders may believe'that *■ this'would have a powerful effect on ■' "British" judgment. They know that • 'they disregarded repeated British • warnings up to October 1. 1938. GUARANTEES TO CZECHS. Moreover, if Poland is now guaran- - teed, so was Czecho-Slovakia guaran.teed; .yet her own ally, France, was ,-glad to force a settlement upon her [rather than carry out her pledge. The most significant pronouncement made during the pre-Munich manoeuvres was the declaration by the British Foreign Office on September 26, that France and Russia would stand by the Czechs and Britain would certainly support France. Yet in Paris M. Bonnet told newspapermen that there was no official confirmation of this statement and "La Liberte" published an interview with M. Daladier in which he said the statement had come from a I minor official. Also if Alexander Werth is accurate (andj he is singularly acute) the French! never were under any illusion about j Munich as a settlement; they knew itj would merely create an opportunity for further advances. When those advances were made and the "rump" of - Czecho-Slovakia disappeared from the map, the view of official quarters wasi even that nothing very startling had ' occurred, that it was a consequence of • the mistakes of Versailles. There was • J even relief that the Germans had "gone east" after all. There are thus ... very real arguments to be found in j 'support of the German course to-j ' •'' wards extremism, if that is the direc- j '.'.jfiorrin- which Hitler's inspiration leads, --". him." And competent observers abroad - " report • that there is a very real - • danger that the Anglo-French guarantees to Poland, no less than those to .' • Greece and Rumania,. may not be ■ .-taken seriously by the axis Powers. . > The principal Teason for this appears ---• to have been the inadequate military preparations of Britain, in the eyes of • - Continental Powers. This, it seems, was, the reason for the step in imposingl conscription; the need to give evidence of the fact that Britain means business. The conscription, as it now appears, is much less than what the European nations understand by the term, but it commits Britain to a war of masses again; it proves that she will once more intervene on the Continent with all her strength if that is necessary. .. IMPRESSING HER FRIENDS. • And it would appear that one of the| •: -reasons for the move is the need to impress friends as well as foes. It; . - must strike the observer as a very singular thing that all the initiative in foreign policy has recently passed from Paris to London. However much - .'- this" may be a matter of character and •, personality, and however much the - ■ French have been swayed by Britain in recent years, it is unusual for them to be mute parties, to agreements of •-"■' the nature of those recently announced. - 'There has been growing in France a " - feeling that if the situation is as seri- . ' ous as reports' present it as being, Britain should- be willing ,to adopt j 1 "' some form of conscription, for, in a •' large-scale war, especially one on two -' ' dr three fronts, French " man-power ' might not be sufficient. There has been the recurrent feeliiig which is expressed in the phrase that "Britain . will fight to the last French soldier." This feeling the acceptance of the principle of conscription is designed to remove. ; ILLUSION ATTACKED. \ Thus the illusion of freedom of .- ' action by the axis Powers has been ..-, attacked. For in the meantime they .have been making more and more preparations. German troops are reported to have been concentrating in increasing numbers on the Polish, Danish, Dutch, and Swiss frontiers. Italy has .- been concentrating forces in the Dodecanese Islands, in Albania, and on the Egyptian border. Increasing

numbers of men are called away from their civilian work to serve in army units. Germany is declared to expect to be able to use Spanish Morocco and Rio de Oro, which hem in French Morocco, and the latter of which borders Fr-uich West Africa, as bases for attacks against ' the democracies in wartime. German military critics have declared Gijon, in North Spain, to be a suitable base for bombing Plymouth. Gibraltar is threatened from land as never before, and air action might make the harbour untenable. Field guns and tanks have been arriving at nearby towns and troops concentrated at La Llnea.