national diets, it is still evident that, if in Europe and New Zealand average diets supply 3,500 calories, whereas in South East Asia the figure is between 1,800 and 2,200 calories, then the Asian is far worse nourished. Clearly then the immediate result of poverty of this magnitude is chronic malnutrition, which must needs leave sufferers open to the attacks of various diseases to which they may not otherwise have fallen victims. The combined effect of chronic malnutrition and disease is weak and inefficient producers, and where the margin between productivity and subsistence is very small indeed, this can be considered to complete the vicious circle from which no South East Asian country has so far escaped. Formerly it was possible to blame European colonialism for the state of affairs in South East Asia—and its legacy still remains, but since 1947 all of these countries have emerged as independent states, and now face the tremendous tasks of fulfilling the economic and social hopes of their successful political revolutions. On the basis of their national incomes per head it is possible to deduce easily that there is no margin for saving, therefore capital development must depend on outside aid. Both the Anglo-American and Russo-Chinese camps are anxious to provide this assistance, since neither wishes to see an area whose politics are still undecided fall ideologically to the other side. On the other hand, the fierce pride of newly acquired nationhood prevents these countries from eagerly accepting sorely needed help, if they suspect that there are political strings attached. In some cases, e.g., N. Vietnam, Thailand, the pressures have proved too great and a measure of national independence has been abandoned in return for help, but the majority of these states still remain undecided. The West, of which Australia and New Zealand form a part culturally and ideologically, has followed two main lines of policy towards South East Asia. The first is a policy of containment (of Communism to the countries it has so far overrun) and the other is a policy of stabilisation (of economics of South East Asian countries in the hope that a full rice bowl will minimise the appeal of communist doctrines). The former has been implemented largely by means of providing military aid to those governments considered by the West to be politically ‘reliable’, and by the formation of defensive regional pacts such as ANZUS and SEATO. The latter has been implemented on a much wider basis by such projects as the Colombo Plan. It is possible that, in providing aid to governments that may be out of real touch with the village communities they supposedly represent, the West may be backing the wrong horses. The example of American aid to Chinag Kai Shek and the Kuomintang is a permanent reminder of the danger involved in making a bad choice of allies. On the other hand economic aid realistically planned and given without political conditions attached appears to be a much safer investment. The only catch is that in trying to carry out both policies the West may find first, that it has not got sufficient surplus funds to complete either plan successfully, and secondly, that the antithetical nature of the policies may result in the possible benefits from each being cancelled out by the antagonisms that are aroused in Asians by the knowledge that the other policy is also being followed simultaneously. Finally, in dealing with the problem of framing a policy or policies towards South East Asia, any party at all, and the West in particular, must bear in mind that their recent history has left these countries strongly suspicious of anything that even remotely resembles an attempt to reimpose colonial rule in a different guise. Also that hand in hand with the completed national revolutions in these countries are two as yet unfulfilled revolutions—an economic one demanding fairer shares for everyone, and a social one demanding freedom from the control of authoritarian traditional ruling classes. Unless policies are planned so as not to run counter to these strong currents, they cannot hope to succeed. The nation that would deal wisely with South East Asia, must deal with the village communities, and it cannot hope to do this unless it understands, not only their problems, but their aspirations. No country needs to do this more urgently than New Zealand, for after all we cannot escape the simple geographical truth that now, and in future, South East Asia is our nearest Asian neighbour, and what happens there cannot help but affect this country and its people, whatever their race.