MAKING JAPAN OVER

Korero (AEWS), Volume 3, Issue 13, 30 July 1945, Page 23

MAKING JAPAN OVER

By

in the New Republic, May 28, 1945

A curious dichotomy has prevailed in A curious dichotomy has prevailed in the traditional American outlook on Japan. In one mental compartment we have nurtured a set of dislikes and fears : an ingrained concern over Japanese militarism and expansionism, an easily stimulated reaction against the competition of cheap Japanese goods. Tucked away in another compartment has existed a sort of guilty conscience. Composed in part of a general belief in Japan’s supposed economic handicaps, skilfully fostered by the “ over-population ” thesis of Japanese propaganda, it was also associated with a more legitimate sympathy for the difficult living conditions of the Japanese people. Since these inconsistencies of attitude were walled off in separate compartments, the necessity for reconciling them did not arise. Even the war does not seem to have given us a more inclusive and integrated concept of the problem we face in dealing with Japan. We have yet to visualize the ruthless conqueror, the intense competitor, and the poverty-stricken populace as natural products of a complex social system which has its own inner logic.

This failure, or perhaps unwillingness, to look into the entity we label “ Japan ” carries with it inevitable penalties. It leaves us with no frame of reference within which to set proposed policies and guage their effects. Without such a frame of reference, controversy over a “ hard ” or “ soft ” peace is the most futile of exercises. Shall we abolish Japanese industry completely, or shall we keep it in whole or in part ? Shall we enforce strict controls on Japanese trade and industry indefinitely, or for a limited term ? Questions such as these cannot be answered in vacuo. Substance is given only as they are related to the kind of social order which develops in post-war Japan. If it is the old order, or a masked replica of it, both military and economic controls must be maintained indefinitely. En-

forcement of these controls will impose a continuing burden on the world security

organization, but they can hardly be relaxed without long-term, even if not immediate, risks. On the other hand, if a new democratic order rises in Japan, the road to economic freedom and to the nation’s full association in the world community can be cleared without undue delay. The vital policy decision, in the first instance, will thus be a political one. Particular circumstances existing at the end of the war will affect this decision. An early unconditional surrender would help Japan’s present ruling groups to salvage the essentials of their oligarchic regime. Per contra, the emergence of a strong, popular resistance movement would provide the basis for a new democratic order. But the prime responsibility will still rest with the occupying powers. They can welcome or frown upon liberal popular forces, or even positively help them to develop strength if it is lacking. They can also deliberately permit or assist so-called “ moderate elements from the old ruling circle to

organize the first post-war Government.

Not without political significance is the fact that official propaganda activity which must hew to a line set by the State Department, carefully limits its attention to the “ militarists.” In this controlled propaganda campaign, the Emperor and the Court circle are immune from attack. So also are the business groups, the party leaders, and the bureaucrats. Strangely enough, the political complexion of the Suzuki Cabinet exactly corresponds to this division, in the reverse sense. The “ militarists ” are in the back seat. The Cabinet is dominated by a Court-Navy-bureaucrat-business coalition, with generally “ moderate ” political antecedents. It is just this coalition which might engineer a surrender with the hope of being able to continue in power after the war. The professional Army leadership, like the Reichswehr in Germany, would

also be inclined to follow a line that holds out the possibility of a future revival, even at the cost of temporary eclipse. Japan’s

military-naval leaders know that they are a necessary adjunct of the old regime, which has before this assumed for long periods the mask of “ moderation ” and pseudo-liberalism.

These facts point to a more fundamental aspect of the Japanese social structure. They refute a currently fashionable oversimplification that the “ militarists ” are the dominant political force in Japanese society. Actually, the key feature of Japan’s social order lies in the special relationship which obtains between the monopilists (Zaibatsu) and the landlords In the countryside the large holdings of some 3,500 big landlords (including the Emperor) stand out above the meagre plots of more than 5,000,000 tenant and small-owner farm households. In the big cities a dozen Zaibatsu concerns and semi-State monopolies (in which the Emperor holds large blocks of shares) dominate the banking, industrial, and commercial life of the country. The nexus between Zaibatsu and landlords is t formed by the 30,000,000 poverty-stricken farmers, who constitute an inexhaustible reservoir of cheap labour. Even the lowest wage in mine or factory has averaged better than the livelihood in rural areas, which has often dipped toward famine conditions. Professor Shiroshi Nasu, one of the foremost students of Japan’s agrarian problems, describes the situation in these terms : —

“ Existence of up-to-date factories with high technical efficiency side by side with millions of small farms amply supplying these factories with skilful but low-wage man-power constitutes the backbone of the national economy of Japan. This relationship is made possible by the fact that, the birth rate of the rural population is higher than that of the urban population.”

But this “ relationship ” has most important effects. It condemns the mass of the Japanese people—the farmers and workers—to a chronic poverty. It stunts the home market, forcing the export of 30 and 40 per cent, of total production (factory and small-scale industry) in normal years. The relative paucity of local natural resources—which however, can easily be overstressed—accentuates the difficulty. By necessity an intensive

drive for foreign trade has characterized Japan’s economy throughout this century. The cheap labour, the technical efficiency of modern factories, and the severe exploitation of small-scale industry propel Japanese goods into foreign markets with great competitive force, but this misshapen economic structure is peculiarly dependant on the vicissitudes of the world economy. Economic security even for the Zaibatsu-landlord combination, not to mention the people, is a will-o’-the wisp. An alternative is sought in territorial expansion—the natural and, indeed, inexorable outcome of the whole system. Around the Zaibatsu-landlord core—the true essence of modern Japan—are grouped all the other elements of the ruling caste. Emperor worship, as an idealogical instrument, is designed first to lead the mass of the people to accept without protest their miserable economic lot, and only secondarily to provide divine sanction for conquest. The military still wield their ruthless feudal sword, but in answer to the dictates of an unstable economy geared both to the modern machine and the tenant farmer’s rice plot. A class of bureaucrats, larger even than the German professional Civil Service, performs the essential administrative tasks. Party leaders grace the pseudo-parliamentary facade of the regime, which is an unlimited oligarchy in actual content. The Emperor unites in himself all the diverse aspects of the oligarchy. He is the high priest of a tribal religion. But he is also the biggest landlord, a leading member of the Zaibatsu, the supreme head of the State, and Commander-in-Chief of the Army and Navy.

In this highly complex organism each member functions in relation to the others, but the whole being has an essential vitality of its own. Assume, now, the post-war policy which lops off one limb — the “ militarists.” The Emperor remains; so also the bureaucracy, as well as the Zaibatsu and landlords. One limb is removed, but the soul, the hands and brain, and the body and heart are left. Is it logical to expect that the organism will thereafter take on a new form of life, different in any essential respect from the old ? Or must we not

assume that it will devote its efforts to restoring the limb which has been struck off ?

Territorial issues will present the first test. In this field the decisive measures will relate not to the strategic islands of the Pacific but to Manchuria, Korea, and Formosa. Maintenance of the old order in Japan, and the eventual restoration of an aggressive Japan’s industrial and military strength, will be immensely facilitated if Japanese economic interests in the colonies are protected by the peace terms. There are to-day approximately 320,000 Japanese civilians in Formosa and 750,000 each in Korea and Manchuria. Since the overwhelming majority are administrators or business men, closely linked to the colonial political structure, they seem likely to be swept out by military defeat. The utilities and great industrial enterprises of these colonies are largely State controlled and should be transferred to the Chinese and Korean authorities. Japanese investments in State and private undertakings in the colonies, as in China proper, will provide the sole large and immediately available reparations payments, though quite inadequate to cover the devastation caused by the war. Assuming that these changes are applied in the peace, they will force the repatriation of Japanese civilians, eliminate potential nests of irredentists and fifth-columnists, and thus limit the scope of Japanese under-cover activity in preparation for renewed aggression. Above all, they will force post-war Japan to seek the solution for her economic problem in the homeland, and so stimulate necessary modifications of the old system.

Japan will experience the economic disabilities of defeat primarily in the destruction of industry, transport, and the merchant fleet, in the loss of virtually all foreign investments and assets, and in the disruption of her connections with the world market. Recovery will be slow, unless it is stimulated by the external measures, such as loans, which restored the German economy during the “ twenties.” But such a programme will carry the same dangers in Japan if it entrenches the old groups in power, even should the oligarchy be temporarily shorn

of its military accessories. To be affected with safety, it would require economic controls adequate to prevent the building of an arms industry, no easy task short of continued military occupation, and the closest economic co-operation among the powers. Even then the world security organization would have to maintain sleepless vigilance. On the other hand, the restoration of Japan’s economy is clearly desirable, as much in the interest of the outside world as in those of the Japanese people. Industrial development and foreign trade, moreover, represent a necessary condition for an economically healthy Japan. Can the outside world assist such a development without the necessity of standing perpetually on guard ?

Only under one condition : that the stranglehold of the Zaibatsu and landlords on Japan’s economic life, and on the welfare and livelihood of the Japanese people, be broken. Agrarian reform constitutes the starting point for the needed changes. The break-up of the landed estates, an essential preliminary in this task, has to be associated with a thoroughgoing democratization of the agricultural co-operatives, thus far used mainly as an agency of authoritarian regimentation. Through the co-operatives, with which the Japanese farmer has had much experience, can be handled such problems as the purchase of supplies, the marketing of products, and the provision of cheap credit. This programme of agrarian reform, however, cannot be expected to work unless it is associated with measures curbing the great industrial and commercial monopolies. Along with railways, communications, and the electric-power industry, all of which have been already nationalized, the large modern factory enterprises will have to be taken over and operated by the state. Small and middlescale enterprises, freed of the tribute formerly exacted by the Zaibatsu monopolies, should be able to develop on a much wider and more profitable scale. Previous restrictions on labour organization should be removed. The higher living standards of the farmers and workers, by providing greater domestic purchasing power, will expand the home

market and reduce the pressure to export, even though a large and expanding foreign trade will continue to be a necessity. Economic reforms of this scope and character, it is obvious, cannot be expected of a government staffed by representatives of the Zaibatsu, the Court circle, and the old bureaucracy. Farreaching internal political changes, deriving from a government well to the left of centre, must be carried through before economic measures such as these can'be instituted. A period of transition, during which the old regime is thoroughly 7 destroyed in the wake of defeat, is a prime necessity if the eventual political outcome is to be favourable. The cardinal mistake would be speedy recognition of a new Government formed by members of the oligarchy, however “ moderate ” the candidates put forward might appear. This danger will be intensified if the groups now in control should effect an

unconditional surrender that enabled them to put through a minimum set of so-called political reforms. We should take warning from the fate of the Weimar Republic, which left the Junkers, the monopolists, and the Reichswehr to function within an outwardly democratic framework.

he principle that free elections be held before a new Government is established and recognized should be adhered to rigidly. Such elections, preferably to a constituent assembly, should be carried through under United Nations auspices, rather than those of a hold over Japanese regime. he Assembly should draft a new and democratic Constitution, replacing the baldly authoritarian Constitution of 1889. If it decided that an Emperor is to be retained, some guarantee would exist that he would be a genuinely constitutional monarch, functioning under a constitution deriving from the people and not handed down as an imperial " gift.” In these political preliminaries, every evidence of popular initiative and resistance to the old order, even if expressed in turbulent forms such as the seizure of landlord’s estates, would be the most essential testimony that a new order is not only required, but practical and feasible. Such popular resistance would be the guarantee that a constructive post-war

policy could be speedily implemented in our dealings with Japan. If it should develop and then be crushed because of our taste for ” order ” and fear of “ chaos,” the most promising avenue toward the building of a peaceful Far East would thereby be closed.

Internal economic reforms would have provided the essential prerequisite for satisfying the legitimate economic needs of the Japanese people. Elimination of armament expenditure, which has weighed heavily on the Japanese economy for two generations, would furnish large additional resources for post-war reconstruction purposes. To create a fully prosperous Japan, however, substantial assistance from the outside world would still be required. The soundest contribution would be the speedy removal of all unnecessary barriers to the development of Japan’s foreign trade. This would be the more necessary since the increased wages going to the Japanese worker would partly reduce the previous competitive advantage of Japanese goods, even though a smaller differential advantage might continue to exist.

Economic assistance to Japan by the United Nations will have to be earned. It will hardly be forthcoming in time to prevent the Japanese people from passing through an onerous post-war transition. The needs of the countries devastated by Japan’s war of conquest will have first priority. In the meeting of these needs a toll will almost certainly be levied even on Japan’s limited post-war productive resources. When the Japanese people have met this test, and when thay have accomplished the needed domestic, social and political readjustments, thev will be entitled to turn to the United Nations for those broader measures of economic cooperations which will lay a solid basis for the peace structure in the Pacific.