PHOTO RECONNAISSANCE

Korero (AEWS), Volume 2, Issue 4, 28 February 1944, Page 13

PHOTO RECONNAISSANCE

From Flying, October, 1943

AN obvious truth to Air Force commanders in all active theatres, is

“ better photography creates better bombing.” They believe in photography as they believe in fire-power, for combat experience has shown that more than 80 per cent, of military intelligence is either obtained or verified by aerial

photographic reconnaissance. Effective use of air power depends

upon the ability of reconnaissance to locate prime targets. Combat proved at the outset that the surest way to reduce an Air Force to impotence was to waste its power against inadequate targets. On the other hand, devastating effect was achieved when the total resources

of planes and crews, fuel, and ammunition were hurled against a target of maximum opportunity.

Such targets are not located by chance. They result, in large measure, from ceaseless aerial photographic reconnaissance. Day and night camera planes probe deep into the enemy’s territory to record his movements and unmask his plans.

Modern aerial technique demands an exact knowledge of targets, for the best way bomber crews can be satisfactorily briefed before a mission is to show them a picture of what they are going to hit.

Bombers do not leave the ground unless photographs prove the value of the mission.

From each theatre comes the cry for “ more pictures.” In combat operations one hundred prints may be distributed from each negative. The Air Force commander and his staff, the Navy, ground forces, and Allied airmen clutch at every scrap of photographic information.

Photographic planes streaking over bombed cities after a mission bring back exact answers to a commander’s questions. What factories have been struck ? What storage dumps remain intact ? How long will railroad yards and switchingpoints be bottlenecked ?

Camouflage is seldom effective. Modern photographic methods detect it instantly.

Daily sorties over the Channel ports told the British the exact status of Hitler’s invasion plans. They merely counted the landing-barges, and when the prize looked worthwhile, the} bombed them into splinters.

Following a practice copied from the British, American fighters with cameras come in at low altitude, get their pictures and return quickly to base.

Recently, after a test in America, a photograph taken from a Lockheed Lightning going faster than 300 m.p.h., as low as 300 ft., was so sharp that engineers could count the telephone wires which the plane had flown over.

Tests have been conducted with a “ strip film ” camera which makes a continuous picture on roll film. Cameras are indispensable in searching out weak spots in our aircraft through recording take-off and landing characteristics, recording instrument dial readings during test manoeuvres, training pilots and testing various types of materials.

Typical of photography’s triumphs in wartime is the story of one photo squadron. In April, 1942, nine officers and 60 men disembarked in Australia with four Lightnings modified for photographic use.

With no more than five airplanes in the air at any one time, the squadron flew 457 missions in an eight-mouth period.

One photographic flight over Buna eventually cost the Japs 83 airplanes. Quickly processed pictures told a story which sent a swarm of U.S. fighters streaking for the enemy airdrome. Seventy-nine were caught on the ground and four more were picked off in the air. Photographs showed that they had landed to refuel. One morning the Squadron Commander received a rush request for complete aerial mapping of Guadalcanal and adjoining islands. The mission was beyond the range of the Lightnings, stripped down though they were. A Boeing B-17 Flying Fortress was equipped as a mapping airplane. Flying just beneath a high cloud ceiling along the hump of the central range, the big plane, carrying a wide angle camera, completed the mapping in three passages, then went on to Florida and Tulagi Islands. The job was done in one afternoon.

Soon afterwards the first American offensive in the South Pacific was launched. We made our early gains with minimum loss because the photographic reconnaissance made on this flight had supplied the maps.

Aerial photography also helped turn back the Jap land assault on Port Moresby from the Gona-Buna area along the Kokoda Trail. Once the enemy had crossed the Owen Stanley Range, they were confident of smashing through to the Allied base at Moresby. But photographic aircraft made a forty-five minute daily flight along the length of the trail, spotting supply dumps and encampments. When the Japs had cached supplies at forty-seven installations on the trail’s length, Allied aviation attacked the targets.

Eleven days of bombing left the Jap forces with neither ammunition nor food. Photography had previewed this action, and photography recorded each step in the Jap defeat. \

Technical difficulties arose from the extreme heat, humidity, and dust. But these photo experts learned to overcome climate as well as enemy. They stripped the cameras after each mission and coated moving parts with a thin film of oil. Thanks to this, the squadron had only one

camera failure in eight months. Exhibiting further initiative when the oblique camera installations broke down, pilots dipped their wings, thus elevating the aerial camera to the required tilt. These low altitude obliques were eagerly sought after for surface vessel identification, and “ dicing ” techniques were soon perfected by resourceful pilots.

North-west Africa combat operations led Lieut.-General Carl Spaatz to praise photographic reconnaissance as one of the most valuable tools available to him. Major-General James H. Doolittle, commanding the Strategic Air Force, was quick to concur. “ Working without photographic reconnaissance,” he said “ is like working in the dark.”

Operational procedure followed in North-west Africa sets a pattern for the manner in which photography supports strategic bombardment.

An operations officer of the Strategic Air Force sent by messenger a daily list of the objectives to the Photographic Wing indicating the priority, the location, and the reason for requesting the desired coverage.

After checking available airplanes and the weather, the next day’s missions were set up by the Wing Commander. By 1900 (7 p.m.) a copy of the missions was sent back to the headquarters of the Strategic Air Force for entry on their operations board.

Assigned missions were flown the folowing day. All planes usually returned to their base by 1000. Dry prints were made, and the first photographic interpretation was accomplished. Prints were then sped back to the Strategic Air Force, usually arriving at 1200 and were used as a basis for the afternoon’s raids. Photographs secured in the afternoon were delivered in the same manner by 2000 and were used as a basis for the following morning’s operations. Thus, round-the-clock operations were assured.

Each theatre poses its own problems. In Alaska, for example, the below-zero weather on the mainland calls for aerial photographic equipment different from that required by the milder but foggier weather of the Aleutians.

Extremely difficult flying, and weather conditions are prevalent west of Dutch Harbour. Very rarely is it possible to photograph from higher than 5,000 ft. Because of the relatively concentrated areas occupied by enemy installations, large-scale photographs are needed. High shutter speeds are necessary to stop motion and get the needed overlapping exposures at low altitudes. Cameras must be specially sealed against volcanic dust. Because weather conditions change so rapidly after take-off, pilots are now able to control the diaphragm opening of their camera shutters from the cockpit. This enables rapid adjustments for the varying light conditions they will meet.

To obtain more than a small fraction of information which photographic aviation is capable of securing, intelligent co-ordination is required. An understanding of the mission and capabilities of photography by all elements of the command is necessary. The photographic Group Commander is generally best qualified to act as photographic officer on the staff of the Air Force Commander. As such, he advises his Commander on mapping and photographic missions and co-ordinates all photographic aviation to insure peak efficiency of the various interlocking uses to which it is put.

For every minute of the day and night the Air Force Commander wants to know these things : What is the enemy doing ? What is his strength ? What are his intentions ? And photographs tell the story with unerring accuracy.