FLEET BATTLE TACTICS

Korero (AEWS), Volume 2, Issue 3, 14 February 1944, Page 26

FLEET BATTLE TACTICS

Basic Ideas Survive New Air-Sea Factors

From Salt, Australian Army Education Journal

Naval action in the Gilberts and Solomons has led to much speculationwill the Jap. Navy fight ? The Nips have been using their fleet mostly for convoy work, and have lost more ships to Allied planes and subs, than in battle. But, with the everincreasing strength of the United States Navy and the prospect of victory in Europe eventually freeing the British Fleet, the enemy will have to join battle sooner or later. Though air power has changed the face of sea warfare (such points as nearness to land-based planes can decide battles), basic fleet battle tactics remain the same. It is possible, of course, only to discuss “ ideal ” conditions, “ ideal ” circumstances — bases upon which a naval commander would work, although such circumstances would rarely be experienced under war conditions.

How would an “ ideal ” fleet make ready for battle —what would be its tactics ? Strangely, despite steel and armour, oil and speed, Nelson’s eye would light with understanding of today’s naval fights. He would recognize their tactics, though destroyers, cruisers,

submarines, aircraft-carriers have replaced his canvassed sloops, corvettes, and frigates.

First let us look at a perfect battle disposition. Most highly prized, most potent ships of destruction are the battleships. They, together with their big new sisters, the aircraft-carriers, are the targets for most vicious attack. If a battle fleet should lose its big ships (and the enemy retain his), it loses any edge it may have had and most chances of winning.

Consequently heavy cruisers, fast light cruisers, and destroyers are deployed around and about the battleships in protective screens. Their task also is to swap punches with any enemy craft within range. In an ideal fleet another cruiser force with its own destroyer protection would be held in reserve.

Perhaps 50 to 60 miles away from the fighting core of the fleet, in this imaginary, “ perfect ” set-up, would be watchful screens of cruisers and destroyers to prevent enemy attempts to reinforce. The Admiral must decide where to place his carrierswith the battleships or a safe distance away—as much as 100 miles.

Sailors still find that the simple formation is the best. Nelson’s seamanship would be equal to handling a modern fleet. Ships no longer close with one another for boarding, but they still try to close the range (though the battle may begin without one ship sighting another).

In wartime ships cruise conveniently in divisions —usually a division consists of four ships. Each division is then broken down to two subdivisions (as in Fig. 1) with ships paired according to like speeds.

The “ ideal ’’ battle formation of a squadron is single line —each ship following the other. In sailor language, ships sail in “ line ahead.” This time-honoured tactic is still superior because the Admiral can make the most of his hitting-power by using it. All his heavy guns can fire through an arc of 120 degrees on either beam.

If the enemy Admiral should adopt a roughly similar battle pattern, both fleets will then strike parallel courses, closing the range until they are exchanging shell for shell. The Admiral’s

supreme task is to keep his enemy within his arc of fire.

“ Line ahead ” is the classical deployment used in a surface action, but when battle is not imminent it is usually safer to cruise “ line abreast.” In this deployment the ships sail beside one another. This is to cut down the menace from submarines. Ships in a long line are a tasty target for smart-shooting subs. Sailing line abreast, our eight ships would probably not sail in a single line, because keeping station is no easy job. It might, rather, sail in its two divisions of four ships (as in Fig. 1). Ships’ speeds vary. A battle squadron sails at equal speed, knots being decided by the Admiral. This helps to make swift manoeuvring easy when “ action stations ” is given.

The Admiral may be cruising in “ line abreast ” when the enemy is reported. No time can be wasted by switching ships about in intricate patterns to take up battle stations. Equal speed helps him to ring the changes on the two basic formations —“ line ahead ” and “ line abreast.’’

If the ships change to “ line ahead,’ the movement is somewhat as shown in Fig. 1 (one subdivision steaming straight ahead, the others turning toward it, and turning up behind it). But such a manoeuvre is by no means as simple as it may appear on paper.

To change back to “line abreast' the leading ship turns at a right angle—--8 compass points or go degrees —and sails on. The others “ turn in succession.’’ When they are all in line, all swing their helms and proceed in the original direction in line abreast (Fig. 2). There are, of course, “ unequal speed manoeuvres,’’ but they are seldom fast enough to be taken up when the enemy is about.

To put the enemy at the greatest disadvantage, the Admiral will try to throw his fleet across the enemy path. For example, our ships are in line ahead, with the enemy also in line ahead, bearing down at approximately right angles to our line (but farther away from where the two lines meet). As we cross the enemy’s path our squadron can concentrate the fire of all ships on the enemy

leader (Fig. 3). As the discomforted enemy Admiral switches his fleet to get his greatest arc of fire, each of his ships is open to our pummelling as it “ turns the corner ” (Fig. 4). Do wide-awake Admirals fall into such a simple trap ? Well, it happened at Jutland. Battle joined, the Admiral may wish to take advantage of his superior speed by opening range. Or he may want to open range because he is being worsted at the closer range. To open range each ship turns away a few degrees together to take up the new line of formation. It doesn’t greatly affect firing, but only faster fleets can “ sidle ” in this way. Battleships and cruisers need destroyer support, almost always. These little chaps are the counter when the enemy destroyers close in to launch torpedoes. Until this happens destroyers on both sides remain close to their respective battleships. This is a case of mutual aid, for not only are the destroyers protected by the heavy guns, but they themselves form a protective screen for the battleships, guarding against possible submarines and adding their gunfire against enemy aircraft. When called,

the destroyers rush through the line of the bigger ships to tackle the enemy. In theory, and sometimes in practice, the destroyer flotillas should meet midway between the opposing fleets, our destroyers keeping the enemy at a sufficient distance to prevent their tin-fish doing any harm. They, too, will fight in line ahead if possible. If the squadron’s Admiral is being worsted, he may think it prudent to break off the action. Under cover of a smoke screen, he will order his ships to make a dash for it.

Line ahead and line abreast, then, are the classical tactics of the sea engagement. Naturally, in war at sea, as on land, the unexpected generally happens, upsetting the calculations of even the most far-sighted Admirals. Success or failure in battle is more likely to depend on an Admiral’s ability to improvise—on his whole experience and seamanship—than on his “ text-book ” moves.

Each battle has its own surprises, its own moves which do not appear in the rules. One major fight in this war, however, came closer to repeating the text-book moves than others —the Battle of the Java Sea.

Four different navies supplied the ships for the Allied fleet in the Java Sea. In addition, several of the Allied ships were not really sea-worthy, having been damaged in the bitter running fight with the swarming Japanese.

Two British destroyers, “ Jupiter ” and “ Electra,” led the Allied line. Then followed the Dutch heavy cruiser “ De Ruyter,” the British cruiser “ Exeter,” the U.S. “ Houston,” Australia’s "Perth,” the Dutch cruiser " Java.” There were four Dutch destroyers to port and four Americans astern. All were in line ahead. Jap. opposition was two heavy cruisers, six light cruisers, eight destroyers. Despite damage to “ Exeter ” and " Houston,” Doorman, the Dutch Admiral, closed with the enemy. For a time the Allied battle line held its own with superb gunnery.

The eight Jap. destroyers then turned in for a torpedo attack on the Allied line. But Allied shelling set the two Jap. heavy cruisers afire, and four Nip destroyers were diverted to cover them.

But the other four came on under cover of a smoke-screen. “ Jupiter ” and “ Electra,” the only Allied destroyers available, dashed in against hopeless odds. They were not seen again. Then “ Exeter ” was badly hit. “ Perth ” and “ De Ruyter ” turned line abreast to cover her, with the result that the Allied battle line was broken up. The four Dutch destroyers, rushing in around the cruisers, clashed with the Jap. destroyers. One blew up, but the four American destroyers, covering the general retreat, sank two of the attackers. Though scattered, the gallant little Allied fleet had fought an action in the classic manner against heaviest odds. Its seamanship was not wanting. It had closed the range, sailing in line ahead. It brought its greatest fire-power to bear at the right spots at the closest range. By knocking out the Jap. heavies first, the fleet had done the right thing. Chance tipped the balance.

There have been other actions at sea where aircraft from opposing fleets have done all the fighting —notably Midway and the Battle of the Coral Sea. Both were resounding victories for the Air Arm. Yet there have been surface engagements where ships and aircraft have slugged it out. Of the five tangled sea engagements fought around the Solomons, several were fought at night. In a fright fight anything can, and usually does, happen. In the last and most important

night clash around Guadalcanal U.S.S. “ San Francisco,” by running the gauntlet of two Jap. battle lines, did the totally unexpected, as a result, the Jap. ships fired madly, and not unsuccessfully, at one another. In a night action the element of surprise is all-important. Other things being equal, success will go to the side whose guns speak first. Experience of aircraft attack undoubtedly has resulted in some tactical amendments to normal practice. The sailor has to be ready for everything. Training, steadiness, guts, stout ships — these still remain the background of real sea power ; in these, the timehonoured tactics of handling a fleet in battle still hold their place.

After hitting Jap. heavies at 25,000 yards, Allied cruisers close in for first phase. In second phase, with “ Exeter ” and Jap. heavy cruisers ailing, English destroyers turn to meet Jap. destroyers’ attack. In third phase, Allied cruisers turn away in line abreast (English destroyers have disappeared), while Dutch destroyers and U.S. destroyers move to meet attacking Jap. destroyers.