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A NEW MOLOTOV COCKTAIL

BOTH wars with which the modern world has had such painful acquaintance have been followed by hard bargaining. At Paris in 1919 several months were consumed in securing agreement, not between the Allies and the defeated nations, but. between the victorious Allies themselves. It is perhaps not surprising that now and then during the conference of the Council of Foreign Ministers which has been sitting in London side currents should have been observed which have carried attention for the moment from the main theme of the parleys-the drafting of peace treaties. Such a diversion was provided by the Press conference given in London by the Soviet Foreign Commissar, Mr. Molotov, at a time when. the Italo— Yugoslav frontier-one of the most important issues in the framing of a peace treaty with Italy—was under consideration by the conference representatives. Although Mr. Molotov dealt at length with the Yugoslav claims on the Julian March (Venezia Giulia) and emphasised .the strong support of his country for the present

regimes in Hungary, Rumania and Bulgaria, the most noteworthy passage from his statement to newspaper correspondents dealt with his country's attitude to the Italian colonies. He gave a clear hint that the Soviet Union desired to be .given a trusteeship over Tripolitania (the western portion of Libya) and admitted Russian interest in Eritrea, the Italian colony on the Red Sea. Mr. Molotov went further than that. Asked whether collective trusteeship was not the more satisfactory solution, he replied that collective < trusteeship was a great principle and 1 should be applied in some areas, as suggested by the San Francisco conference, but that in regard to the Italian colonies the principle of individual trusteeship should not be ignored. ' Mr Molotov’s chief argument against collective trusteeships was that there had been no instances of such methods or control in the past, and he therefore felt that care should be taken in applying them now. On the other hand, there had been examples of trusteeships or mandates by individual nations and. while not all had proved satisfactory, the experience was there. He suggested that some might be ’’emboldened to try collective trusteeship in practice if those who are confident that it will- be a success pointed to other territories —not necessarily Ital—where it could be applied.” He did not indicate which other territories

he had in mind, but it seemed an oblique reference to existing mandates in the Pacific. Adroit diplomatist that he is, Mr Molotov' knows all the tricks of. tin political game. As usual, his Press interview left the world quite uncertain as to what Russia really wants., Were his references to the Italian colonies thrown out for retraction later as “concessions’ in exchange for the Dodecanese Islands, or was he indicating that Russia—-as is only just and right —should share with Britain ' and France the control of the Mediterranean? Are the Dodecanese being used by the .Soviet to screen her true aims in the Dardanelles, or is she seeking to improve her own position at the expense of others? . It is an undeniable fact that Russia, among all the Great Powers, has suffered most as the result of the war. At the same time it can be said, with almost equal truth, that she has gained the most. She has recovered, as she fully deserved , to -do, all the territories wrested from her in the past and has taken Ruthenia, Koenigsberg and parts of Galicia, as well as winning back Port Arthur, Sakhalin and the Kuriles in the Far Fast. But she has gone still further by demanding concessions from Persia and Turkey and making plain her ambitions in Tripolitania, Eritrea and the Dodecanese, a path which, it is not unreasonable to assume, indicates the pursuit of a frankly imperialistic policy. ... - The Soviet. Government has apparently put forward' its , request for the trusteeship over Tripolitania. on two main grounds— that the I tai - ians . joined with the Germans in invading and occupying Soviet territory and secondly, that the Soviet Government believes that its experience in developing the backward peoples' of Central -Asia qualifies it to take its place among, the trustee (Powers. Such claims can hardly lie refuted, especial-

ly at a time, when the United States is asserting herself in the Pacific and France and 1 China are) making plain their little hopes and ambitions. But. harking back to the Atlantic Charter (endorsed by Russia which stated that the Powers would ’’seek no aggrandisement, territorial or other”, it seems only logical that those places or territories cf vital strategic importance which cannot safely be allotted to any one power should be placed under the control cf the United Nations.. The hopes of the world lie in complete cooperation between the Great Powers. And mutual suspicion between Russia and the West is the cue fear that mars it.

Not the - least of the issues arising from Russia's dealings.with the States of the Balkans and south-east Europe is that associated with the Dardanelles. In her overtures to Turkey Russia has again approached the vexed question of the control of the Straits, an item which has cropped up regularly at international conferences for more than a century.. Russia’s strategic aims as far as the Straits were concerned have always been to prevent foreign warships entering the Black Sea and to e allowed to send her own warships into tin 1 Mediterranean;..

If . it is reasonable for the United States to desire strategic basest in Newfoundland and the British a West Indies, it is equally reasonable for the Russians to desire strategic bases at the Straits and unreasonable to expect them to depend on the good graces of the Turks, however good those graces may be, Britholding strategic bases all over, the world, cannot grudge the Russians the right to protect the seaway to their greatest industrial and agricultural area, the Ukraine: Fifty years ago the Russians would have been content, and secure, with Russian garrisons at the mouth of.'the Bosphorus; now the zone extends, as the result of the advent of the aeroplane and: the submarine, from Constanza, in Rumania, to the Dodecanese Islands, at the outer edge of the Aegean. . In the event of the Straits coming under the exclusive control of Russia, then no doubt Britain will retain exclusive control of the Straits of Gibraltar and the Suez Canal. If the Straits are internationalised, thin the exits from the Mediterranean must be internationalised, too, for co-ojpera-tion in joint undertakings inevitably lessens strategic barriers. The Montreux: Convention of 1036 which left to Turkey the sole responsibility for the custody and defence of the Straits had the strong approval of Russia at the time. Now that Russia has made out a case for the revision of the Montreux system, the correct remedy would appear to be joint custody on behalf of

the United Nations rather than a. bilateral arrangement as between Russia and Turkey., The recent outburst by Field—shal Sir Henry Maitland-Wilson, chief of the Joint British .Staff Mission in Washington, that ’’l cannot see why there is talk of security by Russia and all the demands for bases unless she is bent on territorial gain*', was unfortunate and has been frowned upon by official circles in London. There have -been sharp words from the Russian side, too, such as the allegation by the official newspaper, ’’Pravda” that the Powers of the West were endeavouring to form an , anti-Russian bloc. The published text of the letters from Mr Churchill to. General Franco fortunately gave that assertion the lie direct. There ■ ’ has . been • ample evidence since the war ended of differences of outlook between’ Russia on the one hand and Britain and the United States on the other, with France sensitively pushing. her own case to the fore, but: there can be no room for suspicion on either side when the security of the entire world depends on fruitful cooperation.' And in the Mediterranean as much as in any other zone to which the outcome of the present international deliberations will apply the task of making peace must be pursued with the same united purpose .as brought victory in the war.

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Permanent link to this item

https://paperspast.natlib.govt.nz/periodicals/WWCUE19451015.2.18

Bibliographic details

Cue (NZERS), Issue 33, 15 October 1945, Page 25

Word Count
1,357

A NEW MOLOTOV COCKTAIL Cue (NZERS), Issue 33, 15 October 1945, Page 25

A NEW MOLOTOV COCKTAIL Cue (NZERS), Issue 33, 15 October 1945, Page 25