THE STORY OF IRELAND

New Zealand Tablet, 24 February 1921, Page 7

THE STORY OF IRELAND

(By A. M. Sullivan.)

Chapter LXXI.—"The Culloden of Ireland." How Aughrim was Fought and Lost. A Story of the Battle-Field "The Dog of Aughrim," or Fidelity in Death! J

St. Ruth fell back to Ballinasloe, on Ginckle's road to Galway, which city was now held' by the Irish, and was in truth one of their most important possessions. The Frenchman was a prey to conscious guilty feeling. He knew that Sarsfield held him accountable, for the loss. Athlone, and his pride was painfully mortified. How often do dire events from trivial causes spring ! This estrangement between St. Ruth and Sarsfield was fated to affect the destinies of Ireland, for to it may be traced the loss of the battle of Aughrim, as we shall see. .

At a council of war 111 the Irish camp it was at hist resolved to give battle in the strong position which the army had now taken up, but St. Ruth moved off to Aughiim, about three miles distant, on the road to Galway. The new position was not less strong than that which had just been quitted. In truth its selection, and the uses to which St. Ruth turned each and all of its natural advantages, showed him to be a man of consummate ability. Close to the little villas© of Aughrimdestined, to give name to the last great battle between Catholic and Protestant royalty on the soil of Ireland—is the Hill of Kilcommedan. The hill slopes gradually and smoothly upward to a height of about three hundred, feet from its base, running lengthways for about two miles from north to south. On its east side or slope, looking towards the way by which Ginckle must approach on his march westward to 'Galway, the Irish army was encamped, , having on its right flank the ■n-ass or causeway of Urrachree, and its left flank resting on the village of Aughrim. A large morass lay at foot of Kilcommedan (on the east, sweeping round the northern end of the hill) which might be crossed in summer by footmen, but was impracticable for cavalry. Through its centre, from south to north, ran a little stream, which with winter rains flooded all the surrounding marsh. Two narrow causeways, “passes/’ or roads, ran across the morass to the hill; one at Urrachree, the other at the town of Aughrim • the latter one being defended or commanded by an old ruin, Aughrim Castle, at the hill base. Along the slopes of the hill, parallel with its base, ran two or three lines of whitethorn hedge-rows, growing out of thick earth fences, affording admirable position- and protection for musketeers. It may be questioned if the genius of a Wellington could have devised or directed aught that St. Ruth had not done to turn every feature of the ground and every inch of this position to advantage. Yet by one sin of omission he placed all-the fortunes of the day on the hazard of his own life; he communicated his plan of battle to no one. Sarsfield was the man next .entitled and fitted to command, in the event, of anything befalling the general yet he in particular was kept from any knowledge of the tactics or strategy upon which the battle was to turn. Indeed he was posted at a point critical and important enough in some sense, yet away from, and out of sight of the part of the field where! the main struggle was to-take place; and St. Ruth rather hurtfully gave him imperative instructions not to stir from the position thus assigned him, without a, written order, from himself.” “At Aughrim,” says an||intelligent Protestant literary, perodical, . “three apparent accidents gave the victory to Ginckle. . --The musketeers defending the pass at the old castle found themselves supplied with cannon balls instead of bullets ; the flank movement of a regiment (was mistaken . for a retreat; and St. Ruth lost his life by a cannon shot.” The last' mentioned, which was really ; the , accident that wrested undoubted victory from the-Irish grasp, would have had no such disastrous result had St. Ruth con-

fided .his plan of battle to his lieutenant-general, and taken him heartily and : thoroughly into joint command on the field. •

I know of no account of this battle, which, within the same space, exhibits so much completeness, clearness, and simplicity of narration, as Mr. Haverty's, which accordingly I here borrow with very little abridgment:—■

"The advanced guards of the Williamites came in sight of the Irish on the 11th of July, and the following morning, which was Sunday, 12th of July, 1691, while the Irish army was assisting at Mass, the whole force of the enemy drew up in line of battle on the high ground to the east beyond the morass. As nearly as the strength of the two armies can be estimated, that of the Irish was about 15J300 horse and foot, and that of the Williamites from twenty to twenty-five thousand, the latter having besides a numerous artillery, while the Irish had but nine field pieces. "Ginckle, knowing his own great superiority in artillery, hoped by the aid of that arm alone to dislodge the Irish centre force from their advantageous ground; and as quickly as his guns could be brought into position, he opened fire upon the enemy. He also directed some cavalry movements on his left at the pass of Urraghree, but with strict orders that the Irish should not be followed beyond the ' pass,' lest any fighting there should force on a general engagement, for which he had not then made up his mind. His .orders on this point, however, were not punctually obeyed the consequence being some hot skirmishing, which brought larger bodies into action, until about three o clock, when the Williamites retired from the pass. . "Ginckle now held a council of war, and the prevalent opinion seemed to be that the attack should be deferred until an early hour next morning but the final decision of the council was for an immediate battle At five o'clock accordingly, the attack was renewed at Urraghree, and for an hour and a-half there was considerable fighting in that quarter; several attempts to force the pass having been made in the interval, and the Irish cavalry continuing to maintain their ground gallantly, although against double their numbers.

(To be continued.)