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SIDELIGHTS ON THE WAR

. . , : ~. j ~ GENERAL. *3 ?l£": mi v: v ! t ; n" i|i v; ;il ' -V'T : „ n F '''VT' K /;•'•! •■'Vif,' \ • The /British Government has conferred its “medal of distinguished conduct” on the Rev. Dr'. George . M ‘ Sauvage, C.S.C.,- a Professor at the Catholic. University of America, who has been at the war , front for some time, ; where, he rendered eminent service , while with the! British Expeditionary Force, in France. .He was sent by , the . French Government to act as interpreter for the English, but, his priestly zeal led , him to use an opportunity for heroic religious work. • V . ... .There is one college in Belgium which has so far escaped all the furies of the war and has continued its , ordinary existence. It is, curiously enough, the College. of Notre, Dame de la Paix, the new title, wherewith, our Lady ,of ; Peace is invoked now in the Litany. At the : commencement of , the war a/ shell fell on the : college,' breaking /glass. and damaging the kitchen, but since then no, further hurt. has , been suffered. In October, 1914, the courses of preparation and humanities were resumed, also the course of mathematics, but not the faculties of philosophy and science. , There are sixty boarders and the day school flourishes, although in February and March last both schools were closed " J-: i ♦ • a , ._■ >. »- - -vr _ ; L-.. - on account of the order to economise coal. Father Demal is still .rector, Father Colmant is professor of rhetoric, and Father Chaineux not only teaches Greek and Latin, but visits Ecloo and other places to instruct the convent schools. ■WHERE THE RESPONSIBILITY RESTS. Branding as utterly absurd, charges that the Vatican was in some mysterious manner responsible for the recent Italian reverses, Cardinal Gasparri, according to late despatches from Rome, has issued a statement of the Vatican’s peace position. The criticism of the Vatican, it appears (comments the North-West Review of Winnipeg), was .not originated in Italy,, where the causes of the military disaster were known, but it appears to have been freely circulated among other Allied nations. It is declared to have been part of an organised propaganda directed against the Vatican. Cardinal Gasparri’s authorised statement follows; “The Holy Father is not preparing any new appeal looking toward peace. His earnest desire, many times manifested, for a just, Christian and durable peace, is unchanged and cannot change. Who can crave anything else and call himself a Christian ? “To say that his Holiness favors or has favored, or will favor an unjust, unchristian, and unendurable peace, is not only false, but also absurd. Any pro* pagahda for such a peace, alleged to be conducted at the Vatican’s inspiration, especially in certain nations, is the product of pure maliciousness. {*: “The Catholic Church has always regarded true patriotism as a Christian duty and a Christian virtue, and still so teaches. The fact that the Italian Parliament has had warm eulogy for the clergy should be sufficient to refute the calumnies which irresponsible persons have . circulated and i. are . circulating in . the foreign world. Malicious insinuations propagated .in America, and the tendency to attribute in great part to the Italian clergy responsibility for the recent situation, must be denounced. In Italy no fair-minded person is attributing the situation to the clergy. “When the disruptive propaganda began to affect the morale of the Italian army, the clergy in general and also army chaplains, following the instructions and the example of :r the Chaplain-in-Chief, labored .to counteract it and elevate the morale of the troops. More than • once the / army ; chaplains . informed v the Chaplain-in-Chief, who informed the supreme civil authorities, of the : disruptive movement I that - was creeping in— and all this, long before the publication of the Papal 1 Note. ■■•.. !?.#?.

ij “The true causes of the recent Italian reverses are perfectly, 5 well understood in Italy, and the shoulders ! oh which// rests - 7 the responsibility, arewell? vknown

a.;' responsibility j certainly does not ■. touch the Catholic | clergy and, least of Vail;/ the august person of the Sovereign Pontiff/' V 1 // : //V'/ 1 ?;! : !!'/ ? , ■ full . - ■ :r T V- 1- K, rf'.ii k'V K.Vt"V

CHAPLAINS AND IOFFICERS.

The Rev. Dr. Aveling in 1 the Catholic }i World has ' • • ‘ T '• .i r ... ... , . . . .v’ —--v-i 1- ,«* .• • given some interesting war impressions of a chaplain* in France in 1915-16. Speaking of his arrival at the headquarters' of - his : battalion— north-east 1 England oneat r Fricourt, he says : —“What pleasure . when I passed the sentries and reached the Headquarters of my old battalion situated in dug-outs on - the reverse slope/. of a little hill! What a greeting was given to me! If there had been any danger run in -coming, up to make this informal evening call, it was more than repaid by the large-hearted welcome of.the'H.Q. staff—not one of; whom, be it noted, , was a Catholic. • They made one feel not. only that one was at: home ... there ,in every sense .of the J word, but that it was their own padre, who had thus ; ‘blown in’ to visit ; them. f // Of course/the/ . Catholic chaplain is , really : posted to a brigade, and not to a single battalion, but as he is ; attached to . the latter, it often claims him as peculiarly : its own ; and as a general rule its officers make him feel that he is a very intimate member of a select little, family, from whom they expect much affection and devotion, and for whom they are .ready to do almost .anything. -, But this last is true pretty much of all, the , officers in the brigade. It is this.. spirit of true - comradeship, which makes the chaplain’s work among his men much easier to . do, and helps and inspires the priest himself in doing his work.” Father Aveling goes on to say—“ Personally, I never had anything but the greatest consideration and kindness shown to me by all the officers with, whom I had to deal; and in the formation to which I was posted —a south-east of England one—one ..could . count the Catholic officers almost on the fingers of one hand. Many of them, in all probability, had never met a Catholic priest or been in any way , intimate with one before the war. It is not difficult to appreciate the amount of prejudice that has been and is being dissipated by such a state of things as this, repeated again and again throughout the whole British army, and in all the circumstances of the intimate and actual and limited interest of life at the front which I have endeavored to portray. I think lam not alone among the Catholic priests with the British Expeditionary Force—priests from England, Ireland, Scotland, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand — being able to say that some of the warmest and staunchest friendships we have ever made have been with non-Catholic officers, and men—friendships formed in the throes of war and cemented by the common dangers of the. front line. It is a small thing, perhaps, and a very personal one; but my evening visit in August, 1915, .to the trenches in front . of Fricourt Cemetery , will always be one of : the ; memories .that .1 shall carry through my life,, and not.-, the least because of the real—affection and regard .which I found awaiting me there.” / .....Dr. Aveling then,/ gives his impressions of the effects of the war upon the souls and hearts of the soldiers. He says that while waiting the moment of attack problems that plumb the very abyss of, human, thought—-ihe question is it blind . fate or Divine Providence that orders the affairs of this world—are! pondered over and answered, even though in a dumb, in-/ articulate way. ,v He writes ‘Though their ; language ? is not choice ; though their doing will not always square with the right solution of a case of . casuistry, / the \. British soldier, I believe, has" reached and realised some living notion of the truth; of the Fatherhood of God, some vital idea of the Brotherhood of Man, somes very real glimpse of / the meaning of sacrifice and of - vicarious sacrifice, some solid grasp of a ‘beyond/ ; 1 which depends, in, a large measure, upon his personal, effort and uprightness/ Surely that is something Trained! Faith may be and is a gift' of God; but I believe the natural foundations of that faith are - being laid in the odd moments ’of reflection which are interposed between the comparative safety of camps at" home' or ■bn the lines 5 of /communication; and the personal - struggle for life of ; '

: the front r line and the battlefield. - •. I may be wrong. ,. v I think lam right. In the furnace of this affliction I believe character will ; be- formed; ,on : real and not arti-

ficial grounds; on which character truth may be engrafted—truth .n revealed,-.! but supernatural, — - bear fruit a hundred and a thousand fold, ,to the glory of God and to the salvation of innumerable souls.” . f-iM? fa 'jkzhfil r'i-fi ~ ~Mt • ~ - : - h CAN U-BOAT BASE be captured•

Mr. Charles H. Grasty, writing from London to the New ' York Times, ■'comments''-thusV—ln France, where one comes 'into contact with the army chiefly, an impression * lodges in the mind - that this war : might *• be brought to an end if only the allied navies would “go to it. In London the atmosphere is * distinctly naval. I ' did ° not get a chance to advance ‘ the characteristic land-lubber viewpoint more than about a minute before the argument ' - was taken up in vigorous - sailorman fashion. Why don’t the English and American ships go in and clean them up ? If success or failure right now hinges on the U-boat, why' not send naval forces to batter ?to ‘ bits the bases on the" Channel coast ? Expensive, yes but what are ships for but to be risked and lost ? ’ : K

h lo The counter-attack was so sudden arid sharp that I L am v afraid I put rather more of the onus upon (he absent army critic than was altogether fair, whereat a “ navy"' man who doesn't ’ think meanly of his own literary accomplishments, undertook to prepare for my signature a letter stating the case in such, simple terms as to leave no room for misunderstanding, and here is what ho wrote: -

“Since my " return from Switzerland a few weeks ago I have been looking into the submarine situation again. You may have seen in The Times some of my articles concerning the present shipping situation, which is,—you doubtless know, still so serious that no effort should be spared to diminish the loss and increase the amount of tonnage. “I intend to pound away at this until its significance is more generally understood in America, where the political speeches of Mr. Lloyd George tend to create a ,dangerous optimism. “In the meantime there is another feature of this business which exercises no inconsiderable influence

upon public opinion, and that is the influence of the inevitable mob strategy that manifests itself in all cases of prolonged and serious war operations. “Few persons refrain from expressing opinions as to how the enemy could be routed. All respectable newspaper editors must supply their readers with such opinions and with criticism of the responsible military leaders.

“ Many suggestions as to how to end the war are published, and thousands are submitted to the authorities. These are variations of schemes implied by various catch-phrases. .Of these Winston Churchill’s ‘Digging the rats out of their holes’ is the chief. " Another very seductive one is, ‘Why not stop up the hole in the nest instead of chasing the wasps after they are out?’ : :??; ' " ‘ *

: “The influence of these and similar phrases is such that even educated men do not hesitate to criticise the strategy and even the common sense and courage of the allies, and as this tends to dimmish efforts already under way, I made up my ‘ mind to obtain some £acts and authoritative opinions on ‘ the subject. ’ These have proved so very illuminating and are so readily comprehended, even by the civilian mind, that I am sure that they.‘will interest you: ? ,7; ' 1; . 1 ■ hole in the wasps’ nest, the German bases of their fleet and submarines must be taken by attack from the sea. ’ ,bi 2. This can be done only by reducing by bombardment the fortification protecting the bases.

v-b “3, The guns of modern land defences are f not visible from the sea. ? .Many of them are powerful mortars at the bottom of pits., Ships, of . course,/ are clearly * visible *•■ from • shore batteries - and their captive balloons and airplanes.■ . f, i. The effective. range of^,these guns is over .23

„ - . ... . , f* _ _ . •_ miles. This has been shown by actual shooting at ships in this war. - *-=- ,- , , /

“5. No men-of iguns have arrange of more than 17 miles, and the enemy target is invisible. • ”6. It is therefore apparent that a ‘naval?attack from the sea would be ’ even more suicidal ’ now than in Nelson’s day. - n ;‘' v,/ '

“7. If-might be compared to a blind pugilist" with arms two feet ' long, trying’ to fight 1 one with • good . eyesight and with arms three feet long. ’ ■ ' ! : : ‘ ■ “8. ' Coast positions, large areas (like Bruges, Zee? brugge), are ' bombarded from time to time, but T this can be done only' at very infrequent intervals when the wind is in the right direction for screens to .be"laid to mask the bombarding vessels. - ' : “9. Few civilians know 1 the above facts. *" Many irresponsible officers are equally ignorant, ’ as the essential facts I have been developed during this war, but ! I have yet to meet a single responsible officer who' believes that it is possible to reduce ' land defences by a sea attack. All competent naval historians express the same opinion. -. A ' " \ •? . :: ; x

r ' “10; But even; assuming that this were possible, a glance at the map : will show that the German fleet arid' f submarine bases could not be approached by shipping Unless the powerful defences of Heligoland were destroyed and the island captured and held. nt? “11. But even assuming that this island ' were turned over to the allies with all its defences/iritact it could not be held as a base by them .because, being but a few miles from the German bases, it could be attacked every night and all night by numerous airplanes carrying bombs of over 200 pounds. Heligoland is one mile long by one-half mile wide. “12; There is practically no defence against *uich night raids,. In the recent midnight raid on London only two of the numerous anti-aircraft guns ever saw tho planes. ' “13. Moreover, the island could be successfully bombed by daylight, -because the allies could not bring to bear enough fighting, planes to resist the overwhelm-' ingly greater number that could be sent from the nearby German bases to protect the bombing planes. “14. There has been a recent naval conference iti London in which all the principal allied countries were represented. Their conclusions have not been published, but there can be no doubt that no member

present believed that the rats could be dug out of their holes.

“15. Many schemes have been proposed for building a mine or net barrage, or both, to prevent the German submarines . coming out or • going in to their bases. Many attempts have been made, but up to the present time it has not been found possible to prevent submarines passing through the narrow strip of - water between .Calais and Dover, yet it has been seriously: proposed by all sorts and conditions to build a barrage: from Scotland to Norway, over a distance of about 230 miles, in very , deep water and across a strong tide. “It is, of course, unnecessary to state that the assumptions of sufficient knowledge to decide how the naval war should be conducted on this side presupposes a condition of mind that I cannot well understand. The allied nations have been fighting three years. for their very existence. When the civilian sees that his particular idea of the strategy, of < the situation has not been carried out, ought he not naturally to assume that there must be impelling reasons why this is so ? s, ; “But the civilian critic makes the opposite assumption. is He is absolutely : convinced that his - ideas £ are right. ; They i could only be right ;on the :,assumption: that the combined military, experience of all the allies was not sufficient to comprehend: what seems so,: apparent to him, or else seeing the situation as ; he does, they lack the energy and courage to carry it; out. .’p No other conclusion . would ; appear possible i to a man who- knows anything about history’Hcd ????; . In view of the divergence of opinion between the two-services; to say;, nothing,of the irrepressible, conflict of i theory within the navy r the foregoing /'statement [of the ideas upon which present ; policy is > grounded should be interesting. . • ‘ .. v •

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New Zealand Tablet, 14 February 1918, Page 38

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SIDELIGHTS ON THE WAR New Zealand Tablet, 14 February 1918, Page 38

SIDELIGHTS ON THE WAR New Zealand Tablet, 14 February 1918, Page 38