The New Zealand Tablet THURSDAY, JANUARY 4, 1916. THE OUTLOOK

New Zealand Tablet, Volume XLIV, Issue 1, 4 January 1917, Page 33

The New Zealand Tablet THURSDAY, JANUARY 4, 1916. THE OUTLOOK

R. LLOYD GEORGE and his new War VIIMT/ lII* Cabinet have not been long in getting J!&ovZ>llL to work, and the decision to hold what is vitally an Imperial War Conference at the end of February marks a step of ii&kSiSyfc- ' the utmost importance. -The order of, reference is stated only in very general terms, but ,■•> they are sufficiently clear ','.-. to enable us to form a fairly definite idea as to the questions that will constitute the subject matter of the deliberations of the conference. Urgent matters affecting the prosecution of the war, the -possible conditions on which the Allies could - assent to: its termination, and the problems which must immediately '■"■'"" " •"--.- ■ '.. ...... .? i;;

arise oh the conclusion of hostilities,’ is the official // setting forth of the matters to be discussed at the : gathering. : It is v a comprehensive ?;■- programme: - itl I means, in brief, that f everything will be brought; under ,; ■tr 'T • *•*« -r’j 1 ■■-* ■' v * *•• v - ->fe ,■- 0 »,. . >■* •• '*• - ■ - • » review that can ; be considered as • either < directly -or in- ; directly helping , to the victorious' prosecution of -the .•» struggle. , Especially it will mean, •; we may . be sure, ; a mobilisation of the : resources 1 of every part of : the Empire, ana. there : will, it may be safely assumed, be a call for sacrificesfinancial and economic—far be-

yond • anything that has yet been asked for from the Dominions. / The immediate effect of the move will -be to give the outlying portions 'of the Empire a more direct and vivid interest in the Imperial policy relating to the war; and the infusion of new blood and the gathering in council of the best brains of the Dominions cannot fail to strengthen the hands" of the Government in the heavy work that is before it. - ■

.'>•..• The fact that peace terms figure among the matters to be considered is not the least significant aspect of the gathering. It is not to be taken as indicating that peace is by any means imminent, but at least it \ ; shows that matters have advanced _to the stage when - the Allies , think it necessary to be prepared for that eagerly looked-f consummation. The discussion will doubtless proceed on the basis of the decisive defeat of. the Central Powers, and : the crux of the question will be the determination ; of the precise terms which are to : be imposed in order to* provide the most effective "guarantee against a repetition of the hideous nightmare of a "European conflagration. In this connection it is interesting to recall that a definite attempt has already been made by an -colleague of Mr. Asquith's to set -forth the precise demands which Britain, at least, would be likely to put forward as a basis for the final settlement. Mr. C. F. G. Mastermah (formerly Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster), in an article in the Daily Chronicle, under the title The Only Possible Peace Terms,' thus semi-officially interpreted the then" Premier's ideals: —■ ■ 1. Belgium should be restored to complete independence, Germany paying an indemnity adequate for rebuilding the ruined cities, bringing about the revival of destroyed industries, and paying compensation to disabled men and relatives of the . dead. • ''"" - .' ■ 2. Prance should receive Alsace-Lorraine, an indemnity, and a natural defensive boundary, rendering a repetition of Germany's attack for ever impossible. .... 3. Denmark should receive Schleswig. 4. German, Austrian, and Russian Poland .; shall be united under the Czar or his nominee. 5. Italy should get the Trentino and the whole Italia Irredenta. • 6. The Turkish. Empire should be torn to fragments, and Armenia, Syria, Palestine, Mesopotamia, and Thrace should be divided among those who develop the countries. The Turks should be penned in Central Anatolia, where they should be compelled to learn to work instead of to massacre. 7. Serbia should be restored, with the payment of a heavy indemnity from Austria-Hungary, and should receive Bosnia and. Herzegovina, with adequate access to the Adriatic, and should also receive all of Serbian Austria.' . 8. The German fleet should be surrendered, and divided among the allied nations; the Zep- ; pelins and hangars should be burnt. 9. - The German colonies should remain as trophies to the nations which conquered them. , c " : Compared with some of the terms that have been suggested, these are almost moderate; but it is difficult to imagine Germany agreeing, under any circumstances save those of absolute compulsion, to such;conditions as those embodied in Articles 4 and 8. 1 ~, ".._

Germany has also given an; unofficial; but semiauthoritative indication of the sort o*f settlement which she desires,': per medium -of the; former Imperial Chancellor, Prince von Bulow. ■"'.'- The statement '■'■__ does not ~' condescend to particulars but .even the general observations are of. sufficient interest to merit some attention at the present time. In the new edition of his Imperial Germany —the later chapters of which were written in May last—von Bulow says: ' This war is a national war .-. not, only for -us Germans, but equally for the English, the , French, and the most influential section of \ the Russian '"people. ":; The. national hatred "] which- has been aroused- by the war i and confirmed by: ? bloodshed,; will persist after the struggle is concluded . until- national passions receive an impetus kin- 4 a f new : direction". These >considerations• must be ' decisive in determining the conditions of - peace, and that in two respects. Germany will in future require protection against hostility and desires: for revenge/ both old -and- . new, in the west, the east, and beyond N the;; Channel;' f such protection can only be found in the increase of : her own power. Our enemies will also strengthen their armaments on land and sea.. We must see to it that " our frontiers " and . shores are: strengthened and rendered less easy of j attack than at-the beginning of this war; not in furtherance .of that desire for world : dominion with which we are falsely credited, but for the main- , tenance of our present' position. ,•' • . The : outcome of '■■ the war must be a positive, not a negative, one. '.;•_ To prevent our annihilation, loss of territory, or dismemberment to ensure that we be not bled to the last farthing,? that is hot the point; it is a question of definite gain in the form of real security and guarantees, as an.indemnity for hitherto unheard of labors and suffering, and also as a pledge for the future. In view of the ill-feeling against us which this war is bound to bring in its train, the mere restoration of the status quo ante helium would mean for 'Germany not gain, but loss. Only if our power-political, economic, and military— from this war so strengthened that it considerably outweighs the feelings of enmity that have been aroused shall we be able to assert with" a clear conscience that our position in the world has been bettered, by the war.' Here, then, is the situation: .. Germany will not be satisfied unless she emerges from the contest with, her power strengthened; the Allies," as their reply to the German Note clearly shows, will not be content with any settlement which does not leave Germany crippled, if not absolutely crushed.\ ; It looks as if no amount of negotiation would be able to square . this circle, and as if a settlement will only be reached . when Germany is faced with the prospect of complete defeat. * '.'"'■'.. It is good to read that in connection 'with' the summoning of the Imperial Conference there has been an active revival of negotiations for - the Irish settlement. Little is given vis in the way of -detail, but :■ there is a hopeful tone in the cables on the subject that is very welcome. As we have before put it/ Mr. .;. Lloyd George has taken up the duties of Premier with a firm determination to win the war; and to that end he doubtless realises that the pacification of Ire . / land, .as Mr. Redmond has expressed it, would be, worth more than alliance with half a dozen neutrals. As regards Irish settlements" it seems to be always a. case of 'so near and yet so far '; but at least in. the present interesting juncture we are not left without; reasonable grounds for hope. " .