The New Zealand Tablet THURSDAY, JUNE 15, 1916. THE GERMAN SECRET SERVICE SYSTEM

New Zealand Tablet, 15 June 1916, Page 29

The New Zealand Tablet THURSDAY, JUNE 15, 1916. THE GERMAN SECRET SERVICE SYSTEM

——♦ . IR John Jellicoe, we are told in a late cable, has officially reported that it is now established that the Hampshire struck a mine. The report informs us that at about seven flyfcShi evening the two destroyers attached j&y. to the Hampshire were, owing to the rough sea prevailing, withdrawn, and that at about eight o’clock the explosion took place. That is to say, that so .long as the destroyers were with the vessel all went well, but an hour after their protection was withdrawn she was sunk—by a mine. The official report may be ‘ officially' accepted ; but none the less it may be interesting and

opportune to inquire a little into i the operations of the German Secret: Service stem j-and* to how such a piece of work as the sinking of the Hampshire would come easily and directly under * the scope of its regular activity,; *

There are four systems of Secret Service in Europe, the four leading Powers each possessing one. Easily first in systematic efficiency is the German, next comes the Russian, and then the French and British. For the present our concern is solely with the German system, and we are fortunate in having a complete expose of its methods and ramifications written by one who was himself a member of the staff, who spent twelve years in its service, who, though not a German, was entrusted with many delicate missions on behalf of the Fatherland, and-who was finally arrested in England exactly two years before the war broke out. On a charge of espionage at Edinburgh, Dr. Armgaard Karl Graves —the spy in question— sentenced to eighteen months’ imprisonment, but for ‘ State reasons’ was released and allowed to escape to America. Released from any obligations, moral or otherwise, to the German authorities— unhesitatingly betrayed him when they came to the conclusion that he knew too much to be safely continued in their employ Graves has published a full disclosure of the ’ methods of the German Secret Service system under the title The Secrets of the German War Office, and we warmly commend the volume to all who are interested in the subject. Every statement bears the impress of truth and authenticity, and the book is more thrillingly interesting than the most fascinating work of fiction. The German Secret Service, we learn, has three distinct branches — Army, Navy, and Personal, each branch having its own chief and its own corps of men and women agents. The Army and Navy division is controlled by the General Staff of Berlin (Grosser General Stab), the most marvellous organisation in the world. The Political and Personal branch is controlled from the Wilhelmstrasse, the German Foreign Office, the Emperor in person, or his immediate Privy Councillor. The Army and Navy divisions confine themselves to the procuring of hidden and secret information as regards armaments, plans, discoveries, movements of ships, etc. The Political branch concerns itself with the supervision of meetings between potentates, cabinet ministers, and so forth. The Personal branch, under the direct control of the Privy Councillor, is used by the Emperor for his own special purposes, and service in this branch is the plum of the service. The Personal consists of all classes of mep and women. Princes and counts, lawyers and doctors, actors .and actresses, mondaines of the great world, demi-mondaines of the half world, waiters and porters, all are. made use of as occasion arises. . . . The pay varies, but is always good. ‘Expenses,’ says the -writer, ‘ are never questioned, “the money being no object. For instance, I spent on a mission through: the 'Riviera 20,000 marks (£1000) in fourteen days. My fixed salary towards the end was 10,000 marks (£500) a year, besides 20 marks (£1) a day living expenses when not at work, which was automatically tripled irrespective of expenses when out on work. Besides, there is the bonus set out for each piece of work, the amount of which varies with the importance of the case in hand. I received as much as 30,000 marks (£1500) for a single mission performed successfully.*

Our further selections from Dr. Graves's work will be confined to the training and activities of the- naval spy. First, as to the training. . On entering the service, Dr. Graves had to wait ■ five months before he was given his first work, and during those five months he was kept at a steady grind of ■ schooling , in certain things. ‘ Before entering the German Secret Service, I certainly knew the difference -between a torpedo and a torpedo-boat destroyer, but naturally could not give an accurate description of the various types of destroyers and torpedoes. My instructor in this subject was Lieutenant Captain Kurt Steffens, torpedo

expert of the Intelligence Department of the Imperial Navy. After a month of tutelage under him, I was able to tell the various types of torpedoes, submarines, and mines, etc., in use by the principal Powers. I could even tell by the peculiar whistle it made whether the torpedo that was being discharged was a Whitehead or a Brennan. I was also drilled in the construction of every known kind of naval gun. Dozens of model war-crafts were shown to me and explained. I saw the model of every warship in the world. For days at a time I was made to sit before charts that hung from the walls of certain rooms in the Intelligence Department and study the silhouettes of every known varying type of war-craft. I was schooled in this until I could tell at a glance what type of a battleship, cruiser, or destroyer it was, whether it was peculiar to the English, French, Russian, or United States Navy. As I shall show in relating one of my missions to England, I was brushed up on the silhouette study of British warships, for I had to be able to discern and classify them at long range. The different ranking officers of the navies of the .world, their uniforms, the personnel of battleships, the systems of flag signals and codes, were explained to me in detail. I was given large books in which were colored plates of the uniforms and signal flags of every navy in the world. I had to study these until at a glance I could tell the rank and station of the officers and men of the principal navies. The same with the signal flags. , I pored over those books night after night into the early hours of the morning.’ *• *

All this, however, was merely the general or preliminary training. There is, besides, a special preparation for particular work, where the work is of any importance and special preparation appears necessary or desirable. For example, on November 18, 1911, Dr. Graves was called upon to undertake a mission to England the nature of which will be presently detailed—and was ordered to present himself at the German Admiralty Intelligence Department, where he was introduced to three naval experts. ‘ One was a construction officer, another in the signalling department, the third an expert on explosives and mines. One at a time they took me in hand, grooming me in the intricacies of their respective fields. It was like a rehearsal in the grooming I had received years ago when taken into the Service and trained for months, I sat for hours over diagrams with a naval officer on each side. They brought me before charts that were as big as the walls of the room. These charts gave the exact dimensions and type of every vessel in the British Navy. Not only that, I was made to study the silhouettes of all the new and different types of English warships you will see. ... It was included in my instructions to watch the movements of British warships off the Scottish coast and promptly cable the German Admiralty Intelligence Department concerning them. That is where a study of the silhouette charts would be invaluable. A* night or in a fog or early in the morning I would not be able to distinguish the British ships by name. But knowing the silhouettes of all the naval —for example, certain kinds of Dreadnaughts, powerful cruisers, tor-pedo-boat destroyer^ would be able to tell what ships were putting to sea. When I had memorised all the charts, • they covered the names of the battleships thereon and made me repeat the types. For instance, I would say, That is a Queen Mary type of Dreadnaught. The other is of the A jax type. That destroyer is of the Viper type.” And so on. There are well-defined architectural lines to every group of ships in the British Navy, and these silhouettes I learned to know by heart before I was permitted to leave Berlin. ... I was to watch especially the new Rosyth base and to report progress on armaments, new equipments, and anything of use to the German Admiralty. I was to keep an eye on all the British fleet manoeuvres then in progress on the Scottish' coast. . v • . Not a ship could leave either Rosyth or Cromarty without an immediate cable being sent by me to

Berlin, reporting how many war vessels and of what type had put to sea, also if possible the reason for the movement. . . . Every war vessel of the British Navy, every naval base and depot of supplies was coded in Secret Service ciphers. Arrangements had been made with the Intelligence Department to transmit telegrams to addresses in Brussels, Copenhagen, and Paris. In the event of the Brussels channel of communication being closed, I could resort to either of the others. The Brussels address was C. V. Noens, Rue de Venise, 34. Noens had instructions to forward any communications from me to, the proper authorities in Berlin, and all letters from Berlin went from him to a little tobacconist’s shop in London and were there re-mailed to me in Scotland. Six hours after my subsequent arrest in Glasgow, Scotland Yard detectives sought the tobacconist but found him not; nor did they find Noens. As for the Copenhagen address, that was the proprietor of the Hotel Stadt. Having had him at my beck and call during a mission to Copenhagen, I knew him to be in German pay. Marie Blanche, who conducted a modiste and lingerie shop in the Rue de Tivoli, handled all my communications to Paris.’ We need not follow Dr. Graves in the detailed story of the execution of his mission. It is sufficient to say that in a few weeks he had gained—and duly forwarded all the information he desired, and it was only through the treacherous action of his own' Government that he was discovered. One item, however, deserves mentioning. At his trial there was produced a document, found amongst his effects, which the Solicitor-General described as ‘ the most deadly code ever prepared against the safeguards of Great Britain.’ Regarding which, the author says: ‘ And it certainly was. It contained the name of every vessel in the British Navy, every naval base fortification, and strategic point in Great Britain. There were over ten thousand names and opposite each was 'written a number. For example, the Dreadnaimht Queen Mary was numbered 813. Using a magnifying glass I had written in tiny characters my code. There were so many names it was impossible to memorise them all. Two opposite sheets of the little memoranda book were used, then the edges of the pages were pasted together. Whenever I learned that British warships were going to put to sea, I slipped the book in my pocket, went to a position of vantage where I could make out the silhouettes of the warships, classified them in my mind, and then writing out a cable put down the code numbers, say in this way: 214, 69, 700, 910, 21— (necessary words were filled in by the A.B.C. code). . This message was sent by way of Brussels or Paris to the Intelligence Department of the German Admiralty in Berlin, and.told them what warships were putting to sea or arriving at Rosyth.’ *

It can hardly be said that such revelations as these are without a relevance to such enterprises as that which ended so disastrously off the Orkney Islands, and further comment is unnecessary. Every sensible person will deprecate anything in the nature of a blind panic or * spy fever,’ and so far it cannot be seriously affirmed that the spy problem has reached anything like an acute stage in New Zealand. But the situation is otherwise in Great Britain ; and the kid-glove method of handling this grave matter which has hitherto prevailed in official circles in England certainly cannot be said to be commensurate with a proper regard for the safety and well-being of the Empire.