The New Zealand Tablet THURSDAY, JUNE 8, 1916. THE NAVAL BATTLE

New Zealand Tablet, 8 June 1916, Page 29

The New Zealand Tablet THURSDAY, JUNE 8, 1916. THE NAVAL BATTLE

fPART from the deeply regrettable but unhappily inevitable loss of valuable life, interest in the great North Sea fight now centres chiefly around three questions: (1) With which side, if any, do the laurels of victory rest or, in simple English, who really won ? (2) Which side held the initiative in bringing about the contest? And (3), assuming Germany to have been the aggressor, is there likely to be a repetition of such engagements? With regard to the first, the fact that such a question can be raised goes to show that on the facts so far as they are yet known to us, there is no very marked or overwhelming margin of advantage on.

either side. ' All that can be said is that Admiral Beatty's squadron was substantially inferior in strength to that of the enemy, that he held on with magnificent courage and tenacity, and that he inflicted at least as heavy damage as he sustained. When it is added that the British blockadethe maintenance of which is the present and immediate object of the Grand —has been in no wise broken, it may fairly be claimed that the result of the fight is a very real if not a spectacular victory for. the British Fleet. Such is the view unanimously taken by the French press and naval authorities, and they are capable and reasonably impartial judges. It has to be remembered, also, that while . the British losses are definitely and certainly known, the extent of the damage inflicted upon the enemy is not, and perhaps never may be, fully ascertained. The one man who unquestionably comes out of the adventure with flying colors is the Wexford hero, Sir David Beatty; and it only required the least dash of luck and the splendid tactics he adopted would have ended in the enemy receiving a smashing blow. For the rest, the encounter has shown that the German Navy, as a fighting unit, must be treated with respect; though it is only fair to say that, whatever the press and the jingoes may have done, responsible men in the British Navy have never made the mistake of underrating their enemy. * As to how, precisely, the fight originated, we have as yet no full or conclusive information. Two versions are given in the cables. According to one, the American Associated Press has received from the Admiralty a summary of Sir John Jellicoe's and Sir David Beatty's reports in which the following passage occurs: ' We went within the enemy's waters, seeking a fight. Our inferior fleet engaged the entire German battle fleet, and forced it to return to harbor and abandon any enterprise it may have contemplated.' A later Cable reads: Later fragments of news indicate that the Germans were either attempting some dramatic stroke against the English coasts or were seeking to make a breach in the blockade. They failed against Sir David Beatty's vigilance and gallantry. His battle cruisers suffered heavily but successfully held up a far superior enemy force until Admiral Sir John Jellicoe's battle fleet had time to arrive.' There is no necessary conflict between the two statements; and it is probable that the two movements, operating separately but simultaneously, combined to bring about the clash. The actual course of the engagement has been clearly and admirably summarised in an Admiralty statement, and there are three satisfactory features connected with the story: First, that Zeppelins were conspicuous by their absence; secondly, that gunnery, caused greater material loss than " ; torpedoes; and thirdly, that the much talked-of German 17-inch guns failed to materialise. In a word, there were no surprises; and it is no small, advantage that the exact strength and resources of the enemy have now been fully ascertained. '''"" <.„■'" .-....*.. In respect to the matter of a repetition of such . engagements, the French press suggest that we are perhaps at the* commencement of a series of.inevitable and foreseen encounters';" and there can be very little doubt that this view is well founded. It is part of the recognised and considered policy of the German navy—to whittle down our fleet by a series of surprise attacks until a general and decisive engagement may be ventured upon. Such a policy is again and again set forth, in the pages of Bernhardi. - We quote a .couple -of illustrative extracts:' Every attacking fleet \ from the German north coast will be unhesitatingly attacked on the flank from Rosyth and Sheerness, and cut off from its line of retreat. It is thus almost impossible, owing to the. English superiority, to inflict .'any serious damage on the blockading fleet on this line, and the only course left is to advance from the Baltic ; against the north-eastern part of the blockading line. Here we should have a -tolerably secure retreat. This j accentuates - once more the supreme importance to . us

of keeping open, at all costs, the passage through the Sound and the Great B*lt. The command of these straits will not only secure the Baltic basin for us, but also keep open the sally-ports for our offensive operations against the English blockading fleet f {Germany and the Next War, p. 162). And again: 'The rapid completion of the Raiser-Wilhelm Canal is of great importance, in order that our largest men-of-war may appear unexpectedly in the Baltic or in the North Sea. But it does not meet all military requirements. It is a question whether it is not expedient to obtain secure communication by a canal between the mouth of the Ems, the Bay of Jahde, and the mouth of the Elbe, in order to afford our fleet more possibilities of concentration. All three waters form a sally-port in the North Sea, and it would be certainly a great advantage if our battleships could unexpectedly unite in these three places. I cannot give any opinion as to the feasibility of this scheme. If it is feasible, we ought to shirk no sacrifice, to realise it. Such a canal might prove of decisive value, since our main prospect of success depends on our ability to break up the forces of the enemy by continuous unexpected attacks, and on our thus finding ah opportunity to inflict heavy losses on him (Ibid, p. 232). For the purpose of carrying out this policy, the greatest reliance is to be placed on ' scouting' by airships. 'No proof is required that a good intelligence system is essential to a defensive which is based on the policy of striking unexpected blows. Such a system alone can guarantee the right choice of favorable moments for attack and can give us such early information of the operative movements of the hostile fleet that we can take the requisite measures for defence, and always retreat before an attack in superior numbers. The numerical superiority of the English cruisers is so great that we shall probably only be able to guarantee rapid and trustworthy "scouting" by the help of the air fleet. . . -. Such possibilities of superiority must be carefully watched for, and nothing must be neglected which could injure the enemy; while the boldest spirit of attack and the most reckless audacity must go hand in hand with the employment of every means which mechanical skill and the science of naval construction and fortification can supply. This is the only way by which we may hope so to weaken our proud opponent, that we may in the end challenge him to a decisive engagement on the open sea.' It will be seen that the present enterprise has been carried out precisely on the lines so carefully pre-arranged and prepared for. *. With regard to such a policy it has to be noted that it is an essential condition of its success that in at least the majority of such surprise attacks the enemy should inflict greater injury than he received. Hitherto Germany has failed in this particular. If the wearing down process is to continue at an equal rate as between the combatants, the relative superiority of the British fleet will remain unimpaired, or, rather, it will actually be increased. Every such engagement, therefore, even with its inevitable mournful accompaniments, is to be welcomed, as exhausting our enemy more than ourselves, and as bringing nearer and ever nearer the long-desired end.