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Current Topics

The War Situation A fortnight ago we ventured to express the opinion that in spite of her .long series of successes Germany had not received.adequate value for the gigantic sacrifices involved in her offensive against the Russians; and the cabled summary of Lord Kitchener’s speech in the ,House of Lords last week -would seem to show that this view was entirely justified. Again and again he points out the strategic failure of the Austro-German campaign, and even goes so Tar as to suggest that the apparent victories may prove to be very real defeats. ‘ The Germans since June had been taking advantage of their central position, and had employed a very large proportion of their forces in strenuous efforts to crush our Russian ally. Their great numerical superiority and vastly preponderating artillery had enabled them to force the Russians from their defences. The German objective was to destroy the army as a force in being, and thus to free large numbers for action elsewhere. This plan had been a signal failure, like other plans arranged by the German General Staff. . . . The Russian army to-day was intact. Doubtless it had suffered severely in the hard fighting, but the Germans had also paid heavy toll. . . The Germans appear almost to have shot their bolt. Their advance at one time was carried out at an average rate of five miles daily. Now it is less than a mile. The forces which the Germans boast ingly describe as “broken troops” are still doggedly fighting along the whole line, and in some places are turning and inflicting heavy losses. Thus the German strategy has clearly failed. The victories they claim may only prove to be defeats in disguise.’ * Meanwhile in the west the Allies continue to discharge the hardest moral duty of all—the duty of ■waiting under the strain. Their present task is to contain the enemy. There must come a time when an advance will be ordered—though it would seem as if that could not now be until the European spring—but for the time being the work of the Allies in the west has been and is the dull, necessary, hard task of holding as many as possible of the enemy. It must, however, be remembered that in the west the Allies are not only containing the enemy, but are preparing a vast reserve against him. Britain has sent reinforcements, says Lord Kitchener, which have enabled Sir John French to extend his lines and take over 17 miles of front from General Joffre—thus releasing, of course, a corresponding number of French troops. The doctrine of the ‘ detached reserve ’ is the soul of French strategy; and it was by the application of this method that Joffre so successfully countered Von Kluck’s advance on Paris. The reinforcements of our new armies referred to by Lord Kitchener are part of the reserve. The British Fleet is part of it. This keeping back of a great reserve is irritating to civilian opinion and exasperating even to military opinion, but the experts agree that if it is held back until the right moment and then launched the victory will be decisive. German. Resources It can hardly be said that there is as yet any outward and visible sign of serious economic exhaustion or decline in Germany. The most that can be suggested is that her persistent efforts to secure, through American intervention, some relaxation of the British blockade are suspicious, and would seem to indicate that she is suffering more than she will acknowledge through being cut off from most of her ordinary oversea sources of supply. For the rest, neutral writers who have had an opportunity of seeing something of the state of things in the Fatherland are practically unanimous in their eulogy of German organisation, and in declaring -that, while there-may be some shortage in this particular item or that, the food problem is well

in hand, and that there is little prospect of exhaustion either in respect to men or material. Nevertheless, a London financial and- economic paper—the Statist— of considerable weight and authority has iust published a very confident article with regard to* the limits of German resources. ‘ There is a widespread delusion,’ it says, ‘ respecting the resources of Germany which it it desirable to dispel. Newspaper writers and public" speakers aie never tired of dwelling upon the wonderful resource that Germany has shown during the eleven months of the war. These people have never been prepaied by the classical education which they received to understand national resources or national staying power. It is not surprising, therefore, that they are dumfounded by the evidence given ■ that Germany is not yet exhausted. Tl « are prepared to stake whatever reputation we possess on the assertion that the two Central European Empires have not at the present time six millions of men in the field, and never will be able to bring that force to bear upon their opponents. If the reader will bear in mind what is happening here at home he will share our disbelief. We have been engaged in the war now for over eleven months, and yet we have had to change our Government, to create a new Department, and to transfer our most energetic public man from the Exchequer to this new Department so as to be able to supply our Army with sufficient munitions of war. We have thrown our whole economic organisation into disorder by - withdrawing a couple of millions of men from peaceful pursuits and enlisting them in the army ; and yet we are asked to believe that Germany has withdrawn, not a couple of millions, but five millions of men or over, from productive employments, and that yet she has beaten all her adversaries in producing munition supplies in unheard-of quantities. The thing is absolutely impracticable, and is as much of a dream as any fantasy that haunts midnight sleep. What enables Germany to do what she is doing in regard to men is that she has, since her victory over France nearly half a century ago, been devoting herself unceasingly to preparation for this war. With that view she has built an admirable system of strategic railways, and by means of those railways she shifts troops from France" to Poland and back again as circumstances compel her lo strengthen the one position or the other. But that kind of thing may be done for months. It. cannot be persisted in very long. When one hears of what is being done by Germany, one should remember that a great deal of the ability ~to do so is derived from plundering Belg m and the occupied provinces of France. The resources of Germany, in real simple truth, are by no means what they are supposed to be. They are very nearly exhausted, as will be seen so soon as Russia is in a position to bring up overwhelming forces and to drive the Austrians and Germans before them. But the real resources of the two Central European Empires are very nearly exhausted already. Germany looks imposing now because she made vast preparations that are not yet quite exhausted, and because her people are wonderfully patriotic and are fighting well. But the day of reckoning is rapidly approaching.’ We would all be glad to think that an economic collapse—and consequently the end of the struggle—is drawing near, but there is a little too much of the a priori method of argument in the above reasoning. We would prefer to see a little more in the way of definite facts to substantiate and justify this comforting conclusion.

Germany and Peace

Meanwhile there is unmistakable evidence—whatever military or economic significance is to be attached to the fact—that Germany is putting forth definite feelers for peace. Before the war Bernhardi proclaimed, boldly and confidently, that on the part of Germany the contest would be waged for ‘ world power ’ ; now even the Kaiser is content to have it known that ‘ Germany is fighting for peace.’ On the occasion of the capture of 'Warsaw the United Press (America)

asked German :: Emperor by wireless for an expression of his royal view on the historic significance of the victory In - reply the following message was received through the fc>ayville wireless station from Chancellor von Bethmann-Hollweg: His Majesty the Emperor regrets not to be able, for reasons of principle, to comply with the request of the United Press for a personal expression on the .occasion of the successes of the allied German, and Austro-Hungarian armies in Poland. In having the honor to inform you thereof I add the explanation that Germany connects with these victories especially the hope that the end of the war will be hastened through them. I beg to remind you at the same time that the Emperor, in all his public utterances and lately on July* 31 of this year, emphasised that Germany is fighting for a peace which will obtain for it and for the powers which on its side wage the great struggle such absolute securities as they need for a lasting peace and for their national future. Beyond' Germany’s frontiers the peace which we strive to obtain will secure to all peoples the freedom of the seas and will open for all nations the possibility of aiding the work of progress and civilisation in free competition.’ World power or downfall!” will be our rallying cry,’ were Bernhardi’s words three years before the war. ‘ The peace which we strive to obtain,’ is the burden of the Kaiser’s message after little more than twelve months’ fighting. * Pro-German papers in America are still more pronounced and altogether remarkably outspoken in their peace talk. They profess, of course, that they desire peace, not for Germany’s sake, but purely in the interests of humanity and of the countries that are suffering so severely from the war, but the pretext is quite too thin to deceive anybody. The somewhat notorious New York German paper, The Fatherland, has a particularly suggestive article on the subject. Reviewing the position of things after a year of war, it claims that Germany has been everywhere victorious, and proceeds: ‘Even that impassioned Russian, it. G. Wells, admits that this war is not a war of the Kaiser, but a war of the German people, of German science against England inefficiency. Before long the AustroGermans will dictate the peace in Paris or Rome. Tint if the Austro-Germans are compelled to prosecute the war to the end, the peace terms demanded by the Teutonic nations will stagger the world. His Holiness the Pope is to be congratulated on seizing this moment for his offer of mediation. If Germany is forced to make the utmost sacrifices, she will exact (he uttermost from victory. At present she is still in a- reasonable mood. The Allies should seize, her outstretched hand before it is too late. . . Those who put their faith in the English Fleet, should remember how many Dreadnoughts are already slumbering at the bottom of the sea ; they should remember also that the greatest navy in the world, aided by the navies of France, Russia, and Italy, has been unable to save the Lusitania from its fate, or to pass through the iron gate of Heligoland. . . Germany is forging new weapons and calling out of the native soil unthought-of reserves. After one year it is clear beyond doubt that the Teutonic Allies cannot be beaten. There is every reason to believe that the Teuton will be the victor. Instead of attempting to throw in our lot with the losing side in order to safeguard the profits of Mr. J. Pierpont Morgan, we should, for the sake of our bank deposits, if not for the sake of humanity, join hands with the Holy Pontiff to call a halt upon the blood-madness that is daily crucifying anew the spirit of Christianity.’ Coming from a German source, that is tolerably strong, and would seem clearly to show that Germany is anything but easy in her mind as to the probable outcome of the struggle.

To Capture Calais It seems to be generally agreed that, despite their previous heavy and decisive set-back at the battle of Ypres, the Germans will sooner or later make another determined attempt on Calais; and German .ajxthpri-

ties have it all, figured out, down to the last decimal, ; exactly how and where this undertaking, together with \ the subsequent invasion of England, will be accom- ' plished. We have before us, in fact, a photograph of the precise spot on the » French coast .. on which . the huge howitzers -- are to be planted, with the'guns all neatly in position. Her© are the military and mathematical calculations as set forth in a pro-German paper: ‘The range of the new German crucible nickel shell high powered guns is known to a certainty to be 26 miles. From' Calais to Dover, or, to be more specific, from the solid ground on the right of the jetties when entering Calais to the sea front of the Castle port at Dover, is a distance of 21.35 nautical miles. From Fort Range, midway of the jetties, when entering Calais, to the same objective is 21.2 miles. From Fort Larpin, distant 1.1 miles below the shore end of the Calais jetties, to the end of the Admiralty pier at Dover is a distance of 20.9 miles, and from Sandgate, 2.2 miles below Fort Larpin, to the sea face of the Castle at Dover is 19.2 miles. Dover furnishes the first practicable harbor beyond Calais, but as between the nearest points of opposite shore lines the route followed by the telegraphic cable from Sandgate on the French shore to South Foreland on the English coast is 18.24 miles. From Cape Griz Nez to the shore edge of Dover is a still shorter distance, being only 18. miles. To the popular mind the possession of Calais means the possibility of the Germans shelling Dover, but to military men it means a great deal more. Once the Germans are able to reach Calais they will be in a position to mount guns which will clear the centre stretch of water between the Calais jetties and the Admiralty pier of all resting mines. This can be accomplished by counter mining through the medium of high explosive shells. The method employed to counter mine bv naval forces is to explode counter mines in the vicinity of anchored mines. he counter mines may be towed over the mine field and detonated by wires leading from the towing boats, or the mines may be exploded bv high explosive shells dropped on the mine field and detonated by fuses with sufficient delay action to permit the projectile to plunge for ten or fifteen feet below the water surface before functioning. * ‘ The shores of Dover, it is known, are to-day blocked with anchored mines. There are leads through these mine fields which are known only to the Government pilots, but a vessel attempting to pass through the straits without the assistance of a duly accredited British pilot- would to-day be blown to pieces. Before the Germans could make use of the straits it would be necessary to clear the intervening water of mines through counter mining, and the quickest way would be to have recourse to high explosive shells. . . The currents in the Dover Strait, while strong with certain tides and winds, are not too great to permit of effective mine fields being established, and it can be put down as a certainty that once the Germans have blown a free passageway across the Channel they will line both sides of this passage with protecting mine lines. With a patrol of submarines doing picket duty inside these protecting barriers of mine defences it would be next to impossible for an opposing fleet to break through the passageway. This is the danger which confronts England to-day if by any chance the Germans in their new drive succeed in hacking their way through to Calais. The danger is an imminent one when it is known that at this writing not less than ten German army corps are known to be en route to that point of the western lines immediately in front of Calais. . . While it is known that the British possess long range f guns of the navy pattern, it has been demonstrated that the Krupp pieces are outranging in this war any weapon which the Allies have been able to bring into action, and it is conceded that once the Germans are able to blaze a clear passage across the strait they will not be hindered from advancing high powered guns into the strait itself or vessels specially adapted to carrying single guns of high power. The securing of

a foothold on the Dover coast, with the ability to rush high powered guns across to hold any ground so taken, U , would mean the clearing of the land in the rear of. Dover and the rendering all the more secure of the strait passageway.’. ‘lt is 'a knowledge of the fore- - -going/ adds this portentous prophet, ‘ that is causing 'i the deepest concern in England to-day.’ * The answer to all this is threefold: (1) The Ger- • mans have first to catch their —in other words, they have first to capture Calais before the rest of this pretty programme can be carried out. They tried to do this very thing last October, when they were at their maximum strength and when s both the British and the French were far less strong than they are now, and they failed. They threw the flower of their troops against the Allied lines at Ypres, and they were thrown back. (2) The Germans would no more have the mastery over Britain if they, held Calais than had Napoleon when he held every inch of the northern French coast from Brest to the Texel. Calais is not half such a menace to England as is Antwerp, and the occupation of Antwerp has not so far proved catastrophic. It is true that modern artillery has introduced a new factor and that huge German guns mounted at Calais might be able to drop shells on Dover, or upon ships passing up and down the Channel, and so forth. It must be remembered, however, that if Britain should come under fire in this way, the Germans would also come under British fire, and that the fire of big guns from monitors or battleships is at least as formidable as the fire from fixed shore batteries. The British are quite as likely to be able to knock out the German guns as these are to knock out the British. (3) The harbor of Calais even now is exceedingly unsuitable for a big naval operation, and it may be taken as perfectly certain that if the town had to be evacuated it would not be left in a state convenient for the embarkation of Hoops. Calais, however, as we have before remarked, has not yet been taken ; and it is not in the least likely that it will be taken.

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Permanent link to this item

https://paperspast.natlib.govt.nz/periodicals/NZT19150923.2.26

Bibliographic details

New Zealand Tablet, 23 September 1915, Page 21

Word Count
3,178

Current Topics New Zealand Tablet, 23 September 1915, Page 21

Current Topics New Zealand Tablet, 23 September 1915, Page 21