The New Zealand Tablet THURSDAY, DECEMBER 31, 1914. THE GERMAN NAVAL PROGRAMME

New Zealand Tablet, 31 December 1914, Page 33

The New Zealand Tablet THURSDAY, DECEMBER 31, 1914. THE GERMAN NAVAL PROGRAMME

NDER the somewhat inapt title of How Germany Makes War, there has just been published an English translation of General von Bernhardi's book On War of To-day. The original German work was published at the end of 1911; and it was written with an eye to. just such a war and to just iJ Such conditions as are now in being, t It is, in fact, an exposition of the ideas* underlying the German plans for the war with the Allies, and of the methods on which the German staff and War Lords rely for Germany's success in the contest; and it has, therefore, a direct bearing, not only in its broad principles but even in points of detail, on the present struggle and. the existing situation. So far as the operations in the field are concerned, these have now so far developed that the intelligent observer is in a position' to form a fairly clear general idea of the German aims and objectives in the land warfare. More interesting, therefore, at the present juncture-and particularly in relation to recent and future raids—are the author's observations on Germany's probable naval programme. * Not much is said as to the spirit in which the naval fighting is to be conducted, but there is a sufficient hint that as far as is possible the method of terrorising the enemyespecially the non-combatant enemy—is to be ruthlessly carried out at sea as well as on land. ' Especially at the beginning of the war, and sometimes in peace even —if there is no other means of defending oneself against superior forceit will be advisable to attack the enemy by torpedo and submarine boats, and to inflict upon him unexpected losses. War upon the enemy's trade must also be early and, if possible, suddenly initiated, if valuable success is to be achieved. This war must also be conducted as ruthlessly as possible, since only there, in addition to the material damage inflicted upon the enemy, the necessary terror is spread among the hostile merchant fleet, and thereby more injury done than by the capture of actual prizes. A certain amount of terrorism must be practised on the sea, making peaceable tradesmen stay in the safe harbors. It is customary, as a rule, to convoy prizes to the nearest port at home and to destroy them only in case of need, as is also provided for in the London Declaration. But the party-with few naval pivots of its own in foreign waters will very often find itself in a position to assume its case to be one of need, and will then naturally destroy at once" the hostile ships captured ; short work must likewise generally be made of neutral ships carrying contraband.' Bernhardi, it may be noted, fully realised that in a war with England German colonial possessions would be in danger, and clearly foresaw the possibility of losing them. J The defence of colonies, too, whose coasts are insufficiently

protected by fortifications can generally be only effected by acting offensively against the hostile fleet. By attacking and defeating it with the object of destroying next the transport fleet carrying the troops detailed to land- and attack the transoceanic colonies, we can prevent idi© enemy from laying hands on them. If we are not strong enough to . proceed ,in this manner, and if the colonies have not sufficient land forces of their own to ward off an attack themselves, we must 'abandon them for the time being, and may lose them sometimes altogether. The English would surely not hesitate to seize the German colonies in a war with Germany, and keep them should England remain victorious, in the same way as they once deprived Holland and France of their most valuable possessions.

*

The defensive duties of the British fleet under circumstances such as now exist are thus indicated: *. In a defensive war of an insular State, the duty of the fleet culminates in preventing, firstly, hostile landings by defeating the enemy's fleet, and, secondly, in keeping open the ocean highway for the import of provisions and war material. For —which, for the subsistence of her population, depends almost entirely on foreign countries— duty of the fleet is of particular importance, since the country could be simply starved if imports were cut off.' These two requirements the British fleet has thus far completely fulfilled, in addition to doing such offensive work as opportunity allowed. The difficulties attending the British policy of operating as a blockading fleet, and the tactics by which the German fleet are likely to meet that are thus described: ' Keeping up a blockade makes very great demands upon a blockading fleet; that service is exceedingly exhausting, and all the more so when the enemy controls a battle-fleet which takes an active part in the coast defence, and when the blockading line's naval base is far away. The blockading fleet cannot continually keep to the high seas. It must generally confine itself to watching keenly the hostile coast with a number of ships, remaining with the bulk of the battle-fleet at a safe naval pivot behind the line of observation, so as to oppose thence any hostile sorties. If there are no such pivots within easy reach of the fleet, it will try to seize such pivots in close proximity to the coast blockaded—perhaps a suitable island, or a point on the hostile coast itself. The defender, on his part, will turn these circumstances as much to his advantage as possible. He will first of all occupy, and if feasible fortify, at any rate obstinately defend, all those points which would suit the enemy as pivots; he will, further, strive to keep the blockading fleet continuously' on the alert by constant and, if possible, sudden attacks, especially at night, partly with submarines and torpedo boats, partly also with the battle-fleet itself, inflicting upon it as many losses as is ever possible, but always breaking off when the enemy succeeds in uniting superior forces against the ships making the sortie. With successful reconnaissance it will, no doubt, be possible to assail the enemy with advantage at times, when he has weakened himself at one or other place. A blockade by its nature necessitates a certain amount of division of forces, while the defender's fleet can lie always concentrated at safe anchor- . ages, ready to make a sortie. A blockade of this sort will no doubt exact from the assailant great exertions, severely strain his ships, and entail heavy losses.' * , According to the German plans, the decisive battle, when it comes, will be on a huge scale, and will easily rank as the biggest sea fight in history. 'As separation of forces always entails the danger , of small detachments .being defeated in detail, we must try to escape this danger by using our own battle fleet as unitedly as possible, and keeping it as concentrated as we can, so that we may act ; with our, full strength wherever we resolve to fight, and not expose ourselves, in any case to be defeated in detail. There can generally 5 be no such thing in naval warfare as conducting a delaying action, .-- engaging the forces gradually, nor ~

therefore detailing reserves. To begin the combat with a portion of the forces, and then to engage the main body at the- decisive point, is impossible on the high sea. Numerical superiority has here a much more destructive effect than in war on land, because on water it is, much more than on land, a question of war machines fighting against each other.' But German policy frankly recognises that for a long time, at least, it may be impossible or at any rate gravely inexpedient to risk a decisive engagement. 'There may, however, be conditions making such action of the battle-fleet challenging an issue—actually impossible; and this will be the case if one has to fight an enemy overwhelmingly strong, who has his forces united and ready for immediate action. In such a case a strategic offensive, seeking for a decisive issue, is no doubt inexpedient! It could only lead to the ruin of one's own fleet, without the chance of inflicting, in the hopeless struggle against superior numbers, losses upon the enemy even proportionately equal. The law of, numbers rules on the water as well, and there are proportionate strengths making victory positively impossible.' * ' . But however, long deferred, sooner or later the great decisive day must come; and German plans and hopes for the occasion are clearly set forth. 'lf we now survey all the difficulties accruing to the assailant in his blockade and attack upon a well-defended and fortified coast, and if, on the other hand, we consider how comparatively, favorable the conditions are under which the war can be conducted by the defender in a situation like this, we can very well imagine that even a great superiority in ships will gradually dwindle away, and that ultimately a state of affairs may be created in which the original difference. in force seems to be equalized, and that the ideal state in Beseler's fortressdefence has arrivednamely, "that the assailant will become defender and the vanquished." If that moment seems to have arrived, the battle-fleet of the hitherto defender must put to sea and fight the decisive battle. If during its long, wearisome struggle on the coast the fleet has succeeded in gaining and maintaining moral superiority over the attacker, if it has inflicted heavy material injury on him and broken the elasticity of his will to conquer, then it will come out victorious in this combat. But if the attacker has endured all the hardships of the blockade and of the attack on the coast with unbroken courage, and if, in spite of all losses, he maintains a substantial numerical superiority, he may also in this last combat gain a victory, and thus bring about a decision in his favor.' The chapter concludes with the pious hope ' that if our German fleet is called one day to fight it will appear on the stage of the world with as surprising and decisive an effect as the Prussian Army, in 1866, which being raised by universal service, had then been completely misjudged.' Forewarned is forearmed. Oh . . . that mine adversary had written a book!' exclaimed the sage of old. The adversary has written a book, and laid bare his plans; and it may be taken for granted that they are known and noted in the quarter that, most concerns us and our safety.