Current Topics

New Zealand Tablet, 1 October 1914, Page 21

Current Topics

What the Documents Say

There are qui.e a , number of - ‘ scraps ,of paper’t defining Germany’s relations to Belgium, to which that Bower has affixed its signature; and they go to show that not only has Germany broken her pledged word but that her proposals to Belgium, enforced by the threat of treating that country ‘ as an enemy,’ constituted an outrage upon the law of nations, and upon that public law of Europe which constitutes the very title-deeds of the smaller nationalities. First, there was the Treaty of London, April 19, 1839, by which Germany, in common with Britain, Russia, Austria, and France, guaranteed the independence and neutrality of Belgium. That guarantee constituted an obligation both collectively and individually binding; that is to say, each Power undertook not only to respect but to protect Belgian neutrality, and to do that alone if no other Rower would help her. Then came the Treaty of 1870, by which Germany and Britain agreed to co-operate in the defence of Belgian neutrality, ‘ employing for that purpose their naval and military forces to insure its observance, and to maintain, then and thereafter, the independence and neutrality of Belgium.’ Then there was the Hague Convention No. 5 of 1907, on the duties of neutrals in war upon land, which lays it down explicitly that not only is ‘ Tho territory of neutral Powers inviolable (Article I.) but also; ‘ Belligerents are forbidden to move troops or convoys of either munitions of war or supplies across the territory of a neutral Power.’ To that Convention Germany was a signatory ! As one of tho greatest of English international lawyers has pointed out: ‘lf the respect due to our neutral territory was violated by one party, it would soon provoke similar treatment from the other, with the result that what was neutral ground would soon become the theatre of war.’ The right of a country so placed to resist any such violation is expressly recognised in the Hague Convention (Article X.) : and the same Article distinctly provides that ‘ The fact of a neutral Power resisting, even by force, attempts to violate its territory cannot be regarded as a hostile act.’ Under the circumstances, Professor J. IT. Morgan wasabundantly right when he declared, in the Westminster Gazette, that if Belgium’s cry of distress had fallen upon deaf ears, Europe would have committed an act of moral bankruptcy, and the most durable and unimpeachable of all forms of treaties—treaties that are the corner-stone of the public law of Europe—would have been torn up never to be restored.

Identification for Soldiers

Everyone is familiar with the once popular verses entitled ‘ Somebody’s Darling,’ in which were commemorated the tragedy and pathos of the unknown dead on the battle field. In past wars the number of these unrecognised and unidentified victims must have been very large. Intone of the national cemeteries of the United States there is a famous ‘ tomb of the unknown dead,’ erected to the memory of some 2600 men who gave up their lives during the Civil War, and whose identity could not be established. Reference has been made in recent cablesas showing the completeness of the German organisationto the fact that every German soldier carries on his person an aluminium tag, bearing on one side particulars as to the name and identity of the wearer and having on the other side a blank space on which may be inscribed by the proper official the date of death or information ; as to the injury received.. It is interesting to note that a similar device now forms part of the United States Army equipment. After the sinking of the * Maine ’ ■ in Havana Harbor, a, number of bodies were recovered which could not be identified : and to prevent a recurrence of this unpleasant feature of loss by land or sea, ; and to assist as far as possible in the identity its personnel, in event of war or disaster, the United - States War Department issued a general order to the following effect: An aluminium -identification tag, the size of . a silver half-dollar and of suitable

thickness, stamped ' with the name, rank, company; and regiment, .or- corps of the wearer, will be worn by each officer and enlisted man of .the army, whenever the field kit is worn, the tag to be suspended from the neck, underneath the clothing, by a cord or thong passed -through a small hole in the Lag. It is prescribed as part of the -uniform, and when not worn as directed herein will be habitually kept in the possession of the owner. The tag is issued by the Quartermaster Corps gratuitously to enlisted men and at cost price to officers. Provision is also made by the United States War Department to prevent confusion in respect to the horses employed in army operations. The present United States Army regulations provide that public animals shall, upon the day received, be branded with the letters ‘ U.S.’ on the left fore shoulder, and horses assigned to organisations are branded with the designation of the company. It is, doubtless, only a matter of time when the humane tag device for the identification of soldiers will be adopted in the armies and navies of all the great Powers,

The War News

To our mind—speaking, we need hardly say, not as as expert but 'merely as an everyday, commonsense citizen—by far the most important and satisfactory item of the week’s news is the special order issued to the troops by General French. ' We print elsewhere in full the official report from general headquarters regarding the Battle of the Aisne, which covers the period from September 14 to September 18 inclusive, and included in this is the text of General French’s order. Referring to the operations during this period, the Field-marshal says in part: ‘Once more I have to express my appreciation of the splendid behaviour of the officers and men of the army under my command. . . This is the third day the troops have been gallantly holding the position they have gained against most desperate counter-attacks and a hail of heavy artillery. I am unable to find adequate words to express the admiration I feel for their magnificent conduct. The French armies on our right are making good progress. I feel sure that we have only to hold on with tenacity to the ground we have won for a very short time longer, when the Allies will be again in full pursuit of a beaten enemy. The self-sacrificing devotion and splendid spirit of the British Army in France will carry all before it.’ ' *

When the man on the spot, and'the man of all men whose judgment on the subject is to be respected, speaks thus as to the present position and prospects, we may make our minds easy, even though occasional cruisers are sunk and merchantmen captured by the enemy. We confess that anything approaching mere boastfulness does not appeal- to us. To talk, as Mr. Winston Churchill does, of ‘ digging the enemy out like rats,’ is suspiciously like brag, and must appear just about as silly to German readers as the German talk as to-what their navy is going to do to the British. Fleet appears to us. It is always bad policy to underrate your enemy and detestable as his ethical standard during -the war has shown itself to be, the German fighting man, as fighting man, is entitled to respect., It is not the responsible /soldier who gives way to the temptation to swagger. ‘ The Germans are formidable,’ says the official British report already referred to, ‘ well trained, long prepared, and brave. Their soldiers are carrying on the contest with skill and valor.’ Men like Lord | Kitchener —with his /simple ‘We mean to carry this thing through to 1 the end ’ —and General French speak simply with quiet confidence. They mean what they say, and what they say means a very great deal. When, therefore, General French assures us that the British Army is doing, and is capable of doing, all that is* being asked of it; we may accept the statement at its full face value.-V v; : I

The Realities of Campaigning : ! | ’•' Hidden away in Friday’s cables was a tiny threeline paragraph which -is -undoubtedly reliable, -and which is-full of meaning and significance. 1 Ten per cent,’ it

says, ‘ of the British ’ wounded ‘are* suffering from rheumatism, bronchitis;? /orT overstrain due to excessive’ marching.’ Needless to say, it is not only the wounded who are thus suffering. To the mind of the average civilian the .vast majority of the soldiers who never return from the wars fall nobly fighting for their country’s honor upon the bullet-swept field or , die of wounds in the military hospital. As a matter of face the great majority die by the more prosaic though certainly not less honorable way of disease, and not from contact with bullet or bayonet or the other death-dealers whose direct purpose is to dissolve partnership between soul and body. This is, of course, a feature of campaigning life which appeals to the military man and the statistician with greater force than to the war correspondent, the war poet, and the war historian. Hence it is that wo hear so little of this unpleasant side of the soldier’s life. In the American Philippine campaigns some of the battalions lost full half of their strength by sickness, and the hospitals were literally crammed with the victims of disease. In the South African War the censor allowed sufficient information to pass along the wires to show that disease was decimating the garrisons both of Mafeking and Ladysmith. Even in temperate climates and seasons the losses through sickness in campaigns are by no means few : and they must be relatively considerable in the conditions under which marching, camping, and fighting will have to be done in the European winter season now approaching.

In the great wars of the past it has invariably been the case that where bullet and bayonet slew their thousands in war, disease killed its tons of thousands. In the 114 days’ struggle between the United States and Spain, only 279 Americans were killed in battle, and 1423 wounded. The number swept off by disease was 2086 : those stricken by disease were, in round numbers, 40,000. In 1870 some 200,000 Germans corralled Bazaine within the walls of Metz. As many as 130.000 of the investing force were in the hospitals. Out of a total of 467,000 sick men that lay in the Gorman military hospitals during the same war, only 88.000 were there on account of wounds received in battle. In the great American Civil War of the ’sixties, the Northerners lost 78,246 men who were killed upon the battle-field or died of wounds. Their losses from disease reached the enormous total of 149,030. The two great scourges of the private soldier are camp-fever and dysentery. As the cable hints, however, rheumatism is not to be sneezed at as a factor in putting men out of action. In Mulhall’s Dictionary of Statistics we find the following significant entry under* heading ‘Disease’: ‘During the war of 1861-63 in the United States the Federals had 5,825,000 men under colors, and of these 254,700 were sent to hospital for rheumatism.’ In the bungling campaign of the Crimea 362.000 out of a total of 428,000 Anglo-Franco-Sar-dinian troops were stricken with disease. Of this host of sufferers, 69,200 died. The deaths from wounds made the relatively insignificant total of 6200. Of the British soldiers, 2755 met their deaths in action; 1847 died of wounds in hospital. The total of British victims of Russian bayonet-thrusts and sabre-strokes and marksmanship was, therefore, 4602. This was, however, a mere bagatelle beside the holocaust of 75,375 men who were cut off in the prime of life by disease. .It is the same_old tale as far back as military statistics are available. Thus, the long and strenuous campaign against France, from 1795 to 1815, showed an annual deathrate in the British army of 57 per thousand. Only seven per thousand of these met their deaths in action. The overwhelming majority of the remainder were swept off by disease; Happily, .improved methods of surgery and sanitation have greatly diminished the proportion of deaths from "wounds and disease in the campaigns of later years. In- any case, the, risks to be run are thoroughly well ; known to the brave fellows who are freely and. voluntarily making their way to .the front; and their cheerful readiness, to face whatever may befall is eloquent testimony to the fine stuff of which they are made. '

A German,Forecast

To those who have made a close study of military matters and of the European signs of the times the present war has not come by any means as a surprise; and many interesting hints and prescient warnings as to what the future held for us — given when peace seemed assured—have now been recalled and republished. Amongst all these prophetic utterances we have seen nothing quite so completely and comprehensively accurate as the forecast given in a book published in Germany three years ago. The book is entitled German;/ aml the Jc.rt War. The author is Gen. Friedrich yon Bernhardi; and it was written in 1911. An English translation by Allen 11. Powles has been published by -Edward Arnold of London. Even at that time the author regarded a general European Avar as a certainty of the near future. The most remarkable feature of the book, of especial interest at the present moment, is the fact that General von Bernhardi takes anything but a sanguine view of Germany’s prospects. He anticipates Italy’s detachment from the Triple Alliance. lie sees England’s fleet sinking with overwhelming strength at Germany’s fleet. He sees the armies of Germany, with only moderate help from Austria, outnumbered by the armies of France on the west and Russia on the east. lie sees the possibility of an invasion of the empire by England and her allies through Belgium and Holland. He sees Germany’s commerce suffering severely if not ruined. Although ho does not despair, he sees clearly that it will take Germany her very last ounce of effort to win through.

In regard to the Triple Alliance, General von Bernhard! points out that Germany and Austria form the solid, probably unbreakable core of. the group. Its weakness, he presciently declares, consists in its purely defensive character. Since Italy found that it did not aid her Mediterranean policy she has become lukewarm in her adhesion to it. Dealing with the members of the Triple Entente, he remarks: ‘France and Russia have united in opposition to the central European Triple Alliance. France’s European policy is overshadowed by the idea of "revanche. For that she makes the most painful sacrifices; for that she ,has forgotten the hundred years’ enmity against England and the humiliation of Fashoda. She wishes first to take vengeance for the defeats of 1870-71, which-wounded her national pride to the quick : she wishes to raise her political prestige by a victory over Germany, and if possible to regain that former supremacy on the Continent of Europe which she so long and brilliantly maintained. She wishes, if fortune smiles on her arms, to reconquer Alsace and Lorraine. But she feels too weak for an attack on Germany. Her whole foreign policy, in spite of all protestations of peace, follows the single aim of gaining allies for this attack.’ The author lets us into the secret of Russia’s aims, and inferentially explains why she is able to give assurances that she is not desirous of territorial aggrandizement in Prussia. ‘ Supremacy in the Balkan Peninsula, free entrance into the Mediterranean, and a strong position on the Baltic are the goals to which the European policy of Russia has naturally long been directed. She feels herself also the leading power of the Slavonic races and has for many years been busy in encouraging and extending the spread of this element into central Europe. Pan-Slavism is still hard at work.’ In regard to England, he is apparently not quite so well informedat least so far as her motives and intentions are concerned; ‘England has recently associated herself with the Franco-Russian alliance. She has made an arrangement in Asia with Russia by which the spheres of influence of the two parties arc delimited, while with France she has come to terras in the clear intention of suppressing Germany under all circumstances, if necessary by force of-arms. This policy ; of England is, on superficial examination, not very comprehensible. Of course German industries and trade have lately made astounding progress, and the German navy is growing to a strength which commands respect. We are certainly a hindrance

to the plans which England is prosecuting in Asiatic Turkey and Central Africa.’

After some further more or less mistaken comments as to England’s attitude, General von Bernhardi forecasts with unerring accuracy the issues which will confront Germany in the coming struggle. The Fatherland, he foresees, will face either world power or downfall. 4 We shall therefore some day perhaps be faced with the necessity of standing isolated in a great war of the nations, as once Frederick the Great stood when he .was basely deserted by England in the middle of the struggle, and shall have to trust to our own .strength and our own resolution for victory. Such a war—for us more than for any other nation —must be a war for our political and national existence. This must be so, for our opponents can only attain their political aims by almost annihilating us by land and by sea. If the victory is only, half won they would have to expect continuous renewals of the contest, which would be contrary to their interests. They know that well enough, and therefore avoid the contest, since we shall certainly defend ourselves with the utmost bitterness and obstinacy. If, notwithstanding, circumstances make the war inevitable, then the intention of our enemies to crush us to the ground and our own resolve to maintain our position victoriously will make it a war of desperation. A war fought and lost under such circumstances would destroy our laboriously gained political importance, would jeopardise the whole future of our nation, would throw us back for centuries, would shake the influence of German thought in the civilised world, and thus check the general progress of mankind in its healthy development, for which a flourishing Germany is the essential condition. Our next war will be fought for the highest interest of our country and of mankind. This will invest it with importance in the world’s history.’

As to naval preparations and (he probable course and result of operations so far as Germany is concerned, the author’s reading of the situation continues to be remarkably accurate, though ho still shows a prejudiced view in regard to Britain’s motives. 4 These (Britain’s) preparations,’ he says, 1 are like a strategic march and the natural extension of their naval bases leaves no doubt as to their meaning. The great military harbor of Rosyth is admittedly built for the eventuality of a war with Germany and can mean nothing else. Harwich has also been recently made into an especially, strong naval base and, further, the roadstead of Scapa Flow in the Orkney Isles has been enlarged into a cruiser station. These are measures sp directly and obviously directed against us that they demand an inquiry into the military position thus created. If the French fleet — as we may expect — combines with the English and fakes part in the war/ General von Bernhardi continues, 4 it will be much more difficult for us to wage than a war with England alone. France’s blue water fleet would hold our allies in the Mediterranean in check, and England could bring all her forces,, to. bear upon us. It would be possible that combined fleets of the two Powers might appear both in the Mediterranean and in the North Sea, since England could hardly leave the protection of her Mediterranean interests to France alone. The prospect of any ultimately successful issue would thus shrink into the background. But we need not even then despair. On the contrary, we must fight the French fleet, so to speak, on land —namely, we must defeat France so decisively that she would be compelled to renounce her alliance with England and withdraw her fleet to save herself from total destruction.’ . "

The crushing and decisive blow on France has so far not eventuated : and the compact entered into by the Allies not to make peace singly, shatters what this accurate and well-informed writer evidently regards as Germany’s one ope. of success.