A FEATURE OF SECRET SOCIETIES.

New Zealand Tablet, Volume XII, Issue 27, 24 October 1884, Page 7

A FEATURE OF SECRET SOCIETIES.

(From the Catholic Mevietv.) As it has often been urged that the hostility of the Catholic Church to secret societies is either entirely unreasonable or founded upon some doctrinal tenet not- intelligible to the average Protestant we propose to show that the oppositon is so obviously just as to compel the approval of the most ordinary honest-minded person, inasmuch as it is a consequence from an ethical principle as broad and simple as morality itself, and one which men constantly apply in the everyday affairs of life. The principle is this, that no person is justified in binding him* self to the observance of a secret the purport or burden of which he does not know beforehand. It is quite possible that the secret know* ledge furnished in this manner may be of such a sort that it ought to be communicated to others either under pain or sin or under the penalty of the law. For instance, should a person find that the secret tnus confided to him involved the life and honour of others, would he not be compelled, even in defiance of his pledge, to acquaint those concerned with the facts as known by him t If he found that such knowledge meant a conspiracy to massacre the inhabitants of a city or to poison its wells, would he not be guilty of participation in the awful crime if he withheld his knowledge from the proper authorities ? Who would say that an oath wan binding under such circumstances ? This is no arraignment of the value of an oatti which of course is sq sacred that life itself should be the forfeit of its observance, but the repudiation of a mistaken pledge which lacks one of the essential conditions of a legitimate oath. It might be said that an alleged inviolable secrecy does not alter the relations in this case, since the person thus bound is as one not knowing, for knowledge which cannot be communicated does not differ from ignorance. This is a mistake, for if such a pledge were binding the person so bound could not make use of his knowledge even should he obtain it through another channel, for his promise was absolute never to disclose certain facts then and there communicated to him. Surely nobody will maintain a proposition so Absurd, and yet it is a possible consequence of the fundamental principle of secret societies. Now, if an oath be taken to keep secret a knowledge of certain facts which it is one's duty to divulge, and if, consequently, such an oath is not binding, does it not follow that such an oath ought not to have been taken, that the taking of it is in direct conflict with public moraU and public welfare ? It matters not what may be the tenor of the knowledge confided to us under the pledge of secrecy ; so long as it is possible that one might be in duty bound to disclose it, so long is it immoral for us to pledge ourselves in advance to keep it secret. If the knowledge were communicated to us first, and that there being no valid reason to refuse, we should pledge ourselves to keep it secret, there is no doubt that such a pledge is binding ; but a pledge to secrecy can never legitimately precede the knowledge to be kept secret. The principle, like all general principles, is universal and can admit of no exception. The fact that the knowledge which we thus obtain is innocent or even beneficial does not alter the case, for such a character of the knowledge occuxs per accidens and does not flow from the secrecy to which we commit ourselves. Were the beneficial character of the knowledge confided to us the necessary consequence of secrecy, then indeed that circumstance would alter the case, for then it would be a. consequence, per se, of secrecy. But it is evident that it can never occur. So long as the pledge to secrecy does not, per xc, carry with it the guarantee that what is to be confided to us is of an innocent or beneficial character, so long is there a risk in accepting it, or, in other words, the pledge is rash. Nor can any general assurance that what we are about to be pledged to keep secret id of a useful character influence the question, for it is possible that we might deem it otherwise, or that the so-called good is only apparent. Therefore, itrict morality sets its face against the taking or administering of an oath to observe secrecy with regard to what is as yet unknown to us. Now, thi* is precisely what takes place in secret societies. The candidate for admission pledges himself to keep a gjcrect, the nature of which he does not know, and so is guilty of taking a rash oath. But a rash oath is no oath at all, and is consequently not binding. He may be assured that benevolence and charity are the aims of the society, but, as before remarked, that is a mere accident and has no effect upon the pledge. Basides, if such be the general objects of a secret body, what ia the use of secrecy ? Evidently none.* A previous general knowledge of the aims of a society narrows the secrecy just so far ; but so far as the Becrecy goes, so far is a previous pledge to it invalid. Therefore, secret societies are subversive of good morals, since they are in conflict with the conditions of a legitimate oath or pledge.