LAW REPORT.

New Zealand Police Gazette, Volume XL, Issue 23, 9 June 1915, Page 405

LAW REPORT.

(“ Times Law Reports,” Vol. xxxi, page 318.) [Court op Criminal Appeal.—(Lord Reading, C.J., Bray, and Lush, JJ.) — 15th March, 1915.] Rex v. Robinson. Criminal Law—Obtaining Money by False Pretences— Attempt. The appellant, who was a jeweller and was insured at Lloyd’s against theft, had suffered losses through the war, and he conceived a fraudulent scheme to make them good by pretending that robbers had broken into his premises, tied him up, and robbed him. A polioesergeant, hearing his cries, broke into his shop and found him partly tied up, but the jewels which were said to have been stolen were found hidden. The appellant made no claim on Lloyd’s, and he was indicted for attempting to obtain money by making false pretences to the police-sergeant with intent to defraud Lloyd’s brokers. Reid , That as the appellant only prepared for the crime and did not take any step immediately connected with it, he was not liable to be convicted of an attempt to oommit

The appellant, Harry Robinson, appealed against a conviction before Mr. Justice A. T. Lawrence, at Manchester Assizes, of attempting to obtain money by false pretences. He was sentenced to six months’ imprisonment. Mr. Gordon Hewart, K.C., and Mr. McCleary appeared for the appellant ; and Mr. Bodkin and Mr. Jordan for the Crown.

The appellant, a jeweller at Oldham, had suffered losses through the war, and, as he had admitted, had conceived a fraudulent scheme to make them good. He was insured at Lloyd’s and had pretended that robbers had broken into his premises, tied him up, and robbed him of £1,500 worth of jewellery. A sergeant of police, hearing his cries, had broken into bis shop and had found him partly tied up ; but as the police were not satisfied with his story a search was made, and the jewels which were said to have been stolen were found hidden. He had made no claim on Lloyd’s.

Mr. Hewart submitted that there was no evidence of an attempt to obtain money by false pretences, but only evidence of preparation to commit that offence. Before being entitled to obtain the insurance money the appellant would have had to obtain from Llojffi’s and fill up a certain form, and Lloyd’s would only have paid on being satisfied with the answers to the questions. He cited Reg. v. Eaglaton (24 L.J., M.C., 158), Reg. v. Roberts (25 L.J., M C., 17), and Reg. v. Button (16 The Times L.R., 525; [l9oo] 2Q. 8., 597). The indictment charged the appellant with the making of the false pretence to the policesergeant who had broken into his shop, “ with intent to defraud ” Lloyd’s brokers. The false pretence must be made to the person to be defrauded. Mr. Bodkin said that an attempt to commit a crime was defined in Stephen’s Digest of the Criminal Law (fifth edition, p. 39, art. 50, as “an act done with intent to commit the crime, and forming part of a series of acts which would constitute its actual commission if it were not interrupted.” That was approved of by that Court in Rex. v. Laitwood (4 Grim. App. Rep., at p. 248). He submitted that if, with a guilty intent, any act was done which constituted one of those elements, it was sufficiently proximate to the commission of the full offence to constitute an attempt. Attempt might be defined as proximate preparation with guilty intent. The appellant had entirely completed the construction of the false pretence, and must have contemplated a police report as part of that construction. Counsel admitted that he was attempting to go farther than any previous case, but if it was legally justifiable it was also justifiable on the facts of the case. He referred to Rex v. White 26 The Times L.R., 466 ; [l9lo] 2 K. 8., 124 ; Dugdale v. Reg. (Dears., 64) : and Rex v. Linneker (22 The Times L.R,, 495; [1906] 2 K. 8., at p. 104).

Mr. Hewart, in reply, referred to Rex v. Linneker (supra)

The Lord Chief Justice, having stated the facts, said that if the appellant had made any claim on, or had taken any step to communicate with, the underwriters with the object of making a statement as to the burglary and of claiming money under the policy, he could have been convicted. The principle of the case was set forth in Baron Parke’s judgment in Reg. v. Eagleton (supra), at p. 166: “ The mere intention to commit a misdemeanour is not criminal. Some act is required, and we do not think all acts towards committing a misdemeanour indictable. Acts remotely leading to the commission of the offence are not to be considered as attempts to commit it, but acts immediately connected with it are.” The difficulty which had led to the use of somewhat different language regarding this offence, in the cases and text-books, lay in the application of that principle to the facts of a particular case. To determine whether the act was remotely or immediately connected with the full offence was sometimes difficult; but in some cases, as in Reg. v. Button (supra), where the aocused, who was a runner, attempted to obtain a prize in a race by personating another and inferior runner, and thus getting a longer start, th 6 solution was easy. The difficulty in the present case was that there was no evidence that anything done by the appellant ever reached the ears of the underwriters, the persons who were to be induced to part with their money. The sergeant could not be considered as their agent. In truth, what the appellant did was preparation for the commission of a crime, and not a step immediately connected with the crime. He was preparing evidence of the facts that he would rely on to constitute the pretence ; and it was that kind of evidence—namely, a police report, which would probably induce the underwriters to pay without much inquiry. Applying the principle laid bown by Baron Parke they thought this was an act remotely and not immediately leading towards a crime. The conviction must be quashed. Solicitors : Messrs. Megson and Nicholson (Oldham) ; the Director of Publio Prosecutions.