LAW REPORT.

New Zealand Police Gazette, Volume XXXVIII, Issue 16, 23 April 1913, Page 247

LAW REPORT.

(“Times Law Reports,” Vol. xxix, page 250.) [Court op Criminal Appeal.—(Ridley, Piiillimore, and Avory, JJ.)— 3rd February, 1913.] Rex v. Charles Payne. Criminal Law — Evidence — Accomplice—Wife of Accomplice. Whether the testimony of the wife of an accomplice can be corroboration of his statements, queere. This was an application for leave to appeal against conviction and against sentence. No oounsel appeared on either side. Mr. Justice Phillimore, in stating the facts, said that the prisoner had been convicted at the Middlesex Sessions on a charge of larceny and of receiving certain motor accessories, and had been sentenced to two years’ hard labour. Another man was arrested for the offence and made statements implicating the appellant in the theft. The police went to the appellant’s house and found part of the stolen property there. The other man pleaded guilty, and was called to give evidence for the Crown; and he and his wife then described how the appellant had planned the offence with them. There was ample ground for believing that the appellant took part in the laroeny. He put forward various idle grounds of appeal, such as people of his class usually put forward, and they were quite worthless. The conduct of the trial, however, had caused the Court some difficulty. The jury were warned as to the necessity of corroboration for the story of the other man; but they were not warned that the wife’s story also needed corroboration or that the wife’s evidence was not corroboration of that of her husband. The case of Rex v. Neal and Taylor (7 C. & P., 168) had given them some trouble. It did not say that a wife’s evidence could never be corroboration, but only said that it could not be accepted “in a case like this.” It had, however, found its way into text-books, and had been taken broadly. If it was desired to say that in no case and in no circumstances could the testimony of the wife of an accomplice be corroboration of his statements the proposition would require to be argued more fully at some future date. But here, even assuming that case to apply, they had still to consider whether there was any reason for giving leave to appeal. In the circumstances they thought that the proviso to section 4 (1) of the Criminal Appeal Act applied, and as no substantial miscarriage of justice had occurred leave to appeal must be refused.