Miscellaneous Information.

New Zealand Police Gazette, Volume XXIII, Issue 26, 19 December 1899, Page 267

Miscellaneous Information.

Promotions. The following constables are promoted to detectives from the 15th instant, inclusive : Boddam, Tudor Welby Balfour, No. 537. Mcllveney, William Bernard, No. 667. Broberg, Charles Robert, No. 689. Mcllveney, James, N0.’697. (99/2113.) Appointment. George Pratt, as Native Constable at Rotorua, Bth instant, vice Arama Karaka resigned. (99/1934.) Discharged on Compensation. Constable Hay, Peter Stewart, No. 705, 15th instant.

Rewards. Constable J. W. Moar, No. 166, Auckland police, has been awarded £1 by the Marine Department for services in securing two convictions for selling undersized flounders. (99/1995.) “ The Payment of Jurors Act, 1899.” The following circular from the Under-Secretary of the Justice Department is published for general information : Circular No. 9.—Memorandum for Coroners. Department of Justice, Wellington, 3rd November, 1899. Referring to my telegram of the Ist instant, I have the honour to state that arrangements have been made whereby, whenever possible, the police will pay Coroners’ juries on the certificate of the Coroner. In places where the police have no funds in their hands, payment will be made through the local post-office. An abstract on the accompanying form showing the respective amounts due should be prepared and handed to the Postmaster with an order to pay, in the form attached; and a notice should be given to each juror, on presentation of which at the post-office he will receive the amount payable to him. (Form of notice also attached.) If the Coroner should prefer to pay the jury out of his own pocket, taking their receipts for the sums so paid, the department will refund the amount on presentation of a properly certified voucher supported by the receipts given by the jurors. F. Walde GRAVE, Under-Secretary.

Public Works Stores-supply Contracts, 1898. (See Police Gazette, 1899, page 196.) The Under-Secretary of the Public Works Department notifies that the contractors in the several districts whose contracts were extended to the 31st instant for the supply of stores to this department have again been approached with a view to their contracts being still further extended to the 31st March next, and the following contractors have agreed to an extension of their contracts for this period, as under:—

Auckland — Class 6 .. .. .. J. Wilson and Co. Classes 7 and 8 .. .. J. J. Craig. W ellington— Classes 1 (exclusive of galvanised iron of New Zealand manufacture), 3,4, and 9 .. Briscoe, Macneil, and Co. Class 2 .. .. .. Cameron and Christie. Class 7 .. .. .. J. J. Craig. Christchurch — Class 7 .. .. .. J. J. Craig. Dunedin — Class 6 .. .. .. Milburn Lime and Cement Company. Class 7 .. .. .. J. J. Craig. Invercargill— Classes 1 (exclusive of galvanised iron of New Zealand manufacture), 2,3, 4,5, 8, and 9 .. .. .. A. Brisooe and Co. Class 6 .. .. .. Milburn Lime and Cement Company. Class 7 .. .. .. J. J. Craig. Greymouth— Class 5 .. .. .. J. Holmes. Class 7 .. .. .. J. J. Craig. Class 9 .. .. .. C. Hansen.

All stores hitherto purchased under suoh contracts as have now lapsed are being obtained, as far as possible, under the Stores Contract for the Working Railways Department for the present.

Receiving.—Evidence of Other Property found in Defendant's Possession admissible as showing System.

The following decision in Regina v. Wilkinson (17 N.Z. L.R., 1-6) is published for general information : Case stated for the opinion of the Court of Appeal under section 412 of “ The Criminal Code Act, 1893,” by his Honour Mr. Justice Conolly. The prisoner Henry James Wilkinson was tried at Auckland on the 2nd of December, 1897, on a charge of receiving a watch, the property of one Herbert Henry Smith, knowing the same to have been dishonestly obtained. The theft of the watch on the 28th of September, 1897, and the receipt of it by the prisoner on the 29th of September, were proved. After proof of these and other relevant facts, the Crown Prosecutor proposed to give in evidence, under section 262, subsection 2, (a), of “The Criminal Code Act, 1893,” that other property, stolen from a person other than Herbert Henry Smith, on the Ist of August, 1897, was found in the possession of the prisoner within twelve months of the time when he was first charged with the crime for which he was then being tried. Counsel for the prisoner objected to the evidence on the ground that such evidence could only be given when the property received was part of the proceeds of the same crime. The Judge admitted the evidence, reserving the question of its admissibility for the opinion of the Court of Appeal. Denniston, J. :— It seems to me that the point reserved in the case is stated in the case. The point noted and reserved for this Court seems to have been that evidence of other stolen property having been received by the prisoner could only be given when the property received was part of the proceeds of the same crime. On that point, I feel perfectly clear that the evidence was not inadmissible on that ground. The case depends upon subdivision (a) of subsection 2 of section 262 of the Criminal Code. I need not read it: it has been referred to by counsel. It first lays down the law as to receiving—what receiving is. It then proceeds to establish a rule of evidence on the subject, to the effect that when any person is being proceeded against for a crime under this section—that is, for the crime of receiving—there “ may be given in evidence to prove guilty knowledge . . . the fact that other property obtained by means of any such crime or acts as aforesaid was found in the defendant’s possession within twelve months of the time when the alleged offender was first charged with the crime for which he is being tried.” The wording of subsection 2, therefore, is that it refers, first, to a person being proceeded against “ for a crime under ” the section, and then to other property obtained by means of “ any such crime or acts as aforesaid.” Now, do these latter words—“ any such crime or acts as aforesaid ” —refer to the previous words of the same subsection—that is, to the “ crime ” which the defendant is charged with—or do they refer generally to any such “ crimes or acts ” as are mentioned in subsection lof the same section ? It seems to me obvious that they refer to the words of subsection 1, and not to those of subsection 2. The fact that the word “acts” is used in subsection 1 and not in subsection 2 shows this clearly. It is also obvious that it is the only construction which would give any effect to the alleged intention of the subsection—namely, to enable evidence to be given to prove guilty knowledge. It is obvious that, if the effect of the subsection were simply to provide that, in order to prove guilty knowledge in receiving stolen property, evidence might be given of the receipt by the prisoner of other property stolen at the same time, it would be entirely unnecessary and useless. Such evidence would be plainly admissible apart altogether from any statute. That deals with the matter as it stands on the New Zealand statute.

The cases cited on the English statute, Reg. v. Drage(l) and Reg. v. Carter(2), so far from supporting Mr. Cooper on this point, are directly contrary to his contention. For in those cases it was distinctly held that the English statute was intended not for the trifling and useless object suggested during the argument, but in order to make the possession of any other stolen property what to common-sense it always has been—namely, evidence of guilty knowledge. That is shown by the words of Mr. Justice Hawkins in the case of Reg. v. Carter(2).* This disposes of the point which seems to me to be the one noted and reserved.

As, however, the other point has been argued, and it may perhaps be held that the question is stated generally as to the admissibility of the evidence, I think, without expressing any opinion as to whether it is really open, that it is right that we should express our opinion upon the admissibility generally. In arriving at an opinion on that point we have to consider first the decisions upon the English statute, and secondly the difference in language between the English statute and our own. As to the question of the construction of the English statute, it was held by Baron Bramwell in Reg. v. Drage(l), and by the Court for Crown Cases Reserved in Reg. v. Carter(2), that the other

property, as to the finding of which in the possession of the receiver evidence may he given, must be found in such possession at the time of the finding of the property in respect of which the oharge is made. The words of the judgment of Hawkins, J., in Reg. v. Carter (2) were that “if you find other stolen property in the possession of the person charged as a receiver at the same time that you find the property with regard to which you are charging him with receiving, you can prove that you did so find such property if it be property stolen within twelve months preceding.” The words of the section of the English Aot are simply that evidence may be given that there was found other property ; and that was held to mean, found at the same time. If our statute were in the same terms, we should be bound by that decision. But our statute was passed twenty-two years after the English one, and after the decision in the case of Reg. v. Carter(2), and the language of our statute is different. The English statute speaks of finding other property stolen within twelve months, our own of other stolen property found within twelve months. That in terms fixes a period of time within which the other property may be found. To give to our Act the same interpretation on this point as the English Aot has received would be not only to ignore this provision as to time, but to negative it. It seems to me that, that being so, the English cases do not apply, and that, applying strictly the language of our own Act, the evidence is admissible generally. I am therefore of opinion that the evidence was properly admitted, and that the conviction ought to be affirmed. Conolly, J. : —

I am of the same opinion; and Mr. Justice Denniston has gone so fully into the matter that it is hardly necessary for me to add anything. I may say this, however : that at the trial I had no doubt about the admissibility of the evidence after hearing considerable argument on the point; but when the oase was so strongly pressed, and the cases which have been cited were pressed upon me as they were, I thought it advisable, the liberty of the defendant being involved, to have the opinion of my brother Judges. I have no doubt upon the question, whether the argument were confined to the single point noted, or had reference to the admissibility of the evidence generally. Pennefather, J. : I concur. (1) 14 Cox C.C. 85. (2) 12 Q.B.D. 522. Erratum. (See Police Gazette, 1899, page 261.)

John Joseph Inkster, discharged from Auckland Gaol. The reference to previous conviction should read, “ See Police Gazette , 1899, page 137,” not page 245.