PUBLISHING THE ODDS.

New Zealand Illustrated Sporting & Dramatic Review, Volume XVIII, Issue 1021, 30 September 1909, Page 5

PUBLISHING THE ODDS.

WHAT THE “GAMING ACT” ALLOWS. A MAGISTERIAL CONVICTION QUASHED ON APPEAL. An interesting and important judgment was delivered by His Honor Mr. Justice Sim at Christchurch on Friday, in the appeal case of Barnett v. The Police. The facts as stated by His Honor were that Matthew Frank Barnett, the appellant was convicted by the Stipendiary Magistrate .at Christchurch of the offence of publishing on July 3rd a newspaper entitled “ Daylight,” containing a notification by some person as to betting on horse races to be run in New Zealand. The .magistrate held that publication of the information was an offence within /the meaning of subsection 1 of section of the Gaming Act, and convicted appellant. The question was whether this decision was erroneous in point of law. Subsection 1 of section .31 ■made it penal to publ’sh in any newspaper— x (1) Any advertisemenl or notification made by or on behalf of any person, club, or association, as to (a) betting on any horse race to be run, or (b) investments on totalisator in respect of any such race; or any information, advice, or suggestion as to the probable result of any such race. The information published by appellant was clearly information as to betting on horse races to be run, and the question was whether it could be regarded as an advertisement or notiii cation on behalf of any person, club, or association. He thought it could not be so treated, and that the effect of the first part of subsection 31 was not to prohibit the publication of information such as that in question, but to prohibit the advertising of any person, club, or association in connection with the business of betting on any horse race or in connection with making investments on the totalisator in respect to any such race. That this was the meaning of the section was made clear, he thought, by the language used in connection with investments on the totalisator. These investments were made on the racecourse on the day the race was run, and it was thus practically imposs ble to publish in any newspaper before

the race was run any information with regard to investments on the totalisator. It could not be supposed, therefore, that the Legislature was seeking to prohibit something what was practically an impossibility. The only way in which reasonable meaning could be given to the words of the subsection as to investments on the totalisator was to treat them as referring to advertisements or notiflcaiions that some person, club, or association who was named or indicated therein was ready and willing co undertake the business o' invest ng money foi' others on the totalisator. If the words should be construed in I his way, it followed, then, that the words used in connection with betting ought to be construed in a similar way, and he read as prohibiting the publication of any advertisement or notification that any person, club. :or : association, named or indicated therein, was ready to make bets ou any horse race, or act as agent for any other person in making such bets or to act in any other way in connection with betting on a horse race. If the construction contended for by re spondent were accepted, the words would amount to a prohibition of the publication of any information with regard to betting on any horse race to be run, but the Legislature did not prohibit that, especially as it might have done by the use of a few simple words, and where the intention was to prohibit publication of information with regard to any matter that intention was clearly expressed. Thus subsection 1 of section 31 prohibits the publication in any newspaper or other document of any information, advice; or suggestion as to the probable result of any horse race to be run, and subsection 4 of the same section prohibits the publication in any newspaper or other documents of any statement as to the dividend by the totalisator on any race, or as to starting price in respect to such races. The appeal was therefore allowed, and the conviction set aside. As the prosecution in this case was made by a police officer, and there was a genuine point of law to be argued, costs would not be allowed appellant.