STRENGTH OF THE FLEET

New Zealand Graphic, Volume XL, Issue 19, 6 May 1908, Page 65

STRENGTH OF THE FLEET

BATTLESHIPS AND ARMOURED CRUISERS.

(By

Our Naval Correspondent.

This year the British Fleet is at its maximum strength. We are reaping the advantage of the active constructive policy of the Boards of Admiralty presided over "by Lord Selhorne and Lord Cawdor, and of the large sums which the House of Commons provided year after year with hardly a murmur of disapproval, either within St. Stephen’s or form the public. Indeed,Lord Selborne was frequently reproached for not spending more money on the Fleet, but he refused to go beyond the demands of the experts. Lord Cawdor was similarly attacked for the moderation of his shipbuilding programmes in face of foreign shipbuilding; but he, again, would not be driven from the proposals deliberately adopted on the advice of the Sea Lords after full consideration of the future requirements of the Fleet. It is now evident that the official view was sound; we always followed, and never led, in the rivalry of armaments, and we obtained better-gun-ned and swifter ships than rivals. The Navy was particularly weak in large armoured ships when Lord Selborne went to the Admiralty, because we had built a number with unarmoured ends. This design had been shown to be faulty, and consequently for some years past attention has been devoted to the construction of battleships and very powerful armoured cruisers, it has been said that this year the British Fleet is at its maximum strength. This is directly due to the Dreadnought. When she appeared on the stocks, nearly three years ago, the building of armoured ships abroad ceased for a whole year, while we continued ‘busily at work. Foreign construction received a set-back; we pursued our course, while rivals remained idle, planning ships 'on the new all-big-gun principle. The outcome of this is that in modern battleships and in armoured cruisers'we have a lead at this moment, and are well up to the two-power standard, as this graphic (Bagram shows: —

In this period of eleven years the expenditure on new construction has been as follows: —

1897 .. .. ... £5,051,000 1890 6.733:000 1-8997,518,000 1900 8,9574)00 1901 8,865,000 1902 8,535,000 1903 .. .. .. 11,116.000 1904 ... .. ~. 11,263,000 1905 ... .. ... 9,688,000 1906 .. .. .. 9,300.000 1907 .. ... ... 8,113,000 The line of expenditure muni now inevitably trend upwards. The struggle in the race of Dreadnoughts is Is-eoming severe, and we need more cruisers and tarwsdo craft. In the past four years we have built no prntedted cruisers for scouting work with the Fleet, and since torpedo craft are dicing -built in such large liumbon — Germany is laying down

twelve annually—the British Admiralty cannot hold its hand.

At the same time, the improvements in the social conditions of the men of the Fleet, and higher pay, and the necessary augmentation in the'number of the most skilled ratings, must lead to an increase in the naval votes, other than those concerned with material. An upward tendency in naval expenditure once more is unavoidable. The taxpayer, in anticipating the future, has reason for gratification in the fact that for years past the line of expenditure has been downward, as indicated below: —

The thick line indicates, approximately, the total tonnage of the battleships (less than twenty years old) in the several fleets, and the thin line the aggregate tonnage of the modern armoured cruisers. The complete figures of the navies on January 1 last, showing ships completed and at sea. of less age than twenty years, are as follows: —

Now, however, rival Powers have recovered from the disorganisation which was caused by the appearance in 1905 of the Dreadnought and the three Dreadnought cruisers. For a year past they have been hard at work. France has four large battleships under construction, and two more on order; the United States has four building; Germany has five in hand; and Italy, Austria, and Jaoan are busy with new ships, or projects Tor new ships, Italy alone proposing to commence at an early date no fewer than four Dreadnoughts. Consequently the British authorities cannot remain inactive, and they have all the more claim to confidence, because they gave the taxpayer full value for the success of the Dreadnought in economies on shipbuilding in the immediate past, as may be seen from the following chart:

The above chart indicates the variation in the aggregate expenditure on the Fleet, including the maintenance of the squadrons at sea, new ships, stores, etc., in the past eleven years, the figures being as under:

1897£22.170.000 1898 23.881.000 1899 25,731.000 1900 29.999,000 1901 30.981,000 1902 31,004,000 1903 35,709,000 1904 36.869,000 1905 33,152,000 1906 31,869.000 1907 31,419,000 It should be explained that down to last year the Navy Estimates did not include the outlay on naval works—dockyard extensions, etc. Consequently, to arrive at a correct view of the real tall in expenditure, the sums laid out in these permanent undertakings, and jiaid for out of loans, should lie taken into account. In the eleven years we silent approximately £21,000,000 lor tnese pur-

poses, or an average of about two millions annually. Last year the Government decided to raise no more loans. Thus, while the previous expenditure provided for in the successive Estimates down to 1906-7 was about £2,000,000 less each year than was actually expended, last year the sum provided by vote, apart from a small loan balance, was every penny which was available for att the various channel of naval activity, including [icnsions, which do not appear in the German appropriations, and the Royal Marines, which in the case of the French Navy are provided for out of the Army Votes. We have now reached the end of the years of falling expenditure. Whatever opinions may be held by those who object to the size of our armaments, the country has no alternative. Our standard of naval power is virtually regulated by our rivals, because we have a twoPower Standard. This automatically fixes our Estimates from year to year; we are the financial victims of the ambitions of neighbours who may become enemies, and if we cease to play the role we have adopted for years past we may be their victims in a far more serious .sense; the Empire may be riven asunder, these islands overrun by foreign troops, pur food snatched from our mouths. The sums we spend on the navy are the premiums we pay by way of insurance against the perils which would threaten us immediately we lost command of the sea. Peace at a cost of even forty millions a year—less than £1 per head of the population—is cheaper than war and an eventual victory. A Two-Power Standard ensures peace, and anything less may tempt some rivalry to try conclusions, with the result that we should probably win—but at a cost.

Battleships. Armoured Cruisers. England . . No. Tons. 772300 No. 33 Tons. 385,000 United States 25 358,200 11 134,700 Germa n v . o*> 260,(500 8 80.000 France .. . . 21 239,200 19 167,000 Japan .... . . 13 184,100 11 111,0)0 Russia ... 9 107,700 4 50.500 Italy .... . .. 7 79,000 6 40,000