Naval Lessons of the War

New Zealand Graphic, Volume XXXIV, Issue 23, 10 June 1905, Page 16

Naval Lessons of the War

By

H.W. Wilson

in "The Monthly Review."

EDITORIAL INTRODUCTION. This masterly analysis of the sea lighting in the Russo-Japanese struggle was written hist month before the Baltic fleet reached the theatre of war. It is doubly absorbing at the present juncture and is therefore printed here in view of our usual article un local matters which could not have at the moment the same interest. Though the war in the Far East has now been in progress for th? best part of a year, there has as yet been no attempt, so far as the writer is aware, in any English work accessible to the general public .to sum up its naval lessons and to apply their teaching to the peculiar conditions of the British Empire. The British Admiralty has been in the closest touch with all that has happened, but the results which it has ascertained have naturally not been communicated to the world, though the influence of th? war is plainly to be seen in various new departures of British naval policy. Yet the naval operations have been of unusual importance and interest even to the unprofessional reader, as they may be said to have thoroughly tested the implements and strategy of modern naval war. upon success in which the very existence of England depends. The test has been on a considerable scale, whence the difference between this war and the conflicts between Japan and China in 1894-5, and between the United States and Spain in 1898, where one side was far inferior to the other in material strength as well as in skill, and where actions between hostile fleets of battleships did not occur, because in either cast? one navy was without battleships. In this war the material employed has been of the very newest and best: the Japanese fleet was ahead of most of its European competitors in obtaining the most perfect appliances, while the Russian ships, notwithstanding unfavourable reports which have been circulated in England, were excellent. The force of the two combatants at the opening of the struggle was as follows: — Japan. Russia. First-class battleships 6 7 Armoured cruisers (modern) S 2 Other cruisers 16 9 Destroyers 19 23 The Russian force was indisputably weaker, but not so much so as to render its position hopeless, while Japan was hampered by the fact .that Russia had a considerable fleet in Europ?, which sooner or later was certain to attempt to intervene in the war. Hence Japan had to nurse her strength to the utmost, and her admirals were ordered in the most imperative terms to refrain from risking their heavy ships. To these orders the inconclusive issue of several of the* actions must be ascribed. On the eve of war the g.-neral impression on the Continent was that the Russian fleet in the Far East would easily be able to hold its own. “Le Yacht'’ published an interesting article in which the Japanese personnel was declared to want just the very qualities it has displayed—vigorous initiative. technical skill in gunnery and tb<? handling of fleets, unity of purpose, and, in a word, all that States endeavour to obtain by maintaining organized navies. Though the English public bad formed a juster estimate of the Japanese navy, competent writers in the British press thought that the struggle for the command of the sea would Ik- a desperate one. and that in obtaining so great a prize the Japanese must lose heavily in ships and men. The Russian navy was known to have paid great attention to gunnery, and there was good (Serinan authority for the high quality of its shooting. It had not. like the Spanish and Chinese navies, neglected target practice: indeed, on the eve of war, the continual firing carried out by the fleet at I’urt Arthur was one

of the reasons which led intelligent neu trals to forebode war.

The first lesson of this war, in which it confirms previous experience, is the advantage of a prompt offensive. The Russian fleet at Port Arthur had been warned of the imminence of hostilities, but does not appear to have taken the warning seriously. There were some precautions on the eve of the Japanese attacks on February 8 and 9, but the ships did not protect themselves by getting out nets, constructing booms and keeping their crews at quarters. The Japanese torpedo boats appeared about midnight, and filed 23 torpedoes, of which a very small number took effect. But though the damage done was far less than we should have expected, on that fatal night Russia lost her chance of commanding the sea with her fleet in the Far East. Two battleships and one cruiser were bady injured, and probably it was only the skill and presence of mind of the junior officers on board them that saved them from total destruction. The blow struck was stunning, and had it been instantly followed up by the Japanese, Port Arthur would have fallen within the first three weeks of war. The unreadiness of the Russians does not appear to have been altogether understood at Tokio, or else there were conditions, of which we knew nothing, that intervened to prevent the seizure of Dalny—an event expected after the first blow at Port Arthur—since the opportunity was allowed to pass. On the. morning after the torpedo attack, Admiral Togo appeared off Port Arthur and shelled the Russian fleet, but only inflicted upon it slight additional damage. His attack was not pressed, clearly because he was not allowed to risk his ships, though many of his junior officers would have preferred more resolute tactics. From this point on for several weeks there was no serious fighting between the fleets. I he Russians made no more grave mistakes, though they displayed a great want of initiative, and failed to use their torpedo craft with energy. The Japanese maintained a mild blockade of Port Arthur. and the two fleets virtually neutralized each other. But the Russians had abandoned all claim to tl:r? command of the sea. The value of a perfect co-ordination of political and naval action is g. second lesson of this war. When matters were growing serious, in the winter of 1903-4, the Japanese navy underwent a special battle-training—con-stant firing at long range with heavy guns, under war conditions, torpedo work at night, in bad weather, using live torpedoes, manoeuvring at night without lights, night-firing, and the rehearsal of operations that were actually to form part of the war when it began. Hence the immense self-confi-dence which the Japanese displayed, and the complete preparedness of their fleet when the hour for action came. Plans were practically worked out immediately before the war, and not pigeon-holed at the Japanese ‘Admiralty. In fact, the Japanese navy took a “flying start.” This power of intelligent preparation. so that the maximum of force may be exerted in the minimum of time, is what we mean by the word organisa-

tion, and the study 6f all modern wars shows it to be the chief factor in giving success. Here, happily, there are signs that the British Admiralty is tak-

ing action, and in the future useless exercises, of no military value, will be eliminated from the training of our fleet, so that its whole energy will be concentrated upon readiness for war. Yet the danger always remains that the military section of the Admiralty may be obstructed in its efforts by the civil section or by the Cabinet, winch may refuse to vote the funds required, not understanding the vital importance of the measures proposed.

A third lesson of the war in the Far East has been the importance of the Napoleonic principle of concentration of force. The Russian Admiralty did not place in the Far East a fleet equal to the Japanese. though without any great difficulty it could have done so, since there were a number of heavier battleships and cruisers in the Baltic that might have been very serviceable had they been stationed at Fort Arthur or Vladivostok. Possibly the want of docking and repairing facilities was the explanation of this mistake. But even accepting this explanation. it does not account for the fact that when war was imminent isolated ships were not recalled and placed in safety. Thus three vessels, the Variag, Korietb. and Mandjur. were lost to the Russian flag with their crews for the whole of the war. and the Japanese were given an easy victory ai Chemulpo. The present British Admiralty is taking steps to do what the Russians left undone, and to withdraw weak and old ships from exposed positions. Yet not till the advent of Sir J. Fisher to Whitehall was this policy of concentration adopted, so easy is it for the obvious to escape the attention of those whose main energy is. absorbed in routine work. In the first twenty-four hours the Japanese navy had asserted its temporary command of the >ea (temporary because the arrival of the Baltic fleet was always to be. feared- and might transform the conditions), yet it is instructive to note that the greatest difficulty has been experienced in blockading the Russian ports. I p to May, indeed. Port Arthur was only watched while Vladivostok was practically left unmolested to the date of writing. The peculiar geographical conditions of the Far East enable the Japanese to adopt this policy, since the \ ladivostok ships could not well escape from the Japan Sea without being sighted from the Japanese coast, and thus could not suddenly fall upon the communications of the Japanese fleet at the Elliot Islands or the Japanese army in Korea. The Straits of Korea were hold by Kaminiura with four armoured cruisers, a force slightly superior to the Viadivostok ships, but this disposition left the Russians free to cruise within the .Japan Sea. or even, as they actually did ir July, to pass out through the isugaru Straits and blockade Yokohama. It was dangerous for the Japanese squadron to leave its post and go m pursuit, as the Japan Sea is famous for its fogs and under cover of tog the Russian ships might easily have slip-

ped southward past Ka minima and caused great damage to the Japanese transporis and colliers. At the same time, with the Japanese force available it was impossible to blockade \ ladivostok. because the port has two entrances, a considerable distance apart, because of the frequency of fogs there, and because of the want of a good naval base near at hand. At the very outset the Japanese navy force proved too weak for the work which was demanded of it, and notwithstanding its high efficiency was unable to peitorm that work with perfect success. let it had a greater margin of superiority as against the Russian fleet than the British navy possesses against one existing and possible naval combination. At Port Arthur a strict blockade was attempted towards the close of May. but the Japanese have never been able to prevent isolated ships from running in and out. The long range guns mounted in the Russian works keep the powerful Japanese ships at a distance and do not allow them to close in as Admiral Sampson did at Santiago. Thus tlie Lieutenant Burakott ran in and out ; the Reshitelny and Raztoropny escaped; and numerous merchantmen and junks laden with supplies and ammunition have made their way through tiie blockading line. 1 his is in entire accordance with British manoeuvre experience and it shows the practical impossibility of sealing i hostile port by any blockade, however close. We must be prepared in war I<> see hostile ships escape singly, if not in squadrons, should we attempt a blockade, though whether we can blockade is more than doubttub as there are no good bases near the ports which we. should have to watch, whereas the Japanese were able to seize and use first the Elliot Islands, only seventy miles from Port Arthur, and well placed from the strategic point of view, and then Dalny as their flying bases. Their battleships could remain at these points in perfect security- and receive from their cruisers olf Port Arthur information of the enemy’s movements, lienee the conditions must be pronounced far more favourable to them than they would be to ourselves in any probable conflict. Turning now from the strategical lessons of the war to the tactical lessons. the fir-t and most striking is the comparative inefficiency of the torpedo. From this weapon much had been expected, ami it was employed upon a large scale. But except in the initial attack at Port Arthur it has gained no successes (since this was written, after six attacks, the ’‘Sevastopol'' has been seriously -injured outside Port Arthur by the Japanese torpedo flotilla), and even at Port Arthur it did not sink a single ship. It failed to put any Russian ship permanently out of action. That the Retvisan. Tzarevitch. and Pallada would have sunk if they had been torpedoed far from shore is probable, hut not certain. As it was, contrary to all anticipations they were again at sea in five months and very little the worse for their experience. The torpedoes used upon them were the large and powerful ISin of latent pattern, which, after the British experiments upon the Belleiy'e. might have been expected to shatter completely the part of the ship struck and to cause a ter-

rible shock to the boilers and machinery. The actual damage xva< as follows: —A large hole was blown in the Retvisan’s side. her engines were thrown slightly out of alignment and her boilers developed leaky tubes. She was easily repaired, but her speed was much reduced. The Tzarevitch had her rudder blown off and her steering-gear damaged, but the injury was completely repaired. The Pallada was struck amidshps; the torpedo exploded in a coal bunker, blowing a large hole and damaging the Belleville boilers. The injury was easily and swiftly repaired. An even more astounding failure of the torpedo occurred in the case of the Sado Maru. This Iner, without any kind of protection. first of all had 150 shells fired at her by the Vladivostok fleet, and then was torpedoed twice with the ISin Whitehead by the Rossia. The torpedoes blew enormous holos in her and did great damage to her engine-room, but she did not sink, and was towed into Sasebo look’ng outwardly little the worse. A second fact which appears with regard to the torpedo is the infrequency of hits, even when attacking ships which are not in motion. In the first and most successful Fort Arthur attack the Japanese destroyers slowed to live or six knots and closed to withing a short cPstance of their enemy, but of their 23 torpedoes only three made hits. Tn the other attacks on the Port Arthur ships they do not appear to have scored any successes, for though there were reports at the time that several Russian ships had been hit. these do not seem to have been true. On the night of June 23-4, when the whole Russian fleet was outside the harbour, a long series of attacks was delivered by the Japanese torpedo craft, with no result whatever, but on th s occasion the Russians are said to have had nets out and to have been covered by a boom. The greatest gallantry and coolness were displayed by the Japanese, so that the failure of the torpedo was not due to any want of courage or skill on their part, and it remains an almost inexplicable feature of the operations. Against ships in motion, the generalization still holds good that the torpedo is useless. No hits have been affected during the war. though attacks are said to have been made repeatedly upon the Russian fleet during the battle of August 10; and, after that battle, the Russians report attacks on the Askold and Tzarevitch. The Vladivostok squadron was also attacked by the Japanese flotilla in June, but again without any result. It looks, then, as though tlie efficacy of the torpedo had been greatly exaggerated, though the weapon is being so rapidly improved that predictions with regard to its future are dangerous. Its accuracy, range and size are being steadily increased. and in the near future we shall have to reckon with 2lin and 24in torpedoes—2l in tubes are already being des'gned for the newest American battleships—the explosion of which in contact with a battleship’s hull ought to be deadly. But the bigger and heavier the torpedo grows, the larger the vessels that are specially built to use it must be, and the smaller their number, so that the danger to be apprehended from destroyers and submarines

appears to be much less than had been suppo-ed. if torpedoes have proved comparatively ineflhient. far otherwise i* it with mines. Before the war inwhanical mines were despised by a large school of British naval officer’* ami neglected in the British service, so that it was possible f< r a Brit sh officer to write in 1904 hi a Service periodical: “Most foreign nations appear to be ahead of us. ... 1 am not aware that we even yet possess a mechanical blockade mine which has got beyond the experimental stage, though I know we have been carrying out spasmod'c experiments with them for the Hast ten As a matter of fact, the British navy had Captain Ott ley’s mine, which is of a type similar to those used by the Japanese, but the use of these mines in war does not appear to have been thoroughly worked out as it was in Japan. Yet mines in the Far East have done what torpedoes have failed to do, and there is an enormous list of casualties to their credit. On the Russian side, the battleship Petropax losk. the cruiser Boyarin. the mine laying ship Yenese ; , the gunboats Bobr. Gilyak. and Gremiastvhi, and several torpedo boats or destroyers wen* sunk by Japanese or Russian mines, while the battleships Pebieda and Sevastopol and the armoured cruiser Bay an wire considerably damaged. On the Japanese side the battlesh’p llatsnse. the coastdefence ship 11 ei Yen. the cruisers Sai Yen and Miyako. the gunboat Kaimon, and the torpedo-boat No. 48. ware injured or destroyed by mines, most of them sinking almost instantaneously, while the Yasbima is reported to have been sunk or damaged. In the case of the Petropavlosk and llatsnse the mines wluch caused the ships destruction exploded right under the magazines and fired them, whence tlie terrible consequences of the explosion. The ships were rent in two. and almost every one below perished. The detailed accounts of these two great disastersters at once recall the Main catastrophe in 1898. when that American battlesh’p was blown up in Havana Harbour, and an American Court of Inquiry found that she hail been destroyed by a Spanish mine. It was coni ended. however, at the time by many expert officers that there was no instance of flame passing upwards through water and steel into the interior of a vessel,

ami therefore it was declare ’ impossible that she could have Iron dr-troy<d in ths way. But in the light of tin* llatsuse and Petropax losk affair*, it is noir reasonably certain that the Court of Inquiry was right, and that a mine had been laid under her by s».inr enemy either of Spain or the Cnitv«l state. As to the reported loss of the A ashiina. there are no tru*txvortby particulars, and the very fact that she xvas lost cannot be said to have l»c<m defiirtely ascertained. But. even if she is ruled out of the list of casualties, the surprising fact remain* that more than one-seventh of the battleships ft-rce on either side has born drstroyed by mines. The mine thus appears to be one of the most serious peril* of the future, and its use is certain to spread unless restrained by the laws of xvar. It is an inhuman weapon, the more so as it is terribly dangerous to neutral shipping, and there are three instances in this xvar of neutral vessels, plying their lawful trade, bav’iig been damaged or sunk by it. In a European struggle the risk to neutrals would be very great indeed, as the vohmie of traffic passing through the waters which may be soxvn with mines will be far greater than it was in the Far East. Here it xvould seem that some international agreement is required, limiting the use of mines to territorial waters, in the interest of al! Powers alike. The weak state cannot be allowed. like Russia, to presume upon its weakness, and because it is unable in fa r fight to injure its enemy, to attack that enemy in a manner xvhich imperils neutral lives and property. If the torpedo has been relatively ineffective, it has yet produced a very curious effect, on naval actions. All the fighting betxvecn large ships in the Far East has been conducted at extreme ranges. The Asaina destroyed the Var’ag at a distance of 400(1 to 7000 yards; in flu* great action of August the two fleets were never less than 3SOO yards apart, and generally 5000 to 8000 yards. As one result of this long-range fighting the fiin guns with which most batlieships and cruisers are largely alli ed have been proved to be almost useless, d'he heaxy iruiis. 2in. loin, and Sin. have done all the xvork. In the light of thi- fact, it distressing to rellect tba* the Brilish Admiralty clung longer than any Power to the Gin gun. the de.nise of which hid been foreseen by every intelligent critic,

and t-i.it England '.as still bat-e--ships and eight large armoured cruisers completing in which a large uuiulw-r <f thr*« guns arc mounted, in our very neve-’ battle* q.- and crui-er*. ever, an immense step for a aril ha* • e -n taken which foi the first time within H\ ing men gives Eng nd s i ♦Jig for any foreign Power. Her two new battleships will carry nothing smaller than the 7.siit weapon. These :wo gun< are well Mined for long ran- - fighting. and every Power inr the wo’ld > ed to fol _ The war ha< demonstrate I c<«nciu*ive- \\ battleship and armoured cruiser. ’f'» e I ■ ' been < out inuously employed «»n difficult service, and have taken pan in f.mr jeverc actions, yet in not one single upon an; - it sea. ships at Port Arthur wa> effected by high-angle tire, not 1 y normal tire. H:gh- _ s battleships are weakest, on their thinly-armoured decks. and no vessel can resist it.l Che same is true of the R issian battles .•’• s. The Tsarevitch, in the battle of A ig i*t. Was the target of the Japanes< fleet, md was hit 15 times in every part of the chip by 12in and Sin shells, whi -h j tig’t a priori have been expected to pur her out of action and to wreck her complet As a niattei f f t slu d«t only four officers and eight men killed and fifty oflicers and men wor.nth 1 out of a it 750. so 1 • - _ oteetion. ■ ■ • rrge r g -.- . were put out of action. It had been s sed that a sing ■ ■ water- line would <]<«■: n»y even the largest ship; the Tsarevitch, h u ver. was st ruck by a 12in s ram r 3 which inflicted very little injury. Her funnels almost shot away, while t • offi rs at 1 men in her conning-tower wore place I hors de on 1; . by .Taj an< se s Ils. oi e of which killed the Russian adn iral. But at the end of the battle the Tsarw's a was quite ab’e to defend herself, and could steam 14 knots, though only at a fearful expenditure • f coal. There are no published details * the injuries to the other Russian bat tlr> but these are not likely to have be? a. more serious than those of the Tsarex itch, and not ont f the bat -hips sank. The righting quality of the large arn Is as thus been proved. Of course, if the Japanese had employed Nelson tactics, they would, Jafter gaining an advantage at long range, have closed in to complete their vi<-tory. when the results of their t;-rg«*t practice would have been very different. Rut just when the moment for such action had arrived night came down an 1 the risks of night action in these days of mines and torpedoes are very great indeed. Hence Admiral Togo, perhaps wisely, drew off. though an English critic mav fe«-l that he would have done bettor. in view of the immense moral off**, t of the complete destruction of the Ru<e fleet. 1 es.-< is . tag<

to tl e utmost. It is in th* la*’ hour of battle that the fruits of victor* are gathered in. and the great leader it set must be of that tenuxr which •vtHinii nothing done while aught remains to do.’* Had he struck hard and heavily in Augu*t the Baltic fleet would never have >aihd. and though he might have have taken at ka-t one <f the enemy’s in exchange. The spectacle of tiii* indecisive action makes Neis m’s courage and genius in always forcing a dose encounter, where hr must either have won a complete victory or suffered a - mirablv. for Nelsen fought, as did Togo, wi h *he certainty that if he were beaten it wa* the end of his ocunfry. Bat he took risks, and took them with a b»bi heart, knowing that “n••thing great van be achieved without risk.’’ At the same time. Tcgo had many dillicvkies to face. He could not »pen his attack impetuously, as a lighter would love to do. because the Russians had to be ceaxed out anti away from Feri Arthur. Any premature attack would have led the tortoise to withdraw I the shelter f its ass of foil*. In the second phase <»f the battle he may have been prevented from closing as he would have wished by the necessity of g is i t interp >se 1 between the Russians and Kiaochati ami Vladiv< stok. In the brilliant action which Admir.il Kamimura fought with the Vladivostok cruisers, ulterior purposes once more intervened to prevent the destruction < f the Russian squadron. The Admiral was charged with the duty of covering the Straits of Korea, through w ■ ich it was imperative that none of the Fort Arthur fleet should pa*s. He met the Vladivostok ship*, evidently attempting to effect a junction with the Fort Arthur fleet, attacked them with the utmost energy, and destroyed their weakest unit, the Rurik. inflicting treiuendou* damage on i arid Rossia. < f ioh M-it'S is stated by Russian authorit'e- to have lost about 300 men. The Japanese fought with the more fury because of the extreme severity shown by the A ladivostok ships to Japanese and neutral shipping, but when Kamimura may be said to have had the shattered Gromoboi and Rossia at his mercy be let them go. and broke off the pursuit instead of following them at all costs and sinking them. The undoubted explanation wa* that he feared io uncover St ra it s f K to me(t rhe Port Arthur fleet. Yet this seems to have been another error, for a pursuit of the battered ships would have placed him in a po-irion to meet any Russian refugees off Vladivostok. The more the history of this war is studies!, the more clearly does it appear that it is the first duty of rhe conit press thi i ediat< advantage to the utmost, and that the ulterior results are. as a ride, best secured by such a course. “Not victory, but annihilation,” is the true aim of naval war. A fact shown by the lighting has been the necessity «»f providing protection f«»r all gun*. At Chemulpo the Variag lost one third of her crew l>ccause her guns

were wit* out *hi«Jd<. No <me, on the other hand, was injured below the armoured <leck. In the battle of August 10. ti e Askold, a crui*er of very s'-rikir d<*ign !.» the Variag. was struck bv 14 shells, mostly < f large calibre, she leaked heavily after the hattie, but her lo** ef life was small, as her gun* wen- protected by shield*. Her funnels were damaged, cue of them having been *h«»t away, ai.d another badly injured; two heavy shells struck her below the water* hue. making large L«»b-* in her side, but they did not pierce the armour deck or cause very* serious damage, hcymnl admitting a <-onsith-rxldv quantity of water. Her sjH-ed fell to twelve knots fro.n a nominal twenty-three, but externally the amount of water in her hull di 1 not change her appearance or perceptibly alt r her trim. A French critic believe* that there was *ome defect in the •L:p.im*e *hclls. *ince. as he says, “they did not « pen enormous holes or destroy the decks, as do melinite shells.” Certainly, if the Japanese projectiles were a fair specimen of the shells used by European artillerists—and it i* probable, notwithstanding the French criticism, that they were —the destructive power of modern ordnance has been greatly exaggerated. One cau*e of the Japanese successes in the earlier peiiod of the war wa* the excellence of the telescopic eights provided. The Ru**i;»n fleet at Port Arthur is *i:ti» «l. rightly or wrongly, to have been equipped with very inferior sights; indeed, some authorities have declared that there were no tvle*vcq»iv sights at all. Remembering certain incidents which have occurred in the Briti>h navy, thi* i* not incredible. Our own <ights in many of our ships are inaccurate, or fitted with cpe* of too low power to be thoroughly satisfactory, and it is net very pleasant to read in a Service journal that within th.- past few weeks the gun-sights of most of the Home fleet battleships have been found to be defective. In the Kittle of August the Port Arthur fleet made better s'nooting. hitting the Mika*a repeatedly, and this is probably to be ascribed to the fact that the gun* had then been fitted with the latest and be*t *ight*. which had been thoroughly tv*tcd in actions with the Japanese siege artillery before Port Arthur. Generally speaking, the le>*cn* of the war confirm predictions, except with regard t<» the deadline-s of the torpedo and mine and the eflicacy of modern artillery. The immense value of the large battleship and armoured cruiser has been again and again demonstrated. Small craft can effect nothing without their support, and are further liable to lose their speed in. continuous -service. The wear and tear of warships has been proved to be very *eriou*. and to increase a* the size » f the vessel decreases. A large margin must be allowed in any fleet which mean- to take the offensive for mishaps due to mines and collisions. The effect of the war in the navies of the w. rid w ill inevitably be to stimulate the construct ion of battleships and large armoured < rinsers, and to increase the attention already given to organisation. Success has been proved to depend • n three things: being ready first, the po-—e**i« n of a iM-r*onne! trained for war and net merely practised in inane pear * • volutions, and a good material. Pushing the analy*is a point further, it is clear that the personnel, or the quality of the general staff, is the final determinant of victorv. A g« < d general staff

will provi le ”v<wl ship- and be ready i> time; the best ships will be useless weapons i; the men who have to work ."nd light them are unready or ill-trained when the day of battle comes.—By H. W. Wilson.