Modern Naval Warfare.

New Zealand Graphic, Volume XXXII, Issue XIII, 26 March 1904, Page 38

Modern Naval Warfare.

I’he following article by that very well-known writer. Herbert 'Russell, which was written just prior to the outbreak of hostilities will be read with interest: The menace of war in the Far East has brought into considerable promin ence the problem of modern naval tactics, for it is universally recognised, says Mr Russell, that if the two countries come to hostilities, the issue will be determined upon the sea. Speculation is being freely indulged in as to the manner in which the opposing fleets would he most likely to fight. Modern naval tactics are largely theoretical. I have in my possession a paper written by the late Vice-Admiral ( olomb. himself held as no mean authority upon this subject, in which he seeks to demonstrate that the tactics of Nelson would be the tactics of today. I believe, however, that latterly he largely modified his views, and admitted no parallel could reasonably be drawnIn the days of Trafalgar, the question of tactics was comparatively a simple one. The mobility of a fleet then depended entirely upon the force and direction of the wind, The first objective was to gain the weather-gauge. which is the more commanding position: the next- to cut the enemy’s line in such a fashion as to bring the whole, of the attacking force into play upon only a portion of the foe. But steam has imported a condition into naval warfart* which Nelson’s captains never had to reckon with. Speed, and its concomitant quality of mobility, are essential factors in determining all questions of tactical distribution. RFLES OF SEA WARFARE. Let the. distinction between strategy and tactics be (dearly drawn- for the two terms are frequently used in an erroneous sense. Strategy is the planning of a campaign: tactics are the evolutions of a battle. For the former it is impossible to lay down ary general guiding rules. Strategy is an inherent quality of leadership, and no two great, militant minds have ever yet proved quite in accord in plotting out a war, whether by sea or landBut with tactics it is a different matter. In their probable application they remain, as 1 have said, largely theoretical: but the rules of them are reduced almost to the nature of an exact science. The rudiments of modern naval tactics aim at bringing about sets of conditions that shall respectively make for the greatest advantage to the aggressor. and militate as far as possible against the assailed. Therefore, naval tactics are broadly differentiated under the two heads of offensive and defensive. While many of the elements of both are identical, they differ materially in their manner of employment- The primary business of an admiral before going into action is to have a (dear perception of the power of bis licet in both these qualities. He has so many battleships, so many cruisers. These represent a collective total of gun power, and a definite degree of armour resistance. If the ships conform at all to the modern standard of homogeneity, they w ill have a uniformity of speed under the stress of warfare. The problem, then, is bow to get the highest degree of fighting value out of these distinctive features. Naval strategists the world around seem to be agreed that the issue of a sea war can onlv be finally decided by 1 he battleship squadrons of the combatants. Bloc’ading operations, cruisei actions. commerce destruction, and the like may inflict great injury and suf fering upon the contesting nations; but the accepted authorities doubt whethei it is conceivable that effective submission can be attained by these means. STRENGTH AXI) DISPOSITION. As the Japanese fleet is organised and administered essentially upon British ideals, so are our own naval tactics those which the ’•little yellow men’ would follow. Russia, during the course of her recent naval manoeuvres. haprettv (dearly demonstrated that the tactical theories according to which hei licet would be fought are also very sinii lar Io our own. Therefore. to discuss British tactic* is equally to explain tin* principles upoi which the threatening war in the Fai East would be thrashed out. 'l’he two element a ry consideration' which any admiral has to determine be fore deriding upon his plan of batth

;rc a clear realisation of the strength engaged. and the disposition of the unit.- coinposing this -t length, The old idea that the bigger a licet the inure formidable it relatively becomes now only holds good in a very modified degree. A very big licet liecoines an unwieldy lleet; and. in these days of high speeds and rapid evolutions. numbers beyond a certain point handicap that freedom of action so vital to successful sea warfare. Il is held by most naval tacticians that eight battleships and a screen ot •misers one-third more numerous is the most ellicient manoeuvring size for a modern lleet. It is worth noting that the Admiralty evidently accepts thiview, because not only are they build ing <mr latest battleships in classes ot eight, but the combined battle divisions of the Home and ( hannel Elects respec lively consist of this same number. Kight battleships ami twelve cruisers —of which on an average four would be armoured ami the remainder light or protected cruisers may be regarded, then, as the maximum of tactical ellicieney. We now come Io the question of Ihe array in which this force* may best light. THE IDEAL BAT ILE \RR \Y. In steaming at sea under normal peace conditions such a lleet would bo formed as follows: The battleships in two eipial divisions of line-ahead, the senior admiral leading the port division, and his flagship acting as “fleet guide'': an interval of one cable's length between the ships in line, and of four <ables between the two divisions, keep ing station abreast. The cruisers would be disposed in divisions abeam al another six cables' interval from their respective battleship divisions, or might be formed into single column of line a head. The sea formation is not the disposition in which any admiral would steam into action. His first business is to cause his cruisers to break back out of range, ami then work round so as to try to get into touch with and engage the enemy’s cruisers. It is highly probable. however, owing to Ihe high light ing value of the latest classes of armoured cruisers that these vessels would be formed into a third battle division. The great objective Io be aimed at in picking up lighting formation is to bring the heaviest aggregate of gun power to bear upon the enemy while forming Ihe smallest possible target for his lire. Battleship gun fire is classed under two heads—primary and secondary. Primary lire is delivered from barbette or turret guns, and the principal naval Powers Russia ami Japan among them have aII adopt ed the 12in. gun for t heir main battleship armament. Secondary lire is delivered from casemate guns which range downward* from bin. quick filers. I have not referred to the 9.2 in. or 7.din. guns, because except in the case of t he two ex-Chilian vessel none of our battleships yet have these weapons. A portion of the primary gun tire can he delivered in equal degree ahead or astern or the whole of it can be concentrated as beam lire along a radius of about 4. - >degs. forward ami abaft the beam. In tin* opening .-t ages of an action it is only primary gun fire that need be reckoned with. I have found naval tacticians arc virtually unanimous in agreeing that the most favourable disposition tor attack is in single column of line-ahead against an opponent coming up abeam in line abreast. In this formation the collective primary gun lire of the entire licet can he delivered in an end-on raking ot the enemy, while he can only rely with his head lire. During the great mimic battle ot the last naval manoeuvres. Admiral Wilson disposed the fourteen battleship- ot his attacking lleet in four divisions of bow ami-quarter line. That is to say. they advanced in four parallel oblique col umns. similar to tin* echelon ot army format ion. I'lie assailed fleet, which, being small, was endeavouring by superior speed to escape action altogether, spread out in single column of line-ahead, steaming laterally athwart the course ot its pur suers, so as to restrict them to ahead lire only, ami at the same time to diffuse itself over as wide a tract of waler

a- possible. to altord le— oppurl unit \ to it- aggro—or- for tire cent rat ion. The line-ahead disposition is univei sally regarded as the most eilertive po -it ion of both attack and defence, whe thei* in -ingle column or l»y divi-ioiis. It certainly gives greater facility for promptly (•hanging direction than any other formation. An admiral want- every -hip in hi- fleet to deliver her heaviest volume of tire- ami it is in a line ahead engagement that -he gets her chance ot doing thi-. And. therefore, both adver-arivs in the next open -ea battle will doubt le-- try t( pick up thi- same dispo-ition. The im*-timable value of superior heel- will then manife-t il-elf. A- a result, the action will develop into an artillery duel between two single column- in line ahead, travelling at their topnio-t -peed.