War as a Science.

New Zealand Graphic, Volume XXXII, Issue X, 5 March 1904, Page 53

War as a Science.

A PRUSSIAN GENERAL'S VIEWS.

“The side which is in a position to support the strain of war the longest,” wrote Lieut .-General Von der Goltz, many years ago. in his book ‘The Conduct of War,” “enjoys a great advantage. Theoretically it is quite conceivable that a State may destroy the organised military power of another nation and overrun a great part of its territory, and yet not be able to bear for long the sacrifices which the occupation imposes on it, and in the end be compelled to grant a comparatively favourable peaee to the defeated State. This is frequently lost sight of, and the destruction of the enemy’s main army is taken as being synonymous with the complete attainment of the object of war. Countries of great expanse, like the Russian Empire, with a population elosely united by the bond of a common nationality, whose in-

habitants do not live too much crowded up, and whose conditions of life are still simple, are little dependent on the undisturbed maintenance of international trade, and naturally Buffer far less from the continuance of a state of war than highly civilised States with contracted frontiers and dense populations composed of different nationalities. . . . Social and political conditions also play an important part in this connection. If it be only a rural population, living scattered over the country which is affected by the war, the Government has an almost perfectly free hand for its decisions, as the people are not in a position as a rule to give authoritative expression to their ardent desire for peaee. It is different where there is a commercial citizen class, settled in large towns, which stands to lose everything by tho disturbance of the usual order of things. After a few defeats such classes will be the first to be in favour of peaee, wh.le at the same time they as a rule possess the means of procuring attention to their wishes through their control of the press and other means of influence. It is only when the two opposing States are somewhat similar in national characteristic*: that the ultimate object, namely, tho enforcement of the desired peace, can at once be attained by the defeat of the enemy’s main army. . . . Napoleon

failed in 1812, not because he was unable to beat the Russian armies, but because, as a matter of fact, the defeat of these armies and even the loss of the capital, Moscow, did not compel Russia, with its enormous extent of territory and stubborn population so hard to affect, to make peace. . . . Thus, after breaking up the enemy’s main army, we have in many cases to be further prepared for the special, mid- under certain circumstances, more difficult task of en forcing peaee. Indeed, the possibility of having to perform this further task must be reckoned with at the time when war is decided on. It is above all things necessary to satisfy ourselves as to whether our own military power is sufficient after victory on the battlefield to cause the enemy to feel the burden of war severely enough to desire a return to peaee. In this respect Napoleon failed l . The organisation of his fighting forces was not complete enough to allow of his great anny, whieh had gone forward to defeat and destroy the Russian armies, being followed up by fresh bodies of troops, w’hich, occupying the enemy’s territory in sufficient strength, would have rendered its reconquest impossible. . . . The means to be employed

in order to exert the pressure necessary to create a strong desire for peaee on the part of the enemy will depend on the nature of the country and people. To capture or merely to threaten the capital may be enough. But. it may also become necessary to seize the harbours, arsenals, important trade routes, fortresses, and factories for supplying warlike stores; that is to say, all important possessions essential to the people and army for their existence—in fact, to seize a considerable portion or the whole of the enemy’s territory.”