Port Arthur.

New Zealand Graphic, Volume XXXII, Issue VIII, 20 February 1904, Page 55

Port Arthur.

OCCUPATION AND DEFENCES. JTS VALUE AS A NAVAL BASE CRITICISED. An interesting account of Port Arthur appears in Alexis Krause’s "Far East,” published a few months ago. The writer says : —“ Port Arthur. occupied by Russia in 1897, is at present th.e most southerly naval station possessed by that Power in Asia. Formerly a Chinese arsenal, constructed under supervision of European engineers, the Russians found the town laid out and the scheme of defences already planned; but they set about re-arming the forts and adding to the military strength of the position, and at the beginning of 1903 the state of the armaments and defences was such as to defy any probable attack. The entrance to Port Arthur is exceedingly narrow—in one place less than 200 yards; and this, of course, greatly adds to that security within, which, like that at Vladivostok, is at right angles to the main channel. The water in the

inner port is, however, of insufficient depth to permit of the largest vessel lying there, and the only available berth for ships drawing more than 24ft. is the outer roadstead, which is exposed to the sea, and where they could be seen by. an enemy and attacked. The entrance or exit of a vessel must al-

ways be conducted with extreme care, owing to the formation and shallowness of the channel; and altogether, while a well sheltered and safe port for vessels of light draught, Port Arthur cannot be compared with Vladivostok, although it possesses the great advantage of being open practically throughout the year. One other disadvantage possessed by Port Arthur is its liability to become isolated in time of war. The isthmus by which it is united to the rest of the Liaolung Peninsula is exceedingly narrow, in one place only 18 miles wide, and in ease of hostilities breaking out the first aim of the attacking Power would be to seize this neck of land, and so sever all communication between Port Arthur and the rear except by sea. Taken as a whole, while the possession of this place adds very materially to Russian resources and influence in the Far East, its advantage may- be considered political rather than strategic, •nd the benefit attained is likely to be found in the continued extension of Russia’s hold on China, rather than in the superiority of her military and naval position in the Gulf of Pechili. .Wei-hai-wei, when onee the breakwater is completed, will be a far superior naval harbour, and prove in every respect better suited, from a military and strategic point of view’, to the requirements of a naval base than Port Arthur, notwithstanding the strength of that station’s position and the formidable armament and garris-n comprised. There is a dry dock at Port Arthur with a length ef 385 ft.

In discussing the value of Port Arthur the writer of “China in Decay,” says:-— “It only remains to glance at the Russian stronghold, ami enquire whether Port Arthur is capable of being made as impregnable a base as is generally supposed. Geographically, the harbour is most favourably situated. Its position is well adapted for the defence of the Gulf of Pechili, the entrance is easy to guard, and the harbour is protected from the weather. There are, however, corresponding drawbacks, which detract somewhat from its strength. The area of deep wateris small and close to the entrance, necessitating the mooring of big vessels in full view, and within range from the sea outside. The entrance to the port is extremely narrow, and the entrance or departure of a fleet must always be attended with danger. This risk materially' detracts from the value of the harbour as a place of refuge, and renders it a simple matter for an opposing fleet to make the passage of the entrance practically impossible. In addition to this drawback the to the. bay is ice-bound two months out of-the twelve. It has been pointed out by

Lieut.-Colonel Rheinhold Wagner that owing to the formation of the coastline on the land side of Port Arthur it would be a most difficult matter to maintain communication with the rear. The isthmus is extremely narrow, iu one part only 18 miles, and an enemy landing here could easily command the situation by cutting off all communications, while coal must be brought by- sea. Regarded from a purely strategical standpoint. Port Arthur has been greatly over-esti-mated. Its military strength, owing to the heights by which it is commanded, is considerable, but its capacity as a naval base is indifferent, its accommodation limited, and its situation open to attack. It is. indeed, questionable whether the practical utility of Port Arthur is sufficiently great to repay its owner for the gigantic expenditure entered upon for its armament and defence.