China and Japan at War.

New Zealand Graphic, Volume XIII, Issue VII, 18 August 1894, Page 157

China and Japan at War.

THE COREAN TROUBLE AN INTERESTING ACCOUNT OF THE JAPANESE ARMY

AT the present juncture, when our interest is centered in all that concerns the fighting powers of the ap-

parently victorious Japs, we consider ourselves fortunate in having come across a very recent and up-to-date account of the army of Japan. The article is wiitten in a bright, lucid style and cannot fail to interest all classes of our readers :—

In company with Colonels Kouroda and Murata I went over the Tokio arsenal, where the Murata rifle is now being manufactured. Colonel Kouroda is commandant of the arsenal, was president of the commission which adopted the rifle, and visited America in 1876 with the younger Sai go. Colonel Murata, who has made several tours of inspection to Europe, is an intelligent and accomplished officer, and one of the best rifle shots in the empire. Indeed,

THE MARKSMANSHIP OF THE JAPANESE SOLDIER is, on the authority of the French instructors formerly employed by the Government, considerably above the average. The Japanese eye is quick and keen, and I am told that instantaneous photography has verified the correctness of J apanese drawings of birds in flight and other animals in motion—representations hitherto regarded as conventional. Whether this be so or not, the success of Japanese artists in conveying impressions of action is well known. JAPANESE ARSENAL The arsenal, begun in 1874 and completed in 1885, occupies the site of the former residence of Prince Mito, and it is a somewhat novel experience to step from the noise and smell of the workshop into the silence and beauty of a garden 480,000 square metres in extent and 300 years old.

there to lunch under magnificent trees in a tea house beside waters filled with sleeping carp and lotos flowers. The arsenal differs from those abroad only in size and capacity, being supplied with the best machinery of American, English, and continental types. The contrast between the primitive tools in common use and those of the Government workshops is everywhere striking. At Kioto one sees the wooden looms working side by side with the latest machinery from Lyons, and the same is true of the pottery manufac tory with its extensive plant from Limoges. In view of the rate of recent improvements in small arms, types becoming obsolete in about six years, the capacity of the Tokio arsenal is inadequate, its possible day’s work of one hundred (actually seventy) rifles being far below the average of foreign arsenals ; and the problem of ordnance supply, easil / solved by purchase in time of peace, would be a difficult one for Japan in time of war. The production of iron is small ; except a few Government ones, there are no foundries, and the tempered steel bars for the Murata rifle are imported from England. Reliance is naturally placed on Krupp and Armstrong for the larger calibres for naval and seacoast purposes, but the small production of raw material and deficiency in the precesses of manufacture constitute in this age of iron and steel

A WEAK POINT OF THE JAPANESE NATIONAL DEFENCE. The field artillery of various types is made at Osaka, the prevailing gun being of Italian model with a calibre of seven and a half centimetres. All small aims and ammunition are manufactured at the Tokio arsenal, for which a large plnnt has been recently ordered from the Union Metallic Cartridge Company.

The erection of ni >dern barracks on a large scale is in contemplation. For the most part

THE GARRISON OF TOKIO

is now quartered in the yashiki of the daimio, square inclosures of many acres formerly occupied by these feudal lords during their residence with their clansmen at the shogun’s court. They are surrounded by a moat and continuous line of buildings with barred windows, the former dwellings of the retainers. As the capital of the shogunate, Tokio was a vast camp, and the cyclopean walls of its castle (containing stones sixteen feet long, six feet wide and

four feet thick) with their broad moats still suggest a feudal civilization. I visited the only new barracks yet erected, now occupied by the Third regiment of the line. In general arrangement and cleanliness it is unsurpassed by the best modern buildings of its kind. The bath rooms, kitchens, offices and guardhouse are detached from the main edifice, which accommodates one regiment on a war footing. On the upper floor are stored the clothes an 1 equipments of

those in excess of the peace effective ; these are at present supplied by contractors, but it is the intention of the Government hereafter to furnish them directly. Three baths weekly are prescribed — not a hardship for this bath-loving people--and a thorough gymnastic system is also in force. THE JAPANESE SOLDIER is undersized, but muscular and stocky, well developed, and possesses unusual marching pow ers, as was well illustrated in the Satsuma rebellion, where forced marches were made of over sixty miles in twenty-four hours. The total matching weight, including one ration, is slightly over thirtythree pounds.

THE ACTIVE ARMY IS UNDOUBTEDLY BETTER OFFICERED THAN THE FIRST RESERVE.

The superior oflirers owe their positions largely to their services in the war of the restoration and the Satsuma rebellion, and while thus men of considerable local military experience, are generally less thoroughly trained than those of the middle and lower grades. It is also interesting to note that the number of those entering the military schools from the samurai class is decreasing, while that from the common people or heimin is or the increase. MILITARY MANIEUVRES IN JAPAN involve more than ordinary expense, owing to the peculiar agricultural features of the country and the resulting injury to the rice tields. For this reason they are generally on a much less extensive scale than those of this year, when a plan of operations including both the land and naval forces was successfully carried out in the presence of the diplomatic corps, and a large number of invited guests These opera tions lasted eight days, and the invading and home forces were distinguished as the western and eastern armies. It was assumed that the western fleet had divided into two squadrons, one of which had seized the island of Oshima, off the Bay of Yedo, while the other had occupied the island of Awaji, commanding the entrance to the Inland sea, as also the town of Wakayama on the mainland opposite.

The report of Prince Arisugawa, commander-in-chief, states that both sides committed tactical errors to an equal degree and that victory lay with neither ; but ths report of the War Office is not yet published and the data for detailed criticism are not at hand. In the way of general results, however, it may be stated that in exceptionally bad weather 30,000 troops and fifteen war ships were successfully concentrated at the point of attack. The artillery and ammunition supplies were at hand as wanted, but some fault was found with the commissaiiat. From such information as I could gather, the numbers despatched to the front and those actually available on contact with the enemy compared favourably, and at the close of the week’s campaign were not sensibly affected. Few fell out from fatigue, ana as the infantry were allowed to exchange the army boot for the sandal, the men suffered but little in two days’ hard marching from sore feet. The general appearance of the men and the handling of the vessels of

THE FLEET RECEIVED HIGH PRAISE FROM COM PETENT WITNESSES.

It is to be remembered that no foreign ofli rials are now em ployed by the War Department. Indeed, the number of foreigners in other departments of the Government is steadily decreasing. Japan has had a somewhat expensive experience in this respect, both as regards the incapacity of some of her advisers and the non adaptability of their schemes to Japanese conditions. Prince Arisugawa, a near relation of the Mikado, is commander-in chief and director

of the general stall, and Count Oyama presides over the War Department. A general officer commands each of the seven military districts into which the empire is divided.

The annual cost per man of the land forces is slightly over 240 yen, a figure below the average of the corresponding ones for the five great continental powers.

THE TOTAL COST OF THE LAND AND NAVAL FORCES is about thirty per cent, of the income. If the expenses of the military establishment are regarded as 100, those of the navy, including special appropriations for naval stations, are about 93 ; England being the only great power whose naval expenses are so large relatively to those of the army. The task of creating an army is a far easier one than that of creating a navy, which is essentially a growth dependent upon conditions not to be found in Japan. With a large

seafaring population, yet the Japanese are not sailors in the English sense. They have NOT BEEN A PEOPLE OF NAVAL ENTERPRISE, and have no Cook or Drake in their annals. Foreign commerce and colonial possessions, the great spurs to naval development, are wanting, as also the wealth and industries necessary to the maintenance of a large navy. When it is remembered that that of England is the growth of centuries, the sudden creation of dockyards, arsenals and fleets by Japan is a noteworthy proof of her ambition and enterprise. But. in spite of a certain superfical skill, THE SEAMANSHIP OF THE JAPANESE NAVY is not of a high order, and it may be fairly questioned whether undue reliance has not been placed upon the naval forces as an element of national defence. The organisation and equipment of the army, moreover, has not as yet been followed up by the internal improvements necessary to render it effective. The length of the island is a military disadvantage, concentration and operations on interior lines being extremely difficult. Few of the many points of attack are as yet fortified or connected with each other. Engineering difficulties led to the abandonment of the plan to connect the eastern and western capitals by a railway along the Nakasendo, the only route satisfying strategical conditions. The railway along the eastern shore is being pushed forward to the Straits of Shimonoseki, but is a narrow

gauge single track, inadequate for a military emergency, and at several points too near the coast for safety as a trunk line. Important harbours are as yet without overland communications ; the west and east coasts, separated by mountain ranges, are unconnected, and the common roads with their narrow light bridges are unsuitable for the passage of artillery and rapid concentration. The location of the depots of war material in centres sure to be attacked in the event of war is unfortunate from a military point of view, as is also the situation of the capital ; while the protection of the outlying islands, many of which form excellent bases of operation for a hostile force, is a difficult problem. Japan is undoubtedly alive to these unfavourable conditions and will remedy them as thoroughly and as fast as possible.

THE JAPANESE MAGAZINE RIFLE,

of which a picture is given, merits some description. Itis the invention of Colonel Murata of the Japanese army, and was submitted to the Japanese War Office for examination. An Examining Board was appointed, and after a thorough series of experiments this weapon, with some modifications suggested by the experiments, was adopted for the infantry under the name of the Murata repeating rifle. Its manufacture was begun in 1889 at the Tokio arsenal. When loaded it holds ten cartridges ; eight in the magazine, one in the feed chamber, and one in the bore. As the result of repeated trial it is found that the time required to load ten cartridges as above, the cartridges being taken from a

table, is 11J seconds. The soldier standing with his rifle at the shoulder can fire the ten cartridges in 13*9 seconds without aiming, and when aiming in 23'8 seconds. The weight of the rifle with and without the bayonet is 4k.300 and 4k. 170 respectively, and its length is 1m.220, or, with the bayonet, 1m.4885 The calibre is Bmm., and the projectile a cylindro-ogival one of 15gm.55, attaining an initial velocity of 625 m. with a charge of 2gm.2 of smokeless powder.

The accompanying longitudinal section exhibits the mechanism of the rifle whose magazine is below the barrel, and which resembles the Mauser type, with a sliding bolt action and spring feed. The barrel is of steel, the length of its rifled part being 672 mm. Thete are four grooves with a square cross section and a right-handed twist of 235 mm. or 29 5 times the J calibre. Externally and internally the barrel is a truncated cone. The steel bayonet is light, and is a cutting blade 28cm. in length.