RUNDSTEDT'S MOVE

Waikato Times, Volume 196, Issue 22548, 5 January 1945, Page 3

RUNDSTEDT'S MOVE

SURPRISE FOR ALLIES PERTINENT QUESTIONS WHAT WAS AT FAULT? (Special Correspondent) (Received Jan. 5, 1 p.m.) LONDON, Jan. 1 Why did von Rundstedt break through ? Why did he fail in his attack ? Are there going to be changes at the Supreme Headquarters of the Allied Expeditionary Force ? Were the Allies over-confident ? Why should winter delay our forces but von Rundstedt win a battle ? Those are some of the questions now being asked about the western front. Several attempts are being made to answer them. It has long been admitted that the Allies were completely surprised .by von Rundstedt’s attack in the locality used by the Germans not only in 1940 but also in 1914. The Daily Express’ writer, Alan Moorehead, discussing the* queries, says: “After the Normandy break-out General Eisenhower made two prodigious decisions—firstly, to take the field command himself, and secondly, bring all his armies up to the Rhine together. While the German line solidified the Allied armies toiled painfully up towards the Rhine and the Supreme Headquarters found itself conducting a battle 150 miles away. From the Mediterranean to the English Channel six armies were deployed and there was no real cutting edge anywhere. No Reinforcements “Soon the individual commanders found that even if they did make a breach in the German line they had no reinforcements on hand to back it up and go through. Faced with this evenly-spread pressure the German line was able to hold intact, which was the state of affairs at the end of November. It then became difficult for the Allies to get news out of Germany and follow the rear movements of the Wehrmacht, while von Rundstedt, with Germans and German sympathisers behind the Allied lines, found it easy to get information. He marshalled the Sixth Panzer Army north of the Ardennes, discovered that green American troops had moved into line in the First American Army. In the second week of December, when therq, was no moon, he took the Fifth Panzer Army from the line opposite Liege and slipped it quietly down opposite Luxemburg, while the Sixth Panzer Army moved into positions vacated by the Fifth Panzer Army. Use of Surprise Abandoned “When weather conditions were suitable he struck a weak spot in the American line, and, largely due to our policy of keeping divisions well forward, he found that he at once burst through into comparatively vacant rear areas.” Mr Moorehead praises the reaction of the Americans, and goes on to comment: “For many months now we have abandoned the use of surin our planning. We have simply packed troops up to the line and slogged ahead in fairly obvious directions.” He says: “There is much support for two ideas. Firstly the appointment of a field commander, British or American, would do a great deal towards getting quicker decisions and more adaptability into the line. Secondly, the need one day to mount and supply one dfinite spearhead to pierce the German front and exploit beyond.” Might Have Averted Setback Other correspondents also comment on the fact of the Supreme Command being too far back and on the dispersal of the Allied strength. It is pointed out that if the earlier system of the fighting command being in the hands of a specialist like FieldMarshal Montgomery, as in Normandy, had been maintained the setback might have been averted. At the same time it is generally remarked that there is every confidence in General Eisenhower. Discussions on these lines seem to be fairly general, but messages from New York declare that the chance of Field-Marshal Montgomery being promoted to commander of the Allied land forces under General Eisenhower are “remote.” Regarding the other questions “Strategious” in the Spectator remarks: “What was at fault was the absurd self-confidence which characterised the Allied outlook ever since the exploitation of the Battle of Normandy” and the tendency to be convinced by one’s own propaganda. He asks: “What save this self-confi-dence can explain the ease with which the Germans concentrated in secret and then overran some 70 miles of the Allied front ?” Germans’ Oil Reserve Correspondents on the western front and in Switzerland consider that the Germans “fooled” the Allies about their petrol shortage, and by using horse-drawing traffic deliberately built up a reserve for the offensive, which aimed at capturing Allied petrol and oil to sustain a drive through to Antwerp. It is declared that petrol was, in fact, one of the chief objectives of the offensive, but there is no doubt that after long hoarding the Germans had enough for the present battle plan. Berne reports state that observers in Berlin are convinced that the Germans had far greater stores of petrol than the Allies believed, while synthetic oil is still being manufac-