KING LEOPOLD

Waikato Times, Volume 129, Issue 21525, 13 September 1941, Page 7

KING LEOPOLD

DEFENCE OF ACTIONS DEFEAT OF BELGIUM STORY OF CAMPAIGN (Official Wlreleai) (Received Sept. 13, 11 a.m.) RUGBY, Sept. 12 The story of the 18 days’ campaign in which the Nazi war machine overran Holland and Belgium has been told from the Belgian point of view in a book issued today by the Belgian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. This authoritative document is both of immediate and historical interest, as it presents clearly the motives and the course of the Belgian policy in those critical years from 1936 to September, 1939, as well as her policy of neutrality after the outbreak of the war. Immediate interest naturally centres in the latter period and the document makes plain that while implementing loyally the declaration of neutrality made in September, 1939, the Belgian Government vigorously pursued the task of putting the country in a state of defence. The Belgian army was trained to face Germany and an attack from that quarter. The plan of defence consisted of two lines—(l) an advanced line— 1 running from Antwerp along the Albert Canal to a pivotal point at Eben-Emael and thence back through Liege to Namur; (2) the main defensive position constructed on the model of the Maginot Line and running from Antwerp through Louvain and Wavre to Namur. The plan was to hold the advance line long enough to give the British and French troops time to occupy positions in the main defensive position and a continuation of that position along the Meuse. This was put into operation when Hitler invaded Belgium early on the morning of May 10, but was dislocated at the outset by the brilliant German actions against the advance bridgeheads and the successful use of airborne troops. Reason For King's Capitulation Belgian opinion attributes King Leopold’s capitulation entirely to the Nazi break-through at Sedan, and whether this will also be the verdict of history must remain undecided until the British and French reports are available. One of the main features of the Belgian documents, which subsequent reports are likely to confirm, is that the King’s conduct was above reproach. After the French Commander-in-Chief of the Allied forces had ordered the abandonment of the advanced line the position of the King’s army appeared to be even more hopeless and as early as May 20 he informed the Franco-British liaison officers that isolation might have serious consequences. On May 20 he informed his troops, “Whatever may happen I will share your fate,” and on May 27 he telegraphed Viscount Gort, “The Belgian army is losing heart,” and the time was approaching when it would be unable to continue to fight. The same afternoon the King decided to ask for an armistice and communicated his decision at once to the British and French missions. Of the King's personal actions the document states: “As he had been proclaimed, in order to strengthen the courage of his soldiers at the height of the battle, its Commander-in-Chief, he has since linked up his future with that of the army. By his defiant attitude in captivity, to which he condemned himself by his refusal to recognise an accomplished fact, he has shown himself to be the incarnation of a people which will not accept servitude.”