BOOTS FOR SOLDIERS

Waikato Times, Volume 128, Issue 21409, 1 May 1941, Page 10

BOOTS FOR SOLDIERS

WANTED IN A HURRY WHAT HAPPENS IN U.S.A. The over effort, or lack of it, in New Zealand, has a parallel in some respects in America, and this fact is referred to in an intimate message by the Washington bureau of the Christian Science Monitor, in which the point is made that when the United States Army wants shoes it wants them in a hurry, but the Defence Commission wants to mix m social welfare, and the two don’t jibe. This is the story: Uncle Sam has just bought 1,840.000 pairs of new shoes for his soldiers. That’s a lot of shoes, but more significant than numbers is the way they were bought. The War Department, with the consent of the National Defence Commission, merely asked shoe manufacturers to make an offer for the 25 contracts. The lowest bidders won. This is the way the Army used to do all its buying until the Defence Commission adopted the “negotiated contract” or “selective award” method enabling it to do considerable social welfare planning on the side by inquiring into the geographical location and labour politics of the applicants. Back in October the Government ordered 2,400,000 pairs of shoes. About half the contracts were awarded on a negotiated basis, with resulting protests from manufacturers who pointed out that they were all observing the labour standards fixed by federal and state law. They sent their congressmen to call on the Defence Commission. The switch in policy on shoe contracts may or may not have wide significance depending on whether it becomes an isolated or typical instance of triumph for defence speed over more deliberate preparation keyed to social planning for the years ahead. Army Demands Speed In many cases, Army officers, interested primarily in speed, have been lined up with industry in opposing the Defence Commission, watchdog of “social objectives.” Describing the difficulties of achieving decentralisation of defence industries to a congressional committee the other day, Chester C. Davis, a member of the Defence Committee, told congressmen: “You’ve never had to sit across the I table from an Army officer and have i him ask you if you’re willing to take the responsibility for delaying the defence programme in order to build an airplane factory in the Middle West instead of next door to an exj isting plant in Baltimore.” j But Mr Davis evidently wasn’t I willing to take all the blame. He j turned the tables on the Army, charging that the goal of decentralI isation of defence industries could | have been attained more easily if the ! Army had done the proper research ! on raw materials in the last decade or J so. The Defence Committee is findI ing it cannot suddenly order a pow- | der plant to be set out on the Westj ern plains without some knowledge ! as to where its labour, its managers I and its raw materials are coming j from. I Planning has also delayed the ' housing programme. Confronted | with reports of “alarming” condi- : tirms at many defence centres today, i a representative of the defence j housing co-ordinator says;

“We could have put up lots of shelters if we had paid no attention to standards.” By “standards” housing officials mean not only stable construction to stand for at least 20 years, but planning to fit defence homes into the general housing scheme of the communities where they are located. Haste, They Say, Makes Waste It's all right for people these days tc say they favour building up defence to the limit and with all speed possible, but they must also ask themselves whether they are willing to face a new accumulation of slums, geographical maladjustment of wealth, and an exaggerated depression at the end of the war that might be avoided or lessened if the Government takes more time for defence planning. On the other hand, the Nation cannot expect to make social gains out of a war. Emergency powers and defence mechanisms should not be looked upon as a means of permanently acquiring reforms which the people's representatives in Congress have not approved. Somewhere there is a proper balance between speed and planning. The general lines of such a balance can be fixed by administration policy. but in the end the priority will have to be decided with every new airplane plant, every new order for doughboys’s shoes. It’s the old story of “butter and guns.” In European countries, people have given up butter for guns. The switch from negotiated contracts back to competitive bidding in the Government’s latest shoe order may mean that the United States has reached the point where it is ready to give up “butter” for guns—or at least for shoes for the men who carry the guns.