The Waikato Times WEDNESDAY, AUGUST 28, 1940 STILL A RACE OF ARMAMENTS

Waikato Times, Volume 127, Issue 21203, 28 August 1940, Page 4

The Waikato Times WEDNESDAY, AUGUST 28, 1940 STILL A RACE OF ARMAMENTS

According to the British Air Ministry’s figures, Germany has lost 3253 aeroplanes since the outbreak of war. This computation is believed to be conservative, but even if it does represent the limit of Germany’s losses, it is a toll that must be imposing a heavy strain on German resources. The planes lost were all first line fighting or bombing machines, and the personnel lost probably totals more than double the number of machines. Losses in battle are not the only drain on an air force. A large proportion of the machines of any force is constantly under repair and overhaul, and air accidents account for a large number of planes. If the blockade is affecting the German industry, the construction and maintenance of such a huge fleet must be becoming increasingly difficult.

It must be assumed, however, that since the war began Germany has built more than 3253 aeroplanes, so that in numbers the air force is as strong or stronger than at the outbreak of war. There is, however, evidence that German mass production methods are giving the Nazi airmen machines decidedly inferior to those flown by the British Air Force. Numbers have apparently been Germany’s primary aim, and the results are seen every time the rival forces clash on anything like equal terms. The ratio of more than three German losses to everv one British has been maintained consistently. Either in machines or in airmen, and possibly in both, the German Air Force has been proved definitely inferior, and that is a matter of first importance in the decision of the war.

Production of aeroplanes by and for Britain is by comparison much more diversified and individualistic, with the results that improved types are constantly appearing, with greater speed and greater striking power. If Germany wishes to remodel a standard type she must reorganise a whole factory, and the production of numbers is consequently affected. With its greater variety of types Britain is able to assign a selected squadron for any special task. If standard Messerschmitts are reported to be coming over, Britain can send up superior fighters to meet them. Because Germany cannot always operate only her most efficient machines, the first choice of weapons is not always an advantage. This war will possibly be decided on perfection of mechanised equipment. Just as one tank or one aeroplane could rout 1000 soldiers of the standard of a hundred years ago, so the machines of destruction in 1941 and 1942 will be superior to those of today. Britain’s armament is practically all new—more up-to-date and more destructive, unit for unit, than that of Germany—and if the quantity can be made available in time, Germany will be fighting a losing battle. Therefore it is extremely important that Britain should hold on doggedly for the remainder of the present waning summer. A few weeks more and Germany’s power to strike will be reduced very considerably. Britain’s offensive power also will be affected, but, far more important, the wheels of the armament industry will revolve at ever-incryasing speed and the great factories of the United States will be turning out swelling numbers of death-dealing machines for Britain. The British Empire and the United States have the resources to outbuild Germany if they can gain the necessary time. The British Air Force and the Navy are providing that time.