CONDUCT OF WAR

Waikato Times, Volume 125, Issue 20917, 23 September 1939, Page 8

CONDUCT OF WAR

BRITISH HELP FOR POLAND BEST WAY TO APPLY IT REMOVAL OF MISCONCEPTIONS (Official Wireless) (Received Sept. 25, 3.15 p.m.) RUGBY, Sept. 22 There is still some misconception in certain foreign countries of the underlying principles which govern the conduct of war by Britain. Notably the failure to prevent the overrunning of Poland has given rise to comment in some quarters which betrays a complete misunderstanding of the basic British plan. In western Allied countries, even in Poland itself, it had always been anticipated that large areas of Poland would quickly fall to the enemy. Nowhere was this more frankly recognised that in the Polish High Command. The geographical situation of Poland, many hundreds of miles from Britain and surrounded by enemy or neutral countries, through which the transport of arms is impossible, was a fundamental reason recognised from the outset by the Poles why the war could not be fought on the basis of direct help to Poland. The recognition of this inescapable fact, which lies at the root of the British war effort, is not affected by the overwhelming of Poland earlier than was anticipated. Last Three Years or More ‘Britain’s realistic view of what the war involves was illustrated in the first War Cabinet communique, that Britain’s policy was based on the assumption that the war would last three years or more. The importance of this preparedness for a long conflict lies In the fact that as time goes on Germany will find herself at a disadvantage, whereas the strength of Britain and her allies will grow month to month. Britain is being prepared for a struggle of this magnitude. It becomes clear that to have squandered efforts on a vain attempt to give Poland direct aid would have been folly. No Rash Adventures The Prime Minister in the House of Commons on September 20 said: ‘’There is no sacrifice from which we will shrink. There is no operation the Government will not undertake, provided our responsible advisers, our allies and we ourselves are convinced that it will make an appropriate contribution to victory. But what we will not do is to rush into .adventures that offer little prospect of success and are calculated to impair our resources and to postpone ultimate victory."