THE MIGHT HAVE BEEN

Waikato Times, Volume 125, Issue 20888, 21 August 1939, Page 3

THE MIGHT HAVE BEEN

TRAGEDY OF GALLIPOLI HESITANCY OF THE ATTACKERS WORK OF “UNTRAINED” TROOPS 'By Major C. 11. Clifton, N.Z.S.C.) “Our men were untrained!" Flow often does one hear this apology for the comparative failure of the Anzacs —an apology frequently made bipeople who should know better? The reasons why we missed success on April 25, 1915, are numerous and varied. They have been set forth at great length in voluminous official histories and much private literature. A recent book by John -North entitled “Gallipoli—the Fading Vision,” summarises and condenses in a most readable form everything which has appeared on the subject Those who are interested should not miss perusing this excellent volume. Looking back down the years, we can ask ourselves, how much was the battle of the landings adversely affected by the lack of training of the Australians and New Zealanders? First of all, I disagree entirely with the argument that they were ‘•untrained.” Inexperienced, yes; but certainly not untrained. Every Main Body soldier who sweated blood in New Zealand, on the way over and for months in Egypt to learn his job, will agree emphatically with one. What Happened to 29th Division Did the Anzacs fail in their first battle owing to incompetence? Before answering this question, let us see what happened to Hie 291 h Division down at Cape I Idles on the same day. The 291 h Division was formed of British battalions from India where, as everyone conversant with the system of foreign service knows, they were at full strength and fully trained. On that excellent foundation was superimposed several months’ further training in England. It is fair, therefore, to describe the 29th Division as the most efficient formation sent on active service by the Empire in 1914-1915. How did these seasoned units fare in comparison with the raw troops further up the coast? Five beaches were utilised for the Ilelles landings—W and V at the toe of the Peninsula; X immediately round the corner and almost at right angles to W; Y two miles north of X up the coast toward Anzac; and S inside the Straits about two miles east of V. The 'first objective for the division, to be reached on the first day, was the broad-shouldered ridge of Achi Baba, rising gradually from the plain to a height of 700 feet and just over five miles from Gape Ilelles. Main Attack Launched Half an hour after the first Australians waded ashore at Anzac, 18,000 seasoned British troops launched the main attack. At Y Beach, on the extreme left, 2000 men landed before 6 o’clock without a shot being fired. Scrambling up the low cliff on to the plateau, they found an empty landscape, dominated by Achi Baba. Four Turks were sighted. The two officers in command had orders sufficiently vague to justify any action—from capturing Achi Baba lone-handed to attacking in the rear the Turkish defences which, by the heavy firing so clearly audible, were holding up The main landings. What happened ? One order called for no immediate action —to join in the advance on Achi Baba later in the day. As a result, 2000 fully trained British troops leisurely explored the countryside, “sat about on the cliffs, smoking and quite unconcerned,” and nine hours after landing leisurely dug shelter pits on the cliff top. Vain Appeals for Support Yet the force landed at Y outnumbered all the Turks who were fighting so desperately against such long odds round the southern beaches. Twelve hours elapsed before the troops at Y experienced their 'first attack, which was stopped with the aid of the supporting warships. At ■intervals throughout the night six Turkish companies assaulted the hastily-prepared defences. Appeals for help and for ammunition had been steadily ignored. Nevertheless the last attack shortly after daylight was driven off. Thereafter the Turks did not fire another shot, and withdrew, presumably, to join the main battle. But on the beach at Y panic had already set in. In response to alarmist messages the ships’ boats commenced rc-cmbarkation. Still gettingno reply to requests for assistance, the commanding officer allowed the withdrawal to continue, in spite of the fact that the Turks had also gone. Late in the afternoon a small party of sailors returned, to search for wounded for an hour without being shot at. It is not a very heartening story, the Y Beach landing. Would the untrained Australians

or New Zealanders have done any better? They could not do less. At Main Beaches Let us see what happened at the main beaches. Under cover of a “thunderous” naval bombardment, one battalion was put ashore at X Beach—on the western flank—without a casualty. Twelve Turks constituted the beach defenders. By 9 o’clock "the beach itself and the low cliffs above it were very peaceful.” Two more battalions were landed in quick succession, and a semi-circular position was taken up about 600 yards from the beach, including the hill between X and \V Beaches. At 1 o’clock an attack bv possibly 300 Turks was “’easily beaten off.” Lacking further orders, although at least the senior officers knew that Achi Baba ridge was the first day's objective, three first-class British battalions totalling over 2000 men did nothing. As at Y, the X force outnumbered all the Turks on the south end of the Peninsula. “Like Bottles at a Fair” Yet throughout that fateful -day, within half-an-hour'iS easy walkijng over open country, their comrades at V Beach were being shot down "like bottles at a fair.” Everyone could hear the ral-tat-tat-tat of the Maxims and the gusts of heavy rifle fire; but they awaited the advance from the main beaches. it is true that the commander sent a message suggesting joining up with Y and received no reply. Gould “untrained" Australians and New Zealanders have done less? The opening drama at \Y and Y Beaches can he told very shortly. In each case Hie defenders consisted of 150 Turkish riflemen. strongly entrenched behind ample barbed" wire: at V there were also two Maxims enfilading the small bay. The preliminary naval bombardment “might as well have been confetti for all the effect, it had on them.” As the ships’ boats, crammed with ' heavily-equipped troops, pulled slowly into the beaches, they were met by a storm of bullets and literally shot to pieces. Dazed Survivors under a Bank At V Beach a few dazed survivors crouching under a small bank ten yards from the tideless sea represented the high-water mark of the attack. Throughout the day desperate attempts were made, from the River Clyde and from fresh boats, to resume the attack. Three thousand casualties at V 'Beach bear witness to the sacrifice and the courage of the 29th Division. When the opening storm burst on the heroic Lancashire Fusiliers at W Beach, the brigade commander personally directed the remaining boats on to a rocky ledge just north of the low cliffs that overlook the beach. Scrambling to the lop, this party took the main Turkish post in the rear and, after a grim hand-to-hand struggle, cleared the way. But initial losses, and the resulting confusion, had been so great that only the environs of the beach were captured during the day. Attempts to help V landing made no headway against two heavily-wired Turkish redoubts on the intervening knoll. The fifth landing took place at S Beach, two miles further east and within the Straits. Here three companies scrambled ashore under desultory fve. captured the Turkish ■post on the cliff edge—by attacking it from, the rear—and remained in undisputed possession for three days “waiting for the advance from the south.” In the first five hours 13,000 fullytrained and experienced British soldiers were ashore at four successful landings. Thereafter, with minor exceptions, the troops rested while awaiting “fresh and definite orders — which never arrived.” “Sitting in the Wings” In twelve hours at Ilelles, 3000 British soldiers had been destroyed frying to force their way through an amphitheatre covered by the fire of JSO stout-hearted Turks with two Maxims. Yet nearly 13,000 fullytrained troops, whose courage and efficiency cannot he questioned, sal “in the wings,” able to walk in the back of the stage, but “waiting for orders.” I feel sure that the New Zealand Brigade, "untrained” though it may have been, if put ashore at Y or X on the morning of the 25th, would have done more in spite of its inexperience. Why did the Anzac landing achieve so little? “Tell the colonel that the damned fools have taken us a mile too far north!” Shouted by the naval officer in charge of the flotilla as the first tows pulled slowly in to the silent beach, those words explain the main reason for failure. The Royal Navy can do no wrong. Yet one naval officer wrecked the Anzac attack before it was launched by mistaking Ari Bumu headland for Gaba Tepe and making a landfall two miles ! north of the right place. Even if there had been no opposition, the leading brigade must have been defeated by Hie tortuous maze of scrubcovered, broken ridges and waterscoured gullies which confronted them. To maintain cohesion and direction in an advance across such a wilderness was "an impossible task for the best trained troops in the