Why Labour Failed

Waikato Times, Volume 116, Issue 19457, 22 December 1934, Page 13 (Supplement)

Why Labour Failed

Lord Snowden’s Indictment: Settling Old Scores.

(By W. W. Hadley, 'in Sunday Times.)

IN THE FIRST volume of his Autobiography, ' Lord Snowden told the story of the rise of the Labour Party. The second volume is of greater political Importance, for it gives his record of both 'Labour Administrations, his reasons for their failure, and his adverse judgment on the Labour Party as an Instrument of government. Mr Churchill once said that Labour was- not fit to govern. If he wished now to justify ‘that dictum, he could find much to support it in this book. 'The first Labour Government, as Mr Asquith told Lord Snowden, “wantonly and unnecessarily committed suicide.” The second broke up because it Lacked Courage To Tackle a grave national emergency. The majorily of the Labour Ministers surrendered to ‘ the dictation <Jf the Trade Union Congress, Lord Snowden says, and thus showed they were “not a national party, hut the servants of an outside caucus.” Until it throws 0.l this domination, Labour “can never expect to be regarded as anything more than a * class 'party." And no class party, whatcye" the class may be, is lit to govern Lns country. . , . On all this —'the character of his old partj, its record in office, the sources of both its strength and its weakness—nobody can speak with higher authority 'than Lord Snowden. He did as much as any man to raise the party to power. He held high office in the two Labour Governments. In some respects he is the ableist man the movement has produced. On the platform he was second to none; as a Parliamentarian he was easily first; and, 1 could he have controlled events, both the Labour Administrations would have had a , better record and, perhaps longer- life. Now, no front rank politician is so isolated. He was expelled from his party for joining the National Government, to which he is to-day bitterly opposed, and he is unlikely ever again to hold office under the Crown. He has no party, no allies, no leader, no followers. j He still professes the Socialist faith, still 1 stands on the principle of “co-operation as opposed to competition.” But he is for maintaining individual enterprise and initiative, and the one object he would aim at is ‘‘to secure the most efficient form of management and organisation and to provide ■the greatest measure of social vvell.-being.” And he is ail for Lord Passfield’s “Inevitable Gradualness”

'. “such a Socialism as I 'have in mind will toe reached only stage by stage, so gradually •perhaps that men will not realise that great changes are taking place in their midst.” Lord Snowden knows bow a Socialist audience would receive such a forecast of the future, and he finds consolation in memcries cf the past and in the reflection that the LabouF'Pfifty'ls ’hot what it was. “ It has lost much of its idealistic quality and spiritual .fervour.” A fair commenfbere is that, if one judged him by his Autobiography, Lord Snowden also has lost those virtues. The eagerness with which lie tries to belittle men who were for many years iris intimate colleagues is-pathetic. His animus against Mr MacDonald and Mr Henderson is ■bitter and unrestrained. It is not accounted for by differences of opinion only, for in recent years he has differed sharply with Mr Thomas, for whom ho has no unkind word. Even if they have been his colleagues, be does net quarrel with men he likes, and ihe 'does like the Secretary for the Domin- “ I have said many hard, things to him and about him," lie remarks of Mr Churchill, "hut I am sure lie lias never home the 'slightest malice or ill-wili.” They slogged one another and both enjoyed it, and the joy was Shared By All Who Watched the Combat. But Lord Snowden is not content, in that spirit., to say “hard things” about Mr MacDonald and Mr Henderson; he rakes up from memory little indiscretions in private con.ference or foolish casual remarks in private for example, Henderson said about MacDonald and Thomas about Henderson during fierce strife for the plums of

office. This petty stuff is not worthy of a man of his great qualities. . The most important part of the. book is that which deals with the financial crisis of 1931. Lord .Snowden blames Mr MacDonald for having had a National Government in mind before the crisis came to a 'head. That is surely a case of wise forethought. Lord Snowden came very near to it himselfHe warned the House of Commons in February of the approaching storm. In a heart-to-heart talk with Labour members at a party meeling he made them feel that “their old foundations had been swept from under them." And now, after the lapse of three and a-half years, he declares ins own opinion that “the task was too big for one party and a united national effort would be needed to deal with the crisis. ’ In view of what he tells us of the events or the following August, can he really 'believe that the ‘‘united .national effort” could have worked successfully 'through the agency of the existing Government? The leaders of both the o'ther parties gave, the amplest assurances to the Prime Minister and the Chancellor of the Exchequer that they would support needed economies, and ■if the Cabinet had accepted the measures which Lord Snowden himself regarded as imperatively necessary, lire Labour Government might have gone on. It was only beLabour Ministers Funked Their Job that the National Government, was formed, and, with Lord Snowden’s powerful support, achieved an unprecedented triumph at the polls two months later. Lord Snowden now regards the National Government with aversion: that Mr MacDonald had a special responsibility for. its formation is ope of his grievances against the Prime Minister. But he does, not go back on anything he said at that time, and he continues to denounce Labour ex-Mims-ters for opposing in the country what they supported in the Cabinet. “The Labour Government had agreed to a reduction of 13 per cent in teachers’ salaries. The new Government proposed to reduce them by 10 per cent.- But this did not prevent the official spokesmen of the Labour. Party, who had agreed to the 15 per cent in 'the Labour Government, from making a violent attack upon the proposalto reduce teachers’ salaries at all.” • This exposure, 'relentlessly developed, 'contributed largely to the election result toy which, as lie curiously remarks, the Labour parly were not merely defeated but decimated.” It was, of course, decimation many times over. Don! Snowden fights the battle o’er again with gusto, turns his fire on his National colleagues from Hie lime he made up his mind lo part .from them,; smites the enemies left in his old camp, and throws bouquets here and there to frien'ds in all parties. lie admired -Mr Asquith,-gives warm praise to Mr Baldwin, and records Mr Neville 1 Chamberlain’s “passion for social reform.” But the choicest of his eulogies are reserved. for Lord Snowden. One ■ cannot read without a smile the Records or His Own Triumphs ! in debate. In every combat he was victorious; and it was all so easy. Even his first Budget was no difficult task: “I was as unperturbed as on an ordinary occasion.’ How he downed his opponents in the debate on the McKenna Duties! “ The .'Press next day" testified that his speech was “like an irresistible tide sweeping all before it”; his own testimony is that “the Tories squirmed and wriggled, and the more they did this Use farther I pressed the rapier into their bodies.” And after his second Budget in 193.1. “tlie scene when I sat down ■ was unprecedented in Parliamentary history.” This Autobiography is a valuable conlributon lo history of these post-war years. Exposure ol' the fierce personal rivalries in the two I,abour Governments will not edify the Socialist rank-and-file up and down the country, for they used to think their leaders would set a better example; but .that is of relatively small importance. The outstanding fact here demonstrated, is that the Labour Party is not free to govern, on a broad national basis.