FRANK REVIEW

Waikato Times, Volume 115, Issue 19270, 31 May 1934, Page 6

FRANK REVIEW

DISARMAMENT PARLEY SIR JOHN SIMON’S SPEECH. bridging the gap. (Official Wireless.l (Received May 31. 2.30 p.m.) RUGBY, May 30. Prospects of the Disarmament Conference were frankly reviewed D Sir John Simon when during the debate by the General Commission at Geneva, he expressed the views of the British Government on the present situation. Sir John Simon dealt at length with the recent diplomatic negotiations and asked what were the essential differences which divided the French and German points of view, as they emerged from the documents exchanged between the various powers. In a statement of its views on April 16 the German Government defined the rearmament for which it stipulated in the proposed convention, at the same time declaring it would agree to tiie postponement of a reduction of the armaments of other Powers until the end o} the fifth year of the ten years’ convention. If therefore an international agreement was to be reached either this claim must be modified or conceded. Germany claimed that the convention should accept a level of German armament higher than that provided in the peace treaties to the extent indicated on April 16. On the other hand it appeared that ■ France would desire to stand fast by the limits suggested at the meeting of the Bureau on October 14 with a modification contained in the French memorandum of January iThe suggestions of October propounded a basis which would have admitted no Immediate rearmament of Germany other than the increase to which she was entitled under the Peace Treaty. Germany rejected that suggestion, and the contrast between that proposal and the formulated requirements of Germany on April 16 was obvious.

Were those suggestions in the present circumstances a possible basis of international agreement? The conference would make no progress by avoiding or burying these crucial points beneath merely general observations. The only thing f/hat mattered now was an agreement—to find out If It were possible for a bridge to be built between conflicting views and what was the contribution they must respectively make to construct that bridge. ■The British Government had done its very best to be bridge builders. By, the end of this debate they ought to see more clearly where the foundations for .such a bridge must be laid if the gab was to -be closed. They could see already how overwhelmingly grave the consequences must be if after all this effort and these prolonged debates no bridge could be built. In tiie opinion of the British Government a draft convention which the conference had adopted as a basis still afforded the best solution. Realising however, the serious consequences of failure to reach an agreement they were determined to formulate a modification 'which was expressed in the memorandum of January 29. It contained proposals, regarded not as ideal but as most likely of acceptance. Close approximation between that memorand M m and the German declaration showed the differences were being narrowed. The British Government felt the tines of that memorandum were more likely to produce an agreement than any other concrete proposal. Indeed, die would go further. Unless something like them was agreed upon, then lie did not helieve the disarmament convention would be realised. The British Government was strengthened in that judgment by the most interesting memorandum pul forward by the Danish, Spanish, Norwegian, Swedish and Swiss delegations. He pointed out lhat, part one of the United Kingdom’s draft convention dealt with security along lines on which llicy might hope for the sympathy and co-operation of the United States. | Referring to M. Linvinoff’s dcclara- I tlon that the Disarmament Conference, I so far as the direct object of disarmament was concerned, was manifestly dead, hut should continue in being liecause some pact of security could lie evolved, Sir John Simon recalled that even in 1924 when the protocol was under discussion, no instrument of security was contemplated as coming into operation until a disarmament agreement, was reached. It would therefore be an entirely new departure to transform the conference called l’or the purpose of disarmament into a conference for devising plans of security on a basis that no disarmament at all was possible. The value of security pacts depended not on the fact of a promise, hut on the certainly, if the need arose, of positive performance by tlie signatories. From that point of view there might be a higher practical value in a limited undertaking by a guarantee like tiie Treaty of Locarno Ilian in some new unlimited and world-wide assurance. They had to choose between the chanco that remained of an agreement on the lines Indicated and a breakdown In tho whole of this poace effort, with consoquonces of unllmltod competition In armamonts and dangers to tho future of tho world which no man could measure. It was easy enough In say they were prepared to go on working, but if they were to-do justice to themselves and to their responsibilities those efforts must be such as could conduce to Ibe successful issue of their work. The time was long past when they could delude themselves in/o imagining lhat by the pious expression of a desire to reach an agreement they were promoting au agreement. . , . r ’ >r . r V

1 While we talk the world does not stand still,” declared Sir John. “ Tho British Government is still as convinced as ever that an international ■ agreement about armaments would be I tiie greatest contribution which could be made to the restoration of confidence and the consummation of peace, and realises to the full, the gravity of reaching no result; but while we will still co-operate in any new effort which really contains prospects of producing a general agreement, we will not lend ourselves to the Indefinite continuance of vague and inconclusive discussions, justified by nothing better than the sanguine hope that something in the way of a solution might still turn up—firstly, because we are convinced that such procedure would inflict great and increasing Injury on the League and on the whole conception of effective international action; secondly, because if the Disarmament Conference is kept in being purely for the purpose of debate but without any real hope or prospect of obtaining positive results, we are in effect debarring ourselves from whatever new effort might be needed.” Sir John most earnestly trusted the outcome of the debate might be to provide solid ground for believing that they could accomplish what they set out to do, and the British Government would exert itself to the uttermost to that end. Was there not material by combining such agreements as had already been reached with new concessions which must be made? In any case could not they put into effective shape the protocols and make them ready for signature on two or three more limited but most important matters, which appeared ripe for prompt and _ effective treatment —namely (1) chemical warfare; (2) budgetary publicity and (3) setting up of a permanent disarmament commission. This would be needed in connection with both the matters just mentioned.

LEAGUE AT STAKE. M. BARTHOU SPEAKS OUT. SIR JOHN SIMON CRITICISED. CONCORD PREJUDICED. Unitef Press AssrT.—Flee. Tel. FnnvrlgUi. (Received May 31, 2.30 p.m.) GENEVA, May 30. M. Barthou (France) following Sir John Simon, asserted that not only -the fate of the Disarmament Conference but tho League was at stake. The League was a vital necessity for France. The moment for reticence and complacence, and evon possible compromise was past. Referring to the danger of a race for aerial armaments, M. Barthou declared that France was not preoccupied over the air menace alone. “ Certain countries are favoured by their geographical position, being protected by land and sea, but France was exposed on all three dimensions. France was loyally carrying out the Paris agreement of 1925. He said: “We were asked not to give motor engines to those to whom they were prohibited, and we accordingly took firm and precise measures.” (This generally is regarded as a reference to the recent question in the House of Commons regarding aeroplane engines supplied to Germany.) M. Barthou then quoted Sir John Simon’s speech on October 14, 1933, adding: “Sir John Simon has just, confirmed Germany's withdrawal as unjustified. Do you think I should be silent? Shall not I consider the reality and gravity of the situation? Ido not bring charges agatnst anybody, but the truth is that Germany left the League. Is that a reason why the principle agreed to last October should no longer be valid?” “ Germany, has budgeted for a great increase in military expenditure. This includes certain mysterious hidden items. Is not this tantamount to asking the world what does it matter about guarantees of security? We have left rhe League and regained full liberty, strong in our strength and embarking on a polity of rearmament.” M. Barthou highly praised Mr Henderson and said the paternity of the plans was not Sir John Simon’s monopoly. Let me reassert France’s concrete plan of January 1, 1934, for a parallel and progressive reduction of armaments, accompanied by necessary guarantees of security.” He said: “I feel that, between the extreme optimists and. pessimists are men of action and goodwill, who arc bound to declare war upon war. and who will be able to confer the greatest and noblest of all boons upon humanity.’' It is generally felt, that M. Barthou’s sneecli seriously prejudices the possibility of Anglo-French disarmament accord. .