Lichnowsky's Attack on German Pre-war Policy.

Waikato Times, Volume 104, Issue 17585, 14 December 1928, Page 10

Lichnowsky's Attack on German Pre-war Policy.

LITERARY PIRATE

THE literary repercussions of the Great War have not yet died down. States--1-7- men, diplomats, soldiers, a.nd journal“Cn ists continue to give irfj,, evidence, and to Z/2 pass judgment on it,

I on the tactics of the I irmies, the responsibilities of statesmen for starting the conflict, and its profund effect on the finances of the world (says .Francis Deirden in the “Rand Mail”). Hitherto there has been no great work of fiction mirroring the deeper emotions, aroused by the war; no masterpiece, such as Tolstoy’s “War and Peace,” or Erclc-mann-Chatrian's “The Conscript”; but there has been a remarkable outpouring of official documents, apologias and confessions—magnificent raw material indeed for tho next-century historian. Tho most recent of these books is Prince Lichnowsky’s remarkable volume, "Heading for tho Abyss.” It is an elaborate work, a translation from the German edition published in Leipsig in November, 1927, under the title, "Auf dem (vege Zum Abgrund,” when it provoked i storm of hostile criticism throughout Germany. Its author, who was German Ambassador to London in 1914, was denounced by Dr Thimme and other official orotagonists of the old regime, as the Ambassauor who turned King’s evidence igainst his own country” during the war. These attacks quite overwhelmed him. Dn February 27, 1928, he collapsed and lied. As his translator asserts, he was “the last of Central Europe's grand seigaeurs, and a very notable gentleman.” The book amounts to a powerful indictment of German policy and politicians, md it records its author’s deep conviction ;hat Germany's mistaken schemes and her illiance with Austria were tho root causes of the World War. Kaiser’s Angry Annotations.

The author's anti-German views—expressed clearly in his foreword and in his despatches to his own Foreign Office —inspired tho ire of the Kaiser, who annotated tnese letters with most unkingly comment.

On July 29, 1914, when war with England was imminent, Prince Lichnowsky wrote from London: "At Sir Edward Grey's request I have just been to see him again. The Minister was quite calm, but very grave, and received me with the words that the situation was growing more and more acute."

The Kaiser annotates this passage thus: "The -worst and most scandalous piece of

Ex-Kaiser's Angry Marginal Comment.

English Pharisaism I've ever seen. I will never enter into a naval convention with such scoundrels."

To a later passage in this letter, in •which Sir Edward is reported as having told Lichnowskj? that he did not wish to be reproached with insincerity, the Kaiser appends the comment: "Aha! The common cheat!"

Tho outbreak of war looms closer. Lichnowsky's despatches reflect the gravity of things. The comments of the Kaiser become increasingly vitriolic. The Prince's last official letter, dated August 4, announces that "continuance of English neutrality can no longer be counted on." The Kaiser makes tho note: "So now ho is willing to believe it at last. Poor Lichnowsky !" The scribblings of tho War Lord include such marginal notes as the following: "My impression is that Mr Grey is a false dog who is afraid of his own cheapness and false policy." . . . "Tho rascal is crazy or an idiot." . . .' "England reveals herself in her true colours at the moment when she thinks that we are caught, and, so to speak, disposed of." These notes speak for themselves. Whatever else they are, they assuredly lack restraint and shed significant light on the mentality of a European Potentate with whom rested tremendous power either for peace or for war. Hoots of the Catastrophe.

When a man in an ambassadorial position, with tho inner doors of diplomacy open to him, sets himself passionately—as the broken-hearted Lichnowsky did some years before his death —to get at the rootcause of the World War, his judgments must command wide attention. When, therefore, Lichnowsky traces these origins back to' the personal dislike of Bismarck for Prince Gortschakoff, the Czar's Iron Chancellor, we naturally wonder how lie reaches so dramatic a conclusion. If correct, it reveals tho far-reaching results of apparently innocuous trifles in mid-nine-teenth century diplomacy. Ho writes:— "From 1875 his (Bismarck's) hatred of Prince Gortschakoff . . . induced the Dictator to er.ter into an alliance with the effete old firm known as Austria. Nowhere but in Berlin, not even in Vienna, was tho dynastic and mediaeval congeries of nations taken seriously. Bismarck's mistakes dominated the whole age of tho Epigones, as the Post-Bismarckian statesmen are called, and the Master's errors were developed into a system that finally led the country to catastrophe." An allegation this of immense significance !

Developing his attack, Lichnowsky urges that the mistake made by Bismarck in permitting his personal aversion for Gortschakoff to influence his actions in international affairs led Germany away from an alliance with Russia, and brought about the Franco-Russian alliance. In other words, when Bismarck turned to Austria ramshackle and effete Russia then turned to France.

After that came the follies of the Epigones and the sabre-rattlers. Lichnowsky maintains that after 1880:

"Germany, although by far the strongest Power on the Continent, insisted on keeping the world in a constant state of nervousness with her everlasting new grants for army and navy, with provocative speeches about the 'mailed fist' and 'shining armour,' and with swashbuckling rodomontades and fan-faronnades of all descriptions. To crown all, she refused to listen to any proposals made at the Peace Conference for tho limitatioin- of armaments. One crisis followed another, each leaving our neighlxmrs no choice but to submit to humiliation or to fight. Abroad, these everlasting crises created the impression that a new appeal to arms would be by no means unwelcome to our rulers. We thus induced tho other Powers to forego their old differences, and forced them to come to terms with one another in order to safeguard themselves against tho 'German Peril.' This process led silly people (in Germany) to delieve that we w-ero being 'hemmed in' and 'encircled.' "

The truth is, it would seem, not very I remote from this judgment. Prince Lich- ] nowsky, coming from a long line of diplomats and thinkers, belonged to a family whose name is mentioned as one of the Patrons of Beethoven a century ago, whoso record is associated uninterruptedly with culture and humanism—Prince Lichnowsky was drawn closely to Earl Grey, the dominating figure in the British Cabinet at tho time of the declaration of war. in August, 1914. Tho two men were intimate friends. Lichnowsky realised that England had never contemplated any war of aggression against Germany, and that she was not the arch-schemer, decried so ceaselessly by the Kaiser, by Dr Thimme, and by tho Hcrr von Holstein, who staged the Moroccan crisis. His outspoken denunciation of German Foreign Policy is per contra a tribute to the comparative ingenuousness (if such a word is permissible in Diplomacy) of that nf England. In telling the truth, he, suffered ciomething akin to the obloquy. The inherent nobility of his character is disclosed in the following note appended to the volume: —

"At Prince Lichnowsky's wish all sums accruing to him from the publication of this book in Germany and abroad are to be placed at the disposal of homes for German soldiers blinded in the war."

This indeed might fittingly stand as the author's own elegy and epitaph.