The Waikato Times With which Is Incorporated The Waikato Argus. THURSDAY, MARCH 8, 1923. BRITISH NAVAL POLICY.

Waikato Times, Volume 97, Issue 15183, 8 March 1923, Page 4

The Waikato Times With which Is Incorporated The Waikato Argus. THURSDAY, MARCH 8, 1923. BRITISH NAVAL POLICY.

The far reaching result of the Washington Conference of over twelve months ago is recalled by the appearance of the latest volume of Brassey's Naval and Shipping Annual. Almost every chapter of the naval section of this authoritative work deals to a greater or a less degree with some aspect of the decisions of that Con. ference and their influence on -the world's navies. In the chapter dealing with the Royal Navy it is shown that ,the most profound influences upon British naval policy last year were the Washington Treaty and the report' of the Geddes Committee having for its object a diminution in the national expnditure. It has been Well said that the British Navy has been "scraped to the bone," not only in ships but in man-power. There are many critics of this retrenchment and opponents of the Washington Conference decisions, who see in this cutting nd scraping a danger to the Empire. This opinion was crystallised by Admiral of the Fleet, Lord Wester Wemyss, formerly First Sea Lord, who remarked that "for Great Britain voluntarily to resign that naval supremacy which to obtain and to maintain she has fought and striven for more than 300 years, and the principle of which has ever been the first and foremost article of her political faith, is an act of renunciation unparalleled, we believe, in history. Even though it be to share tlie command of the sea with a Power from whom she expects nothing but friendship, and however expedient such a step may be, it can only fill with regret and even dismay those who realise its potentialities." This criticism, however, is largely disarmed when it is remembered that as long ago as March, 1920 —twelve months before the Washington Con., ference was thought of —the British Government had laid down as its ""policy the "One Power Standard" —i.e., that our navy should not be inferior in strength to that of any other Power. Viewed in the light of this decision the Naval Limitation Treaty signed at Washington simply confirms that policy by placing the British Navy on an equality with that of the United States, and, making it superior to that of, Japan, in the ratio of 55 —3 in capital ships. Moreover, the Treaty imposes restrictions on the size and armament of capital ships, aircraft carriers and cruisers. Not only, therefore, is the signing of the Treaty not an "act of. renunciation" on the part, of Britain, but it is only necessary to consider what the maintenance of the One Power Standard would have meant to her had there "been no Washington Conference. On the conclusion of the war, as Sir Doveton Sturdee points out, the British Navy was, for the moment, left without a rival. The Admiralty at once began to demobilise officers and men and to; reduce the active fleet. All new construction was stopped, except the completion ofthe Hood (a pre.Jutland design) and a number of small ships. In the Navy Estimates of 1919-20 and 1920-21 no new construction of capital ships was included. While this was so, and Britain was condemning and scrapping many of the older ships as fast as the ship-breakers could deal with them,» the United States and Japan were pushing on their vast programmes of capitaL ships so that in about 1924 their navies would have had many "post. Jutland" ships superior to anything in the British Navy and embodying all the Improvements suggested by the experience of the war. Britain was therefore faced with the necessity of a vast and continuous expenditure if she were to maintain the barest One Power Standard. In the Estimates of 1921-22 the first step in this direction was taken by the decision to build four huge battlecruisers at a cost of some £30,000,000 to replace eight older ships. In other l , words, a new "race in naval armaments" was virtually in progress, with Britain reluctantly competing to keep on even terms with, other countries. More than that, as is shown in the chapter in "Brassey" dealing with the "Influence of the Washington Conference on Naval Design," by Sir George Thurston, an eminent naval architect, who argues that the naval treaty is "an artificial restriction on the progress of scientific achievement," the tendency would have been to build even larger ships at ever increasing cost. To incorporate fully the teachings of (lie war in capital ship design it would, he holds, have been essential to increase the size to 57,000 tons as against the limit of 35,000 tons imposed by the Washingtoft Treaty. The burden of Sir George Thurston's article is that the •"realisation of the ideal battleship has for the next ten years been ruled out of court, v and he devotes himself to considering how best the principal factors of armament, speed and pro. duction can be embodied in the 35,000 ton ship. In the face of all this, it is easy to see what the Washington Treaty means to the world in general, and particularly to Britain, who, alone, has cut her navy to the requirements of the agreement, which is still awaiting ratification by France and Italy, America and Japan, meanwhile "marking time." When the Treaty is finally ratified Britain will have achieved the'One Power Standard at a minimum cost, of two new ships which arc to'replaor four older vessels in 1925. If. unhappily. i| should not [be ratified, we [all*to nncond uiace or

must adopt the alternative already outlined of large and continuaus expenditure upon naval armament-