NAVAL OUTLOOK

Waikato Times, Volume 94, Issue 14775, 14 October 1921, Page 3

NAVAL OUTLOOK

POSITION OF BRITAIN, ——~-* THE CAPITAL SHIP. “KERNEL AND PIVOT.” As the expounder of the Admiralty’s policy, of naval shipbuilding, Lieut,Colonel L, S, Amcry, now Financial Secretary to the Admiralty, is considered to have explained that policy with great clearness and with marked effect. He was asking in the House of Commons for a vote of something approaching twelve millions (£1i,845,000 to be exact), and his chief points and conclusions were:— The Grand Fleet is practically obsolete.. There are under construction whole battle fleets of ships of a type incomparably more powerful than anything afloat at the battle of Jutland. in face of tlic shattering fire of sucli ships, all the earlier design are liable to instant destruction. Japan has eight of these under construction, and is voting for eight more, and by 1925 America will have 12 of these supreme engines of war. Equality with the naval strength of any other Power was the minimum British standard. Colonel Amcry emphasised that the policy of laying down four capital ships was not one of competition or challenge, but simply the replacing of obsolete ships already relegated to the Disposals Board. A few hours of actual fighting in the war had been sufficient to revolutionise our ideas as to armament and design. The Grand Fleet, not only by the actual wear and tear of war, but by the experience of the war, had, become in a largo measure obsolete. Great Britain bad only one post-Jutland battleship, the Mood, and she was only equipped with loin guns. Not only was there no challenge in the Government’s modesl programme of four now capital ships to be completed by 1935, but, the Admiralty were open to the charge that they wore allowing the Navy to fall below Hie standard announced by Hie Government in March, 1920. An Admitted Risk, The risk was only justified by two considerations: —, (1) The general financial and international situation; and (2) the desirability of avoiding any step that would invite fresh competition in armaments. (Hear, hear.l It was not likely that the' oilier Great Powers who would be represented at the Washington Conference would offer to scrap ships already built or building, and in view of their programme it w'as obvious that the laying down of our four ships, or even twice that number, could not affect in any way the problem before the Conference. On tlic human and personal side he believed this country stood well ahead. Indeed, but for their reliance on our superiority in that respect the Board of Admiralty would never have been prepared to take the admitted risks they were taking by our modest programmes of replacement, Armed with 16in Guns. The four new ships would be battle-cruisers- of- the Hood type, but with improvements in the matter of protection and armaments embodying the experience of the war to ename them to hold their own with any vessels of their class in other navies. The fact that the American and Japanese ships laid down since the Hood had been equipped with 16m guns had obliged this country to follow their example, and our new ships would, therefore, be armed with l6in and not 15in guns. Their dimensions would be such as to keep within limits which would obviate the necessity of any larger docking or other accommodation being provided for them other than that already existing. The present demand for the appointment of a special committee on design had arisen mainly in connection "with a particular feature, bulge protection. Tlic evidence on that question had already been adequately examined. There had been the most careful and searching investigations ns regarded capital ships, the universally accepted conclusion being mat Hie capital ship was still the basis on which sea power must rest. The real issue had been whether the submarine and IDc airship had reached the point at which the surface shin must become out of dale. But Hint point had not been reached, and until it was the capital ship must remain Hie kernel and pivot of naval warfare. Security of the Empire. Colonel Amcry remarked that when dealing wills the question of naliona) security. Hie Prime Ministers of Mm Empire had to keep in view not only the problems of naval strategy, tint the constitutional issues involved in Imperial eo-upcralion. and Ihe still wider issues of international celadons. On July 27 they passed the following resolution: "That while recognising the. necessity of co-opera-tion among the various parts 0( the Empire to provide such nu\ai defence as may prove to he essential for see.uril v, and while holding that equality of naval strength and n-ixal power is a minimum standard for lha l , purpose, this Conference is of opinion dint the method and extent of such co-operation are matters for Hie final determination of Hie, several Parliaments concerned, and Hint any recommendations thereon should be deferred until after the conference, on disarmament.” "Thai, resolution,” Colonel Amcry declared, amid approving cheers, “is an important landmark In British naval policy.” Their policy was based on the most anxious reward for economy and the most scrupulous care to avoid any suggestion Unit we were giving justification for the criticism that wc were engaging in a renewed race in armaments, but they were anxious and resolved not to let down Hie S'- vy. on which our prosperity and freedom had been founded, and by which aioao wc could endure