The Waikato Times With which is incorporated The Waikato Argus. SATURDAY, JULY 30, 1921. THE RUSSIAN TRAGEDY

Waikato Times, Volume 94, Issue 14713, 30 July 1921, Page 4

The Waikato Times With which is incorporated The Waikato Argus. SATURDAY, JULY 30, 1921. THE RUSSIAN TRAGEDY

The condition of affairs in Europe is not pleasant to contemplate. If the reports that come from Russia are true, we are on the eve of a world’s tragedy. The statement that millions of the population must necessarily starve may possibly be exaggerated, but it is unquestionable that the suffering and the loss of life will be very great. The condition that has arisen is one that has been maturing for several years. The old autocratic Government was wretched inefficient, and the Russian moujik, or small farmer, was left much In his own devices, and in consequence was uneducated and employed methods that were out of date. Then came the war, which was a severe trial for the most highly-organised and wealthy Stales. It was small wonder that Russia collapsed. Then, after a. brief period of unsetllemenl, the Bolsheviks seized power, and have attempted to govern on Communist principles. To use a picturesque description of Mr tl. G. Wells, they thought they had captured the ship ol state and found they had boarded a derelict. Whatever form of government had been tried in Russia after (he revolution, the country must have suffered. There was nothing iu communism which would save them from past mistakes. Even Hie communism was not consistent, for the peasants refused from the first to hold land in common, and insisted on their own farms, and on possessing the titles to them. The Bolshevik Government, however, enabled them to seize the property of the larger owners and divide it up. and U was the dread of

this operation being reversed that Ted to the peasants’ opposition to the various anti-Bolshevik enterprises. The question was how to induce the peasants to grow food enough to support themselves and feed the towns. The prices were controlled, and offered no inducement to the peasants to increase their crops. The factories did not produce enough goods to provide for their small requirements. At first the Bolshevik soldiers seized food where they could not buy it, but such a course did not encourage the production of more. The peasant gradually decreased his j crops, partly no doubt through lack i of Implements, but also to some extent because he fell no confidence that he would be paid for what he sold. It is not possible to grow an exact amount of corn, as a good or bad season will moan a greater or lesser yield. Wo are not told that Russia is suffering from a drought, but as that is the condition in parts of Europe as well as in England, it is possible that it has extended to Russia and is partly responsible for the impending disaster. It is said that the Bolsheviks are panicstricken at the prospect, which threatens to bring their Government to the ground, although there are no signs of any alternative Government. It is reported, however, that the Germans expect the downfall to take place in about 12 months’ time, and that a group of banks have been obtaining options to purchase at a low price estates which contain minerals and coal. Such options would of course be useless if the Bolsheviks remain in power, but if a reactionary Government succeeds, we might well see a great extension of German enterprise in the country. If the moujik can be brought to see the position he may decide to continue to support the Bolsheviks, as the feelmg against Germany was strong, and probably is so still. It would be pleasant if we could think that Russia would turn to Britain for assistance in this time of stress, but it is to be feared that our action in supporting antiBolshevik attacks has created a resentment against us. The poss'hility of ahy close union between Germany and Russia is sufficient to create the utmost uneasiness in all other parts of the world, for it automatically cancels the advantages of sea-power which decided the late war, and has assured Britain’s supremacy in the world during the nineteenth century. W r e have, however, provided both Germany and Russia with a motive to draw together, in the support given to Poland, auc! if this is supplemented by an economic penetration of Russia by German capital and German technical skill, we may well see these countries in close union. The wisest course would seem to be an endeavour to cope with the conditions that are threatened in Russia, in order to prevent the country falling into utter anarchy. Unfortunately such a course is far from easy. To supply food for millions of impoverished people would be an immense undertaking under the most favourable conditions, and here the conditions are all unfavourable. The surplus food does not exist, though doubtless large quantities could be procured if a sufficient price could be paid. Every country, however, is short of money, and England as much so as pny; but if this were overcome the difficulties of transport, remain. A large fleet of steamers would be required to convey the food, and these require ports at which it can be landed, and railways by which it can be distributed, as well as an organisation to manage the business. The Indian Government provides itself with an elaborate plan of campaign to deal with famines, but nothing of the sort exists in Russia. In spite, however, of the difficulties and the cost involved in a great attempt to succour the starving people, it would probably be the wisest course to make the attempt. Thirty or forty millions spent in that way would do much to cancel the harm done by the hundred millions spent in financing anti-Bol-shevik enterprises, and would enable us to exercise a guiding hand in the formation of whatever Government succeeds that which is now in power. It will be many years before Russia can hope to attain anything approaching prosperity, and if we definitely stand aside it will be Germany that will assist, and Germany that will reap the reward. Such a policy may be termed quixotic, but would prove wisest in the long run. The collapse of the Bolshevik power, if not followed by the creation of a Government at least sufficiently strong to repel invasion, will create another vast area to be scrambled for by the Powers, with the inevitable result of farther war and further disaster. The expenditure of forty millions to prevent such a tragedy is prudence itself compared to the expenditure of the same sum to hold Mesopotamia, and of even larger sums to maintain our hold of the various countries in the Near East.