THE MARCH OFFENSIVE

Waikato Times, Volume 89, Issue 13895, 22 October 1918, Page 5

THE MARCH OFFENSIVE

SIR DOUGLAS HAIG'S DESPATCH. THE DIFFICULTIES EXPLAINED. TOO LONG A FRONT: TOO FEW MEN FOG GIVES INITIAL SUCCESS. 58 BRITISH DIVISIONS. BRING 100 GERMAN TO A STOP. (Australian, N.Z. and Reuter.) Received October 22, 9 a.m LONDON, October 21. A dispatch from Sir Douglas Haig, dated July 20, covering the operations sin<i» the first week in December last, has been published. Its chief interest lies in Sir Douglas Haig's account of the German offensive on March 21.

He begins by emphasising that the difficulty created by the transit from an offensive to a defensive policy necessitated by the collapse of Russia was accentuated by the reorganisation of the British divisions from a thirteen battalion to a ten battalion basis, and by the extension of the British front to Barisis. Meanwhile large reserves which the enemy was able to create by transferring numerous divisions from the East enabled him to carry out extensive training of units to complete his establishment.

The Intelligence Department- on March 19 reported that the enemy would probablv attack the Arras-Saint Quentin front on the 20th or 21st, The British dispositions to meet the expected offensives were as complete as time and the trooos available" could make them. General Gough's sth Army then held 42 miles of front from just' south of Barisis to Gouzeaucourt. The number of divisions in the line only allowed of an average of one dvision to 607") vards of front. General Byng's 3rd Anrv held 27 miles of front, from north of Gouzeaucourt to south of Gavrelle, the average length of front held by each division being about 4700 \ ards. Altogether at least f>4 German divisions participated in the operations on March 21. a number considerably exceeding the total forces composing tho entire British Army in France. The total British force on the original battlefront on the morning of March 21 was 29 infantry divisions, of which 19 infantry divisions were in the line The British plans had previously been laid to meet a possible enemy attack with the whole enemy's sinking force. The enemy's initial success was due to fog. Throughout the retirement there was no panic. The units retreated stubbornly until they turned or were threatened with isolation. Wherever tl neniy attempted a frontal attack he was beaten off with loss.

The organisation of General Carey's remarkable composite force was the work of General Philip Grant, the army's chief engineer, who handed over the force to General Carey because he himself might not be sparable.

General Foch assumed the superior control on March 26. by which date the French were heavily engaged.

The, despatch explains that Bray sur Somme was abandoned by a misunderstanding, enabling the enemy to secure several gains.

With reference to General dough's removal, the despatch states that after confronting for a week overwhelming superiority which was a tremendous strain for General Gough and his staff. General Rawlinson resumed his old command and General Gough was entrusted with the important task of constructing new defences in view of further possibilities. Summarising the cause of the retirement of the right wing, Sir Douglas Haig says: '-The forces at the sth Army's disposal were inadequate to meet and hold such an attack. The extent of front made it impossible to furnish adequate reserves at all points, while there had not been sufficient time to complete the defences in the new regions. The dry season made the Oise and Somme passable, necessitating extra troops for their defence, but these could not be spared."

Sir Douglas Haig gives the figures of the comparative strength, and says that in the Somme battle, by the end of March 42 British infantry and three cavalry divisions had brought to a standstill 73 German divisions. In the Lys battle, by April I.'?, the enemy employed 42 against 25 divisions. In six weeks to the end of April the enemy employed 109 against 55 British infantry and three cavalry divisions. At no lime during thOißomme battle was there anything approaching a breakdown of command or morale, despite the extreme trials.