GERMAN PLANS IN THE EAST.

Waikato Times, Volume 88, Issue 13488, 19 May 1917, Page 2 (Supplement)

GERMAN PLANS IN THE EAST.

(By Edmund Dane.) Recently the German Government is reported to have concluded a new Economic Convention with the Government of Turkey. The Government oi Turkey is in this position—that without Gorman support it would collapse. ril a cli( l uo manipulated from Berlin. The reason why .this Economic Convention is interesting a t the moment is this. It shows that the German Government is reckoning on being able to got out of the war before its forces' have suffered complete military defeat. The grounds of that official belief at Berlin are:—(l) That the U-boat campaign will before long place England under a pinch so severe as to tcrce as to accept Germany's terms. (2) That France is exhausted. (3) That German intrigues will prevail in Russia, and (4; That the pressure of neutral opinion joined with so-called nacificism in Enc land will compel a halt. Now, the Convention with Turkev plainly implies a confidence in maintaining and consolidating Germanv's hold in the Balkans. It is true that with the British on the Tigris, the Russians in the Caucasus and Armenia and in command of the Black Sea. and the •Allies at Salonica, this scheme for the exploitation of the Balkans and Turkev is- off its legs. The Germans can send through certain munitions and other equipment to Turkey bv rail, and to Bulgaria by way of the Danube, but that is a very different thin? from meeting the necessities "of ordinarv commerce

Ordinary commence has to be carried on at a profit or it wifl not be carried on at all. The great main route? marked out by geographical convenience must be open to it. Just at present all those great main routes are blocked. If. however, thev can wind up the war short of complete military defeat the Germans relv on getting us

promise.. It is a strange conception if the interests of humanity which is at the same time a plea tor'the continued existence of the German war machine and ail the consequences of that existence

Tu the plain and ordinary not ■ieli-betcoled by some pet •ism" or in other, this is too manifest for contention. It happens, also, that as time goes on the probabilities of Germany's defeat in the field can be .dealt with in a manner more clear-cut. The situation may be summed up in the ;<tatcflient that the enemy has chosen to stake everything on keeping up a show of energy for a limited period, relying on peace in the torm of a conipromis.providing a way of escape either during that period or at the end of it For Germany any compromise would bo to that extent "a victory. We can therefore see why all other considerations should be subordinated to bringing about such a wind-up. It not onlymeans saving as much'as possible—the'v still think at Berlin a great deal —out of the wreck; it means—which is the supreme concern—preserving the HohetusoUern dynasty.

The term 'limited'' is legitimately applicable to the period during which the show oi energy can be kept up, because that shoyv of energy is itself Btrictly conditioned (1) by the length of the front which the enemy has through his "wall map"' propaganda condemned himself to hold; (2) by the numbers available for that purpose; (3) bv the labor resources available to keep those numbers afoot; and (4) bv the food supply and attitude of the' Central European population. Meanwhile the length of fronts is a condition at once definite and measurable. Immobilising by far the greater part of the enemy's forces as garrisons, it cuts down correspondingly his power to attack. The enemy cannot reduce the length of these fronts. Every assertion to that effect is untrue. AH ho can do is to resort to one expedient after another for minmising thes» garrisons. He had been compelled to fall back on such expedients for a long time past. This process began very early in 1916. Since last June it has been more than ever active.

While, then, the enemy is. by a show of activity playing for a way out bv a compromise, he has at the same time to face the fixity, extent, and demand* of the fronts; and. since the s-how of activity has during the past six months and more been kept going by lessening or pinching those demands, it is as evident as anything can be that when the show of activity is played out ihe effective defence of the fronts will be plaved out coineidently. That is a necessary and indeed inevitable result of this trying to kill two birds with one stone. Let us presume that there is to be no compromise, and that the period during which the show of activity can be kept up has reached its term." The garrisons have been reduced a 9 low as it has been possible to reduce them: the defensive sacrificed to the offensive! The offensive has failed in its aim, and the defensive has- been crippled. If there if> no way out by compromise the alternative is a military crash, and it will be swift in its developments. This is the real explanation of events. On our side, for example, the fighting in Roumania is for the wearing <iown of the enemy forces. It is now being accompanied in the Russian operation* round Riga, and also on the west front, by a systematic "feeling" or branding of the German lines. They are beginning to ring hollow. Not very long ago, some months at most, such trench raids as have Jately been taking place on the west would have led to strongly organised resistance. Our "bushrangers," as it is, damage the German defences extensively and experience but few casualties.

Behind all the enemy's show of activity the military crash draws on.